9911796707
|
Home
Forgot password New User/ Regiser ⇒ Register to get Live Demo
1956 (2) TMI 5 - SC - Income TaxWhether in the circumstances of the case appeals lay to the Tribunal against orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissing the appeals against the assessments for the years 1945-1946 and 1946-1947 in limine? Held that - The question referred must accordingly be answered in the affirmative. This appeal will therefore be allowed, and the order of the Court below set aside.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the orders dismissing the appeals as time-barred were made under Section 30(2) or Section 31 of the Income-tax Act. 2. Whether such orders are appealable under Section 33 of the Income-tax Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Nature of Orders Dismissing Appeals as Time-Barred: Section 30(2) vs. Section 31 The primary issue was to determine whether the orders dismissing the appeals as time-barred were made under Section 30(2) or Section 31 of the Income-tax Act. The appellant argued that the unsettled conditions following the partition of the country justified the delay in filing the appeals. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the appeals due to the delay, citing insufficient grounds for condonation. The judgment clarifies that Section 30(1) grants the right to appeal, while Section 30(2) specifies the time limit for filing such appeals, with a provision for condoning delays if justified. Section 31 outlines the procedure for hearing and disposing of appeals, and Section 33 allows further appeals against orders made under Section 31. The Court analyzed conflicting opinions from different High Courts. The Bombay High Court held that an appeal presented out of time without condonation is not an appeal in law, and thus, an order rejecting it is under Section 30(2) and not Section 31. Conversely, the Madras and Calcutta High Courts opined that an appeal filed out of time is still an appeal, and an order rejecting it as time-barred is under Section 31, making it appealable under Section 33. The Supreme Court sided with the latter view, stating that an appeal presented out of time is still an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time-barred is indeed an order passed in appeal under Section 31. This interpretation aligns with the principle that rules of limitation bar the remedy but do not extinguish the right. 2. Appealability of Orders Under Section 33 The next issue was whether such orders are appealable under Section 33. The Court noted that Section 31 is the only provision relating to the hearing and disposal of appeals, and if an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation is passed in appeal, it must fall within Section 31. Consequently, such orders are appealable under Section 33. The Court rejected the argument that Section 31 only pertains to orders on the merits of the assessment. It emphasized that Section 31 should be liberally construed to include orders disposing of appeals on preliminary issues, such as limitation. The Court cited several precedents supporting this view, including decisions from the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts, which held that an order dismissing an appeal on the ground of limitation, after it had been admitted, is under Section 31 and thus appealable. The Court also addressed the respondent's reliance on the Allahabad High Court's decision in Mahabir Prasad Niranjanlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, which held that such orders are under Section 30(2) and not appealable. The Supreme Court clarified that this decision was based on a misinterpretation of observations made in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Mtt. Ay. S. Ar. Arunachalam Chettiar, which did not directly address the issue at hand. The judgment concluded that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is not limited to hearing appeals on the merits of the assessment only. Preliminary issues, such as limitation, can be raised and decided during the hearing of the appeal. Therefore, the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejecting the appeals as time-barred are under Section 31 and are appealable under Section 33. Conclusion The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, allowing the appeal and setting aside the lower court's order. The appellant was awarded costs for the proceedings both in the Supreme Court and the lower court. The judgment establishes that orders dismissing appeals as time-barred are made under Section 31 and are appealable under Section 33 of the Income-tax Act.
|
