2017 (3) TMI 1420 - HC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay - power of Magistrate - Petition u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Held that - Condonation of delay is within the discretion of the Magistrate. Nothing could have been achieved by the complainant by not filing complaint in time. He filed the complaint within eight days from the date of receipt of information from the post office. Thus, even if it is presumed that the complaint was not filed within 30 days from the date of expiry of period of 15 days given to the accused under section 138 of the Act, the fact remains that the delay of around 2 months was caused due to aforesaid circumstances. There is the record and the law is amended in view of the aforesaid probabilities and power is given to the Magistrate to condone the delay. In view of the possibility mentioned, the Court is expected to use this provision liberally. This Court holds that the Sessions Court has not committed any error in holding that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

Summary

Issues:
1. Condonation of delay in filing private complaints under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2. Interpretation of sections 138 and 142 of the Act regarding the period for filing complaints.
3. Application of the proviso to section 142(1)(b) for condonation of delay.
4. Judicial discretion in condoning delay and the requirement of sufficient cause.
5. Comparison with previous court judgments on similar matters.

Analysis:

1. The judgment involves two proceedings challenging the decisions of Magistrate on delay condonation applications in private complaints under section 138 of the Act. The Sessions Court found sufficient cause for delay as the acknowledgment receipt was not returned by the post office to the complainant, indicating the period of limitation had not started.

2. The complaints were filed within eight days of the post office informing the complainant about the service of notice on the accused, well within the statutory time frame. Sections 138 and 142 of the Act were analyzed together, emphasizing the need for the complainant to have knowledge of the receipt of notice by the accused to determine the cause of action for filing the complaint.

3. The proviso to section 142(1)(b) allows the Magistrate to condone delay if sufficient cause is shown. The Court held that the complainant's reliance on the post office's online information was not necessary, as there is no legal requirement for such action. The discretion to condone delay lies with the Magistrate, and in this case, the delay was justified due to circumstances beyond the complainant's control.

4. The judgment highlighted the importance of liberal interpretation of the provision for condonation of delay, especially when the delay is minimal and justified. The Court upheld the Sessions Court's decision of finding sufficient cause for condonation of delay, emphasizing that nothing substantial would have been achieved by filing the complaint late.

5. Previous court judgments cited by the counsel for the applicant were distinguished based on different factual circumstances. The Court found no error in the Sessions Court's decision and dismissed both applications, emphasizing that interference was not warranted. The judgment concluded by upholding the decisions of the Sessions Court in allowing the revisions and dismissing the applications challenging the delay condonation orders.