1989 (1) TMI 222 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the Supari concerned in this case was a Fruit-product or, alternatively, a Flavouring-Agent within the meaning of Rule 29(f) or (m) respectively and, accordingly, the use in it of permitted coal-tar dyes or food-colours was not prohibited? Whether, even if, after an elaborate enquiry, it was held that Supari was not a Food-product appellant having acted bonafide on a possible and not an unreasonable view of the nature and classification of the goods, was, at all events, entitled to the benefit of the doubt? Held that - This is not a case of a relieving provision excepting from the definition of an offence where the Rule of construction against doubtful penalisation operates. The offence is really a violation of a prohibition imposed on a penalty as a social-defence mechanism in a socio-economic legislation. No form of words have ever yet been framed, with regard to which some ingenious counsel could not suggest a difficulty. But in the context of the present statute, it would be a strain on the statutory language and the statutory-scheme to include Supari in the form in which it was sold within Fruit-Products as understood in clause (f) of Rule 29. The first contention has, accordingly, no substance. The second contention is that petitioner had acted bonafide on a particular understanding of the Rule 29 (7) which could not be said to be wholly implausible and that, therefore, even if that understanding is found to be defective, he should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Appeal dismissed.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether "Supari" is a "Fruit-product" or a "Flavouring-Agent" under Rule 29(f) or 29(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
2. Whether the appellant acted bonafide based on a plausible interpretation of the rules and is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.
3. The appropriateness of the statutory minimum sentence and the hardship faced by small-time tradesmen.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Classification of "Supari":

The appellant argued that "Supari" or "Betel-nut" should be classified as a "Fruit-product" under Rule 29(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, or alternatively as a "Flavouring-Agent" under Rule 29(m). This classification would allow the use of permitted coal-tar food-colours. The court noted that "Supari" is indeed derived from the usufruct of the Areca-palm, but emphasized that not all products of vegetative origin qualify as "Fruit-products" under Rule 29(f). The court examined the scheme of relevant rules, particularly Rules 23, 28, and 29, and concluded that the term "Fruit-products" as used in Rule 29(f) refers to items like "Fruit Juice," "Tomato Juice," "Fruit Syrup," and similar products listed in Appendix 'B'. The court held that including "Supari" within "Fruit-products" would strain the statutory language and scheme, thus rejecting the appellant's contention.

2. Bonafide Interpretation and Benefit of the Doubt:

The appellant contended that he acted bonafide based on a plausible interpretation of Rule 29(f) and should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The court dismissed this argument, stating that the question of what a word means in its context within the 'Act' is a matter of legal interpretation and law. The court emphasized that allowing the appellant's interpretation would contradict the fundamental postulates of a legal order, where rules of law enforce objective meanings to be ascertained by the courts. The court cited various legal principles and precedents to support its stance that ignorance of the law or a mistaken interpretation does not justify a defense in criminal cases.

3. Statutory Minimum Sentence and Hardship:

The court acknowledged the hardship faced by small-time tradesmen who often purchase goods from manufacturers and sell them in retail, while the manufacturers or wholesalers responsible for adulteration escape prosecution. The court referred to previous judgments highlighting this issue and noted the appellant's failure to invoke the benevolent provisions of Section 19(2) of the Act. The court recognized the appellant's predicament and the imperfect definition of "Fruit-products" in Rule 29(f), which has since been amended to enumerate specific products. Consequently, the court suggested that the appropriate Government should consider exercising its executive powers of remission of the substantive sentence of imprisonment under Section 432 Cr. P.C. or other relevant laws, taking into account the observations made in the judgment.

Conclusion:

The appeal was dismissed, but the court directed that the imposition of the substantive sentence of imprisonment be postponed until the appellant's prayer for remission is considered and disposed of by the appropriate Government or Authority. The court emphasized the need for a balanced approach in enforcing the law against food adulteration, ensuring that small tradesmen are not unduly penalized while real adulterators escape prosecution.

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