9911796707
|
Home
Forgot password New User/ Regiser ⇒ Register to get Live Demo
2021 (10) TMI 45 - HC - Indian LawsSeeking quashing of FIR issued for offences punishable u/s 120-B IPC and Sections 7A, 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Bribe - active role in the management of the Trust or its constituent institutes, played or not - violations of the GST Act discovered during Audit of the University - HELD THAT - It is a settled principle that the power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or an intermediate stage of the trial is a power which inheres in a High Court, under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., on the broad principle that in the event the allegations made in the FIR or the charge-sheet, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence, there can be no reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to be interdicted in the interest of justice lest the continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. A general argument made by the prosecution is that a general presumption under Section 20 of the Act against the public servant is that he has accepted or agreed to accept bribe, unless the contrary is proved by him. Thus, the burden of proof is on the accused public servant to prove his innocence. However, while making such a submission, the fallacy is that the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked against the accused only if, the investigating agency prima facie satisfies the court that the essential ingredients or the uncontroverted foundational facts unerringly point towards the presence of an act of bribery in a particular case. It is only in such cases, when the prosecution is able to specifically establish the proof of demand by the public servant which he has voluntarily demanded and accepted for doling out an undue advantage only then, can Section 20 be invoked against the accused public servant in question - it is thus to be borne in mind that the standard of proof as required for the explanation offered by the accused for this particular purpose, even at the stage of trial, has been held to be the yardstick of preponderance of probability and not that of the higher/stricter standard of beyond reasonable doubt. The CEO being the nerve centre in the management of the University was best suited to recognize whether the Accountant was an employee of the University or not. That being the case, it seems that the Accountant is a stranger to the University and the fact that an allegation has been made that the present petitioner trustee had conspired with this unknown stranger to the University to bribe GST officials for the ongoing audit process seems inherently improbable and absurd. This Court comes to the irresistible conclusion that the criminal proceedings in the present case are not warranted. As a sequitur it flows that the proceedings against the Petitioner herein be quashed and the same are hereby quashed accordingly, insofar as the role of the present Petitioner is concerned. Application disposed off.
Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of FIR and proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. Role and responsibilities of the Petitioner in the Trust and Management Committee. 3. Allegations of conspiracy and misuse of position by the CEO and CFO. 4. Prima facie case against the Petitioner under Section 120-B IPC and Sections 7A, 8, and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 5. Legal standards for quashing FIRs and criminal proceedings. 6. Evidence and legal standards for proving bribery and corruption charges. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Quashing of FIR and proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: The Petitioner sought quashing of FIR No.RC-10(A)/2020- (RC0152020A0010) dated 29.12.2020, registered for offences under Section 120-B IPC and Sections 7A, 8, and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Petitioner invoked the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of justice. 2. Role and responsibilities of the Petitioner in the Trust and Management Committee: The Petitioner, a founder trustee of Centurion School of Rural Enterprise Management Trust, claimed to have no active or direct control over the day-to-day affairs of the Institute. The Management Committee, including the CEO and CFO, was responsible for the financial and administrative operations. The Petitioner's role was limited to overseeing broad plans and policies as delineated in the "First Statute of the Centurion University of Technology and Management, Orissa." 3. Allegations of conspiracy and misuse of position by the CEO and CFO: The CEO and CFO were alleged to have conspired to siphon off funds from the University for personal gain. The CEO instructed subordinates to send payment advices only to the CFO, bypassing the Trustees. The CFO was accused of fraudulent transactions and defalcation of funds. The Petitioner argued that these actions were taken without his knowledge or involvement. 4. Prima facie case against the Petitioner under Section 120-B IPC and Sections 7A, 8, and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: The prosecution alleged that the Petitioner was involved in a conspiracy to pay a bribe to settle GST issues. However, the Petitioner contended that there was no prima facie case against him, as he had no knowledge of the bribe demand or the actions of the CEO and CFO. The Court noted that the mere presence of the Petitioner in a telephonic conversation was insufficient to establish a prima facie case. 5. Legal standards for quashing FIRs and criminal proceedings: The Court referred to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and other cases, which provide grounds for quashing FIRs, including when allegations do not prima facie constitute an offence, are inherently improbable, or are attended with mala fide intentions. The Court emphasized that criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue if they are manifestly attended with mala fide or are maliciously instituted. 6. Evidence and legal standards for proving bribery and corruption charges: The Court highlighted that demand and acceptance of bribe are sine qua non for constituting offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Mere recovery of tainted money is insufficient without evidence of demand and voluntary acceptance of bribe. The Court referred to several Supreme Court judgments, including C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, which underscore the necessity of proving demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusion: The Court concluded that the allegations against the Petitioner were inherently improbable and lacked sufficient grounds for proceeding. The criminal proceedings against the Petitioner were quashed, while the trial against other accused persons was allowed to continue uninfluenced by the observations made in this judgment. The CRLMC was accordingly disposed of.
|
