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2021 (3) TMI 1448 - HC - Indian LawsPrinciples of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata - Challenge to preliminary notifications bearing No. CI 196 SPQ 98 dated 19.12.1998, 29.01.2003 issued under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 and declaration and final notifications bearing No. CI 196 SPQ 98 dated 08.04.2003 and 05.07.2003 issued under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act - seeking declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KIAD Act had lapsed as per Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Seeking quashing of the acquisition notifications - HELD THAT - The filing of the writ petition seeking relief of quashing of acquisition notifications cannot be reconsidered and the writ petition has been rightly dismissed on the principles of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata. In this regard, it would be useful to note that this very appellant/petitioner had approached this Court in WP. Nos. 43358-59/2003. The said writ petition was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 18.12.2003, inasmuch as 40% of the acquired lands i.e. the acquisition of the lands for township, construction of conventional centre are concerned was quashed. Insofar as 60% of the lands sought to be acquired for the formation of peripheral road, link road, service road and ramps are concerned were upheld. Seeking a declaration that the acquisition of the lands in question had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act - HELD THAT - Section 24 of the 2013 Act creates a new right in the land owners. For the exercise of said right, certain conditions have to exist, the most significant of them being, the initiation of proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, the said words must be given a natural interpretation and not an expansive or wide interpretation, so as to extend the right under Section 24 even in respect of and owners whose lands are subjected to acquisition under any State enactment, such as the KIAD Act or BDA Act or Karnataka Urban Development Act, 1987 (KUDA Act). In fact, the Parliament itself has been conscious of the fact that 2013 Act repeals and substitutes only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central enactment or for that matter any other State enactment dealing with acquisition of lands. Section 24 does not take within its scope nor does it apply to, acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of any other enactment particularly, State enactment, such as, KIAD Act, BDA Act or KUDA Act. The said Section is restricted to only those acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 only. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the land owner would be entitled to the deeming provision regarding lapse of acquisition and not otherwise. In view of the above catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings (P) Limited, 2011 (1) TMI 1322 - SUPREME COURT BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS. VERSUS THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS. 2018 (8) TMI 2149 - SUPREME COURT and in Girnar Traders 2011 (1) TMI 1343 - SUPREME COURT , reliance cannot be placed on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in H.N. Shivanna 2012 (11) TMI 1333 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT to hold that in the absence of any time limit fixed under the provisions of KIAD Act for passing of an award, it would have to be made within a reasonable time, which is two years and if the award has not been passed within the said time, it would lead to grant of declaration that the acquisition has lapsed. Therefore, the petitioners herein cannot be granted relief on the basis of the dictum of the Division Bench in H.N. Shivanna and reliance placed on the said judgment by learned counsel for the petitioners is of no assistance to them. This is because the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana 2011 (2) TMI 1167 - SUPREME COURT and Anasuya Bai 2017 (1) TMI 1828 - SUPREME COURT rendered under the provisions of the KIAD Act hold the field. Similarly, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Offshore Holdings (P) Limited 2011 (1) TMI 1322 - SUPREME COURT and Bangalore Development Authority which are rendered under the provisions of the BDA Act, 1976 are binding on this Court. The learned Single Judge was right in holding that the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, is not applicable to an acquisition proceeding initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act. Hence, there are no merit in the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
Issues Involved:
1. Legality and correctness of the order dated 25.04.2018. 2. Lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act). 3. Suppression of material facts by the appellant. 4. Applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to acquisitions under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (KIAD Act). Detailed Analysis: 1. Legality and Correctness of the Order Dated 25.04.2018: The appellant challenged the order of the learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not apply to acquisitions under the KIAD Act. The Single Judge referred to the Supreme Court judgment in the case of State of Karnataka and Another vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others, which upheld the acquisition for the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP). 2. Lapse of Acquisition Proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act: The appellant sought a declaration that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. However, the court held that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is not applicable to acquisitions under the KIAD Act, as clarified in the Supreme Court judgment in Anasuya Bai. The court emphasized that Section 24 of the 2013 Act applies only to acquisitions initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act, 1894), and not to those under the KIAD Act. 3. Suppression of Material Facts by the Appellant: The appellant had previously challenged the same acquisition process in earlier writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The appellant did not disclose these facts in the current writ petition, leading to a conclusion of suppression of material facts. The court cited several judgments, including K.D. Sharma vs. Steel Authority of India Limited, to emphasize that non-disclosure of material facts is a serious matter and can lead to the dismissal of the petition. 4. Applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to Acquisitions under the KIAD Act: The court reiterated that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not apply to acquisitions under the KIAD Act. The KIAD Act is a distinct enactment with a different purpose, primarily aimed at the establishment and orderly development of industrial areas. The court referred to several Supreme Court judgments, including M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka and Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. vs. Bangalore Development Authority, to support this conclusion. The court also noted that the 2013 Act repeals only the LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central or State enactment dealing with acquisition. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the learned Single Judge's decision that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not apply to acquisitions under the KIAD Act. The court also highlighted the appellant's suppression of material facts and the principle of res judicata, which barred the appellant from challenging the acquisition process again.
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