2002 (3) TMI 44 - SC - VAT and Sales Tax

Whether after the quashing of a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 a fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under section 6? Held that - While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. The legislative casus omis sus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. The language of sec tion 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it the period was further stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of the High Court s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principle is clearly unacceptable. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the Legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent notifications containing declaration under section 6 of the Act are quashed.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether a fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after the quashing of an earlier notification under the same section.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Fresh Notification Period under Section 6:
The primary issue revolved around whether, after the quashing of a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under the same section. The Madras High Court upheld the validity of such a notification based on the decision in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka [1996] 3 SCC 88.

Arguments by Appellants:
The appellants relied on the unreported decision in A.S. Naidu v. State of Tamil Nadu, where it was held that once a declaration under section 6 is quashed, a fresh declaration cannot be issued beyond the prescribed period from the notification under section 4(1). They also cited Oxford English School v. Government of Tamil Nadu [1995] 5 SCC 206, which supported this view.

Arguments by Respondents:
The respondents, representing the State of Tamil Nadu, argued that the logic in Narasimhaiah's case aligns with the statutory intent. They cited Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation) v. Pooran Mal and Sons [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC) and other cases under the Income-tax Act, 1961, to argue for the extension of time limits.

Statutory Interpretation:
Section 6(1) of the Act specifies that a declaration must be made within one year from the date of the notification under section 4(1), with exclusions for periods stayed by court orders (Explanation 1). The court emphasized that the language of section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous, and there is no scope for reading additional periods into it.

Judicial Reasoning:
The court noted that the purpose of the time limit is to avoid inconvenience to the landowner and ensure timely compensation. The judgment in Narasimhaiah's case was criticized for effectively legislating by extending the time limit beyond what the statute prescribes. The court reiterated that it cannot read anything into a statutory provision that is not explicitly stated by the Legislature.

Conclusion:
The court overruled the decisions in Narasimhaiah's case and Nanjudaiah's case, affirming the views expressed in A.S. Naidu's case and Oxford English School's case. It held that after the quashing of a declaration under section 6, a fresh declaration must comply with the original statutory time limits. However, the judgment was made to operate prospectively, ensuring that cases where awards have been made and compensations paid would not be reopened.

Disposition:
The appeals were disposed of, and the subsequent notifications containing declarations under section 6 of the Act were quashed.

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