2022 (9) TMI 212 - HC - Indian Laws

Dishonor of Cheque - calculation of period of limitation for filing complaint - Last date being public holiday - section 138 of NI Act - HELD THAT - The complaint can be filed within one month of the cause of action. In this case, the notice was received on 12.02.1997 and the payment was to be made within 15 days i.e. by 28.02.1997. As the date for receipt of notice was 12.02.1997, is to be excluded - And cause of action arose on 01.09.1997 (12.02.1997 and 28.02.1997 to be excluded). The month of February 1997 had 28 days. So from 01.09.1997, once month (30 days) shall be within 30.03.1997. Admittedly, 28.03.1997 was a holiday being Good Friday and the case was filed on 29.03.1997 i.e. within the statutory period as laid down under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and considering the materials and evidence on record convicted the accused/respondent accordingly. Admittedly, the accused received notice on 12.02.1997. The period of 15 days for making the payment of the amount of dishonoured cheque has to be calculated from 13.02.1997 and ends on 28.02.1997 and cause of action arose on 01.03.1997 (February 1997 has 28 days) and thus the compliant had time till 30.03.1997. The complaint has been filed on 29.03.1997. Learned Magistrate rightly held that 28.03.1997 was a holiday on the ground of Good Friday and as such the law provides that the next day has to be taken as the date for computation. Accordingly, it is seen that the complaint filed before the Court was within the statutory period as provided under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act. In view of the aforesaid findings, the judgment/order of the learned Sessions Judge, 10th Bench, City Sessions Court, passed on 30.01.2002 is erroneous and is accordingly set aside - Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues:
1. Calculation of statutory period for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis:
The judgment pertains to an appeal against the acquittal of the accused by the Sessions Court in a case involving the dishonour of a cheque. The primary issue revolves around the calculation of the statutory period for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The appellant argued that the cause of action arose on a specific date, allowing them to file the complaint within the prescribed timeframe. The Metropolitan Magistrate initially convicted the accused based on evidence including the dishonoured cheque, bank memo, and demand notice. The Magistrate correctly calculated the period for filing the complaint, considering the exclusion of certain dates as per legal provisions.

The Sessions Judge, however, erred in their calculation, leading to the acquittal of the accused. The Sessions Judge wrongly included the date of receipt of notice in the calculation, contrary to established legal principles. The judgment highlighted the importance of excluding certain dates while computing the statutory period for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. The judgment emphasized that the date of receipt of intimation should be excluded from the calculation, ensuring that the complainant has the full statutory period to initiate legal proceedings.

The judgment reaffirmed the correctness of the Metropolitan Magistrate's computation of the statutory period, which allowed the complaint to be filed within the prescribed timeframe. It clarified that the complainant had adhered to the legal requirements for initiating action against the accused. The judgment concluded by setting aside the erroneous order of the Sessions Judge and modifying the sentence imposed on the accused. The accused was directed to pay a fine and face a reduced term of imprisonment, ensuring justice while upholding legal principles.

In summary, the judgment provides a detailed analysis of the calculation of the statutory period for filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, emphasizing the importance of accurate computation and adherence to legal provisions to ensure the proper administration of justice.