2017 (1) TMI 521 - HC - Indian Laws

Joint trial - offences in relation to dishonour of two cheques of the same date - Held that - As per Section 219 Cr.PC, only three offences of the same kind within one year may be charged together. Thus, even if this court directs clubbing of the complaints together, there being seven cheques which got dishonoured, the petitioner will still have to face trials in three complaint cases as against five complaint cases. However, to seek this relief the petitioner ought to have approached the court in the first instance itself and not at a belated stage. The complaints were filed on 3rd January 2014 whereafter the petitioner was summoned and it entered appearance. However, the applications seeking clubbing of the complaints were filed only on 5th February 2016 after the right of the petitioner to cross examine was closed. Even though the contention of the petitioner is that the purpose of joint trial is to expedite the same however as noted above the right of the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses had already been closed which was recalled and last opportunity granted. Hence at this stage, it is evidence that the application moved for clubbing the five complaints is not in expediency of a speedy trial but to further delay the trial. Finding no illegality in the order impugned warranting interference; this court is not required to exercise its discretionary remedy under Section 482 CPC.

Summary

Issues:
1. Clubbing of complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
2. Violation of Sections 219, 220, and 223 of Cr.P.C.
3. Application of principles for joint trial under Cr.P.C.
4. Discretionary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Issue 1: Clubbing of complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
The petitioner sought clubbing of five complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as they were based on the same outstanding liability from a single transaction involving bounced cheques. The learned Trial Court dismissed the applications for clubbing, citing differences in the particulars of the cheques, return memos, and statutory legal notices in each case, leading to added confusion. The court emphasized that each dishonored cheque and subsequent non-payment constitutes a separate cause of action, hence clubbing the complaints would not serve any useful purpose. The court relied on legal precedents to support its decision, highlighting the need for separate trials for distinct offenses.

Issue 2: Violation of Sections 219, 220, and 223 of Cr.P.C.
The petitioner contended that the impugned order violated Sections 219, 220, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which allow for joint trials when offenses are connected or part of the same transaction. The petitioner argued that clubbing the complaints would facilitate a speedy trial, aligning with the mandate of the Negotiable Instruments Act and constitutional provisions. However, the respondents argued against clubbing, emphasizing that each dishonored cheque constitutes a separate cause of action, and the offenses cannot be amalgamated. Legal precedents and principles from the Cr.P.C. were cited to support this argument.

Issue 3: Application of principles for joint trial under Cr.P.C.
The court analyzed Sections 219, 220, and 223 of the Cr.P.C., which provide exceptions to the general rule of separate trials for distinct offenses. These provisions allow for joint trials in specific circumstances to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, ensure expediency, and prevent conflicting judgments. The court highlighted that the discretionary nature of these provisions aims to prevent prejudice to any party and expedite the legal process. Legal precedents were cited to demonstrate the application of these principles in deciding whether to club complaints or conduct separate trials based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Issue 4: Discretionary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
The court considered the discretionary power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to interfere with the impugned order. The respondents argued that there was no illegality or perversity in the order, urging the court not to intervene. Legal precedents were cited to support this argument. The court noted that the purpose of a joint trial is to expedite proceedings, but in this case, the petitioner's belated application for clubbing the complaints appeared to be a dilatory tactic. The court emphasized that the right to cross-examine witnesses had already been closed, indicating that the application for clubbing was not in the interest of expediting the trial but rather to delay it further. Consequently, finding no illegality warranting intervention, the court dismissed the petitions and applications.