9911796707
|
Home
Issues:
1. Whether a vehicle carrying excisable goods can be seized under the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act. 2. Interpretation of the term 'goods' under Section 2(22) of the Customs Act. 3. Analysis of separate provisions for confiscation of conveyances under Section 115 of the Customs Act. 4. Review of the reasoning provided by the Single Judge in the judgment under appeal. Analysis: 1. The main issue in this case was whether a vehicle carrying excisable goods could be seized under the Central Excises and Salt Act. The respondent's jeep was seized by the first appellant under Section 110 of the Customs Act, claiming that uncured coffee seeds liable to excise duty were found in the jeep. The respondent challenged this seizure through a writ petition, arguing that there was no power for such seizure of a vehicle apart from the offending goods. The Single Judge quashed the seizure, leading to an appeal by the Superintendent of Central Excise and the Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise. The High Court analyzed the applicability of Section 110 to the Central Excises and Salt Act and concluded that vehicles could be seized as 'goods' under the provisions of the Act. 2. The court delved into the interpretation of the term 'goods' under Section 2(22) of the Customs Act, which includes vehicles. The argument raised was that since the definition section of the Customs Act was not made applicable to the Central Excises and Salt Act by the notification, 'goods' in the relevant sections of the Customs Act applied to the Excises and Salt Act might not include vehicles. However, the court reasoned that even if the definition was not directly applicable, vehicles could still be considered 'goods' under Section 110. The court also referred to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, which defines 'goods' as movable property, indicating that vehicles could be seized as 'goods' under Section 110. 3. The judgment analyzed the separate provisions for confiscation of conveyances under Section 115 of the Customs Act. The Single Judge's reasoning was based on the idea that since Section 115 specifically provided for confiscation of conveyances, vehicles could not be seized under Section 110. However, the High Court disagreed, highlighting the specific provisions under Section 115 for confiscation of conveyances, indicating the necessity for separate provisions. The court emphasized that the separate provision for confiscation of conveyances did not imply that 'goods' under other sections did not include vehicles as well. 4. The court reviewed the reasoning provided by the Single Judge in the judgment under appeal and found it incorrect. The Single Judge's interpretation that vehicles could not be seized under Section 110 due to the provisions of Section 115 was deemed flawed. The High Court referred to a previous judgment by Govindan Nair J. in a similar case, which was not brought to the notice of the Single Judge. The High Court agreed with Govindan Nair J.'s conclusion and allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the Single Judge and dismissing the writ petition. The court clarified that the first respondent had the power to seize the jeep, and an inquiry under the Act would proceed accordingly.
|
