2023 (8) TMI 527 - HC - Indian Laws

Dishonour of Cheque - rejection of complaint on the ground that the cheque was presented beyond the period of its validity - burden of proof on the complainant - HELD THAT - The cheque Ex. P/1 dated 11.02.2015 was valid for three months only. The averment in Para 5 of the complaint as also Pramod Chauhan (CW/1) in his examination-in-chief (para 5) state that on 15.05.2015 accused assured him encashment of cheque and insisted to present the cheque after couple of days. Relying on this assurance, he presented the cheque at Canara Bank, Madhav Ganj, Gwalior. This statement itself shows that cheque was presented after 15.05.2015. The clarification in para 18 and 19 of the evidence of Pramod (CW1) is an attempt in despair to bring the presentation within validity period. Thus, learned Trial Court after considering the evidence on record committed no mistake in holding that cheque was presented beyond the period of its validity. In the opinion of this Court, learned trial Court has considered the entire material against accused on record and on reasonable appreciation of evidence, after assigning detailed and cogent reasons, has acquitted the accused/respondent. The findings of Trial Court cannot be said to be contrary to the evidence on record. The judgment is not patently illegal or perverse, therefore, no case for interference in the finding of acquittal is made out. This application for leave to appeal against acquittal deserves to be and is hereby rejected - appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues involved:
The judgment involves an application for leave to appeal against the acquittal of the accused for an offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The issues revolve around the errors alleged in the acquittal judgment, including the shifting of burden of proof, presentation of the cheque beyond its validity period, and the availability of funds for the loan extended to the accused.

Application for Leave to Appeal:
The application contended that the Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused, as the presumption under sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should have been applied due to the undisputed signature on the cheque. It was argued that the Trial Court wrongly shifted the burden of proof to the complainant and failed to appreciate the evidence and circumstances of the case, especially regarding the loan advanced to the accused from the complainant's father's retiral benefits. The rejection of the complaint based on the cheque's presentation beyond its validity period was also challenged.

Review of Evidence:
The appellant's counsel highlighted specific paragraphs of the judgment and statements of witnesses to support the contention that the Trial Court erred in assessing the evidence. It was argued that the Trial Court failed to properly consider the availability of funds for the loan and misinterpreted the presentation timing of the cheque within its validity period.

Legal Principles on Appeal Against Acquittal:
The judgment referred to various Supreme Court decisions outlining the scope of appellate powers in cases of appeal against acquittal. The principles emphasized the appellate court's authority to reevaluate evidence, reach independent conclusions, and reverse an acquittal only in exceptional circumstances where the lower court's findings are deemed perverse or illegal.

Evaluation of Facts:
The judgment analyzed the evidence presented, particularly the testimony regarding the loan amount and the timing of the cheque presentation. The Trial Court's doubts regarding the availability of funds and the presentation of the cheque beyond its validity period were considered in light of legal precedents cited in the judgment.

Conclusion:
After a detailed examination of the evidence and legal principles, the Court found that the Trial Court's acquittal judgment was reasonable and not contrary to the evidence on record. The application for leave to appeal against the acquittal was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed accordingly. The Court concluded that no interference was warranted in the Trial Court's findings, as they were not deemed patently illegal or perverse based on the available evidence.