2020 (11) TMI 1118 - HC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay in filing criminal revision petition under the Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - HELD THAT - Exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is mandatory once the conditions precedent prescribed in Section 14(1) are satisfied, whereas the Court's power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is discretionary. Section 14(1) has been made applicable to any suit and suit has been defined in Section 2(l) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and it does not include an appeal or an application. However, the Supreme Court in the matter of J. Kumaradasan Nair and others v. IRIC Sohan and Others 2009 (2) TMI 796 - SUPREME COURT has held that Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable only in suits in view of the definition of suit contained in Section 2(l) of the Limitation Act, 1963, but the principle thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing revision application in terms of Section 5 thereof. Whether in a criminal proceeding, Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable? - HELD THAT - The applicability of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is confined to suit and appeal or revision, it cannot be made applicable to criminal proceeding like revision. However, Section 470(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that in computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded. The petitioner has failed to explain the inordinate delay from 6-6-2011 to 2-5-2013 for more than two years in filing the application for grant of leave to appeal, as no sufficient reason has been assigned for delay of two years in filing the application for grant of leave to appeal questioning the order of discharge of respondent No. 1. The Supreme Court in J. Kumaradasan Nair 2009 (2) TMI 796 - SUPREME COURT has held that the court will not apply the beneficent provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. It is true that sufficient cause has to be construed liberally, but it should be considered whether the person prosecuting the proceeding is himself negligent or is not acting bonafidely. A careful perusal of the record would show that the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any sufficient reason for delay of two years in questioning the order of discharge. As such, the revisional Court is absolutely justified in dismissing the revision and rightly held that sufficient cause has not been shown for delay of two years in filing the application for grant of leave to appeal, as Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in criminal proceeding. There are no merit in this petition, it deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed.

Summary

Issues:
1. Condonation of delay in a criminal revision petition under the Limitation Act, 1963.

Detailed Analysis:

The judgment involves a petition challenging an order passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, regarding the rejection of an application for condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the subsequent dismissal of the revision petition against the discharge of respondent No. 1. The petitioner sought to set aside the impugned order by arguing that the delay should be condoned and Section 14 of the Limitation Act should be applied. The respondents contended that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is limited to civil proceedings and does not extend to criminal proceedings. They argued that the delay in filing the application for grant of leave to appeal was unjustified, leading to the dismissal of the revision petition.

The court examined the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which exclude the time spent in bona fide proceedings in a court lacking jurisdiction. The court emphasized that the principle behind Section 14 is to protect litigants genuinely pursuing their cases in courts without jurisdiction. The court highlighted that the application of Section 14 is mandatory once the conditions are met, while Section 5 is discretionary. The court referred to a Supreme Court case to explain that although Section 14 is applicable only to suits, its principle can be considered for condonation of delay in revision applications.

The court addressed the question of whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to criminal proceedings. It clarified that Section 14 is limited to suits and appeals or revisions arising from them, not extending to criminal proceedings. The court cited a case from the Patna High Court to support this interpretation. However, the court noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, allows for the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting another prosecution against the offender.

After reviewing the legal positions, the court analyzed the facts of the case. It observed a delay of two years in filing the application for grant of leave to appeal and found no satisfactory explanation for the delay. The court concluded that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act did not apply to criminal proceedings like the revision in question. It emphasized that the petitioner failed to justify the delay and dismissed the petition, stating that sufficient cause was not shown for the delay in filing the application for grant of leave to appeal.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the revisional court's decision to reject the application for condonation of delay. The court held that the petitioner did not provide sufficient reasons for the delay and that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to criminal proceedings.