1984 (6) TMI 56 - HC - Customs

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the respondent's possession of the foreign-made Datsun car.
2. Application of Section 135(b) of the Customs Act.
3. Burden of proof under Section 123 of the Customs Act.
4. Admissibility and voluntariness of the respondent's confessional statement.
5. Requisite knowledge or belief regarding the car's liability to confiscation.
6. Evaluation of the appellate court's judgment and principles guiding interference in an acquittal.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the Respondent's Possession of the Foreign-Made Datsun Car:
The respondent was charged under Section 135(b) of the Customs Act for dealing with a foreign-made Datsun car without authority, knowing it to be liable to confiscation under Section 111 of the Act. The prosecution alleged that the respondent, along with a co-accused, was involved in smuggling foreign cars. The car was seized from the premises of the respondent's brother-in-law. The respondent's defense was that he had no connection with the car and that his confessional statement was made under threat.

2. Application of Section 135(b) of the Customs Act:
Section 135(b) of the Act criminalizes possession or dealing with goods known to be liable to confiscation. The trial court convicted the respondent based on the evidence presented, including the respondent's confessional statement and testimonies of witnesses. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, finding the evidence insufficient to prove the respondent's knowledge or possession of the car.

3. Burden of Proof under Section 123 of the Customs Act:
Section 123 shifts the burden of proof to the person from whose possession goods are seized if they are believed to be smuggled. However, the appellate court and both counsels agreed that this section did not apply in this case, as vehicles were not specified under this section by the Central Government.

4. Admissibility and Voluntariness of the Respondent's Confessional Statement:
The respondent's confessional statement (Ext. 4) was a key piece of evidence. The trial court found it to be voluntarily made and admissible. The appellate court did not dispute its voluntariness but questioned its sufficiency to prove the charge. The respondent claimed the statement was made under threat, but this assertion lacked supporting evidence.

5. Requisite Knowledge or Belief Regarding the Car's Liability to Confiscation:
For a conviction under Section 135 of the Act, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation. The appellate court found that the evidence did not establish the respondent's knowledge or belief that the car was smuggled. The court emphasized that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof in a criminal trial.

6. Evaluation of the Appellate Court's Judgment and Principles Guiding Interference in an Acquittal:
The appellate court's judgment was based on the principle that when two views are possible, the High Court should refrain from interfering with an acquittal unless there is manifest error or perversity. The appellate court found the trial court's conclusions unfounded and unreasonable, thus acquitting the respondent. The High Court upheld this decision, noting that the appellate court's view was reasonably possible and did not warrant interference.

Conclusion:
The appeal against the acquittal was dismissed, affirming the appellate court's judgment that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was guilty under Section 135(b) of the Customs Act. The High Court emphasized that suspicion cannot substitute for proof and upheld the principles guiding non-interference in acquittals.

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