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Issues:
Interpretation of section 139(1) and 139(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding the timeline for filing income tax returns and the authority of the Income-tax Officer to demand returns. Analysis: The writ petition involved a dispute between Messrs. Tarzan Hosiery Private Limited and the Income-tax Officer of District I(B) Ward of Kanpur regarding the filing of income tax returns for the assessment year 1964-65. The petitioner received a notice under section 139(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, requiring the filing of a return by July 25, 1964, which the petitioner failed to meet due to a denied extension request. The petitioner argued that they were entitled to file the return by September 30, 1964, as per section 139(1) and that the demand by the respondent was illegal. The High Court analyzed the provisions of section 139(1) and 139(2) to determine their interplay. It was held that these two subsections deal with distinct aspects of return submission: sub-section (1) imposes an obligation to file a return within a specified time, while sub-section (2) empowers the Income-tax Officer to demand a return before the end of the assessment year. The court found no conflict between these provisions and concluded that both should operate simultaneously. Moreover, the court examined section 139(7), which allows for a return under sub-section (2) to be demanded and furnished before the return under sub-section (1) is due. The petitioner's argument that this provision was only for exceptional cases was dismissed, and the court emphasized that sub-section (7) applies beyond those specific circumstances. The judgment also addressed practical difficulties that could arise if sub-section (2) were interpreted to operate only after the period prescribed by sub-section (1). The court highlighted that such an interpretation could lead to anomalous situations, indicating that the framers of the Act did not intend such outcomes. Regarding the petitioner's claim of a potential infringement of article 14 of the Constitution due to discrimination by the Income-tax Officer, the court held that the provisions of section 139 apply uniformly to all assessees without discrimination. While acknowledging the possibility of individual cases of unfair discrimination, the court found no evidence of such discrimination in the present case. Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, ruling that sub-section (2) of section 139 can be exercised at any time during the relevant assessment year, not solely after the expiry of the period prescribed by sub-section (1). The court also rejected the contention that sub-section (2) infringes article 14 of the Constitution, concluding that the petition failed and should be dismissed with costs.
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