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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the order passed under Section 206C(1) read with Section 206C(7) of the Income Tax Act is appealable under Section 246 of the Act. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Appealability of the Order under Section 206C(1) read with Section 206C(7) Facts and Background: The District Excise Officer (DEO) was required to furnish half-yearly returns under Section 206C(7) of the Income Tax Act. The DEO failed to furnish some returns and collected tax at 15% on the cost price of country liquor but not on the purchase price of Nirgam Mulay. The Assessing Officer (AO) issued show-cause notices and subsequently created a demand for short collection of tax along with interest under Section 206C(7). The DEO was also issued show-cause notices for penalties under Sections 272A(2)(c) and 271C. Arguments by the Assessee: The DEO argued that the CIT(A) erred in holding that no appeal lies against the order passed under Sections 206C(6) and 206C(7). The DEO contended that their case falls under Section 246(1)(a) of the Act, which allows for appeals where the assessee denies liability to be assessed. The DEO argued that they are an "assessee" as defined under Section 2(7) of the Act, and the liability imposed on them includes tax, interest, and penalties, thus making the order appealable. Arguments by the Department: The Department argued that the DEO is merely a collector of tax on behalf of the Department and not an "assessee" as contemplated under Section 246(1)(a). The Department contended that there is no specific provision under Section 246 making the order appealable and that the DEO does not fall within the inclusive definition of "assessee" under Section 2(7). Tribunal's Analysis: The Tribunal examined the provisions of Section 246, which lists appealable orders, and noted that while specific sections are listed, Section 246(1)(a) is broader and includes any order against an assessee where the assessee denies liability to be assessed under the Act. The Tribunal also considered the definitions of "assessee," "assessment," and "liability" and concluded that the DEO fits within these definitions. Judicial Precedents: The Tribunal referred to several judicial precedents, including: - CIT vs. Khemchand Ramdas (1938) 6 ITR 414 (PC), which held that "assessment" includes the whole procedure for imposing liability upon the taxpayer. - CIT vs. Kanpur Coal Syndicate (1964) 53 ITR 225 (SC), which held that the denial of liability is comprehensive enough to include partial denial. - Delhi Development Authority vs. ITO (1998) 230 ITR 9 (Del), where the Delhi High Court held that an order determining liability under Sections 194A and 201 is an assessment order and the entity is an "assessee." Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the DEO is an "assessee" and the order under Section 206C(1) read with Section 206C(7) constitutes an assessment order. Therefore, the DEO has the right to appeal under Section 246(1)(a) of the Act. The Tribunal emphasized that the right of appeal is a substantive right and should be liberally construed. The Tribunal allowed the appeals, holding that the DEO has a right of appeal against the orders passed under Sections 206C(1) and 206C(7). Dissenting Opinion: One member of the Tribunal disagreed, arguing that the right of appeal must be expressly provided by statute and that the DEO does not fit the definition of an "assessee" for the purposes of Section 246. This member held that the orders under Sections 206C(6) and 206C(7) are not appealable. Resolution by Third Member: The Third Member concurred with the majority view, emphasizing that the DEO is an "assessee" and the order under Section 206C(1) read with Section 206C(7) is an assessment order. The Third Member highlighted the need for a harmonious construction of the provisions to make the Act workable and upheld the DEO's right to appeal. Final Decision: The Tribunal, by majority opinion, held that the DEO has a right of appeal under Section 246(1)(a) of the Act against the orders passed under Sections 206C(1) and 206C(7). All the appeals were allowed.
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