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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (IAC) to issue penalty notices. 2. Validity of the transfer of cases under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act. 3. Interpretation and application of Sections 123, 124, and 129 of the Income Tax Act. 4. Procedural fairness and the right to be heard. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner (IAC) to Issue Penalty Notices: The respondent-firm was assessed for the assessment year 1962-63, and during the proceedings, the Income Tax Officer (ITO) issued a notice for concealed income and referred the penalty proceedings to the IAC under Section 274(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The respondent objected to the jurisdiction of the IAC, Range XXII, to issue such notices, arguing that the IAC, Range XXII, had not initiated the proceedings and there was no satisfaction on the part of the IAC, Range XXII, about the alleged concealment of income. The court noted that the IAC, Range XXII, was vested with jurisdiction by the Commissioner's order dated October 15, 1968, which created Range XXII and conferred jurisdiction over specific areas and classes of incomes. 2. Validity of the Transfer of Cases under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act: The court examined the transfer of cases by the Commissioner under Section 127. The respondent argued that the IAC, Range XXII, had no jurisdiction as the penalty proceedings were not referred to him by the ITO. The court referred to an earlier decision in Jaswantrai & Brothers v. ITO, where it was held that once a case is referred to an IAC, the referring ITO becomes functus officio and cannot recall the reference. The court also examined the decision in Madhusudan Nandy v. Union of India, which supported the validity of transferring pending penalty proceedings from one IAC to another by an order under Section 123(1). 3. Interpretation and Application of Sections 123, 124, and 129 of the Income Tax Act: The court discussed the jurisdiction of IACs under Section 123 and ITOs under Section 124, noting the amendments introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1967, which included "cases or classes of cases" in the jurisdictional provisions. The court held that the jurisdiction of an IAC can only be affected by an order under Section 123(1), and an order under Section 127, which pertains to the transfer of cases, cannot affect the jurisdiction of an IAC over pending cases. The court further held that the Commissioner has the authority to realign jurisdiction among IACs and ITOs, and such realignment includes pending cases unless specifically excluded. 4. Procedural Fairness and the Right to be Heard: The court addressed the respondent's contention that the impugned order violated procedural fairness as it did not provide for the transfer of pending penalty proceedings. The court referred to the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, which held that procedural changes do not affect vested rights unless explicitly stated. The court concluded that the impugned order did not affect any vested right of the assessee to be heard and assessed by the IAC, as the right to be heard is a procedural right and can be exercised by any officer having jurisdiction for the time being. Conclusion: The court held that the jurisdiction of the IAC, Range XXII, to proceed with the penalty proceedings was valid and legal. The transfer of jurisdiction by the Commissioner's order under Section 123(1) was upheld, and the penalty proceedings initiated by the IAC, Range XXII, were within jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed, the judgment and order under appeal were set aside, and the application under Article 226 was dismissed. All interim orders were vacated, and no order for costs was made.
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