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1984 (9) TMI 54 - HC - Central Excise

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the excise duty collection under Item 16-B.
2. Applicability of Section 11-B of the Central Excises and Salt Act.
3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. Limitation period for refund claims.
5. Concept of unjust enrichment and its implications.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the Excise Duty Collection under Item 16-B:
The petitioner, a manufacturer of plywood and allied products, sought a refund of Rs. 96,331.47, claiming that the excise duty collected under Item 16-B of Schedule I of the Central Excises and Salt Act was illegal. The Delhi High Court had previously ruled that flush doors should be taxed under the residuary Item No. 68, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the first respondent issued a notification deleting "flush doors" from Item 16-B. The petitioner argued that the collection was a mutual mistake of law, invoking Section 72 of the Contract Act for the refund.

2. Applicability of Section 11-B of the Central Excises and Salt Act:
Section 11-B(1) prescribes a six-month limitation period for claiming a refund from the date of payment of duty. The petitioner's claim was made beyond this period, leading the authorities to reject it. Despite this, the petitioner argued that the High Court could still grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court noted that Section 11-B is a special law of limitation and includes a non-abstendi clause that excludes the applicability of other laws, including the Contract Act and Limitation Act.

3. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution:
The Court acknowledged that no legislature could inhibit or limit the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226. However, it emphasized that the High Court should adopt the special law of limitation (six months) as an analogy when granting relief under Article 226. The Court cited several precedents to support this view, including the principle that the extraordinary remedies under the Constitution are not meant to enable the claimant to recover money barred by limitation in an ordinary suit.

4. Limitation Period for Refund Claims:
The Court discussed the evolution of the law regarding limitation periods for refund claims. Initially, Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules prescribed a three-month limitation period, which was not binding on the High Court. However, the amendment introduced Section 11-B, prescribing a six-month limitation period and excluding the jurisdiction of any court for claims beyond this period. The Court held that the six-month limitation must be respected even under Article 226, as it reflects the legislative intent to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure timely claims.

5. Concept of Unjust Enrichment and Its Implications:
The Court highlighted the issue of unjust enrichment, noting that excise duty is an indirect tax passed on to the consumer. Refunds to manufacturers or producers who did not bear the tax burden would result in unjust enrichment. The Court emphasized the State's role in ensuring social justice and the need for funds to implement welfare measures. It concluded that the legislative amendment aimed to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure that refunds are claimed within a reasonable period.

Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioner's claim for a refund was barred by the six-month limitation period prescribed under Section 11-B(1) of the Act. It emphasized that the High Court should respect this special law of limitation even when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court also rejected the petitioner's oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, stating that the case did not involve any substantial question of law of general importance.

 

 

 

 

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