2024 (5) TMI 1319 - SC - Indian Laws

Condonation of Delay in filing the appeal for the enhancement of compensation - Applicability of Limitation Act provisions - Discretionary Power of Courts in condoning delay - HELD THAT - It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. It may be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors 2007 (1) TMI 544 - SUPREME COURT , it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly. It must always be borne in mind that while construing sufficient cause in deciding application u/s 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. In the absence of the facts for getting the delay condoned in the referred cases, vis- -vis, the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the facts or the reasons of getting the delay condoned are identical or similar. Therefore, we are unable to exercise our discretionary power of condoning the delay in filing the appeal on parity with the above order(s). Moreover, the High Court, in the facts of this case, has not found it fit to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. There is no occasion for us to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the High Court for the reasons recorded. First, the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed appeal. Secondly, most of the claimants have accepted the decision of the reference court. Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not been substituted and made party to the reference before its decision, they could have applied for procedural review which they never did. Thus, there is apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing the matter. Accordingly, in our opinion, High Court is justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Thus, we do not deem it proper and necessary to interfere with the decision of the High Court refusing to condone the inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal. The Special Leave Petition, as such, lacks merit and is dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Compensation for land acquisition.
2. Delay in filing an appeal.
3. Application of the Limitation Act.
4. Discretionary power to condone delay.
5. Public policy on limitation.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Compensation for Land Acquisition:
The case revolves around the acquisition of land in 1989 for the Telugu Ganga Project in Andhra Pradesh. The claimants, dissatisfied with the compensation, filed a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Out of 16 claimants, three died during the pendency of the reference, and no steps were taken to substitute their heirs. The reference was dismissed on merits on 24.09.1999, upholding the award of the collector.

2. Delay in Filing an Appeal:
An appeal was proposed to be filed in the High Court under Section 54 of the Act after more than 5/6 years by some heirs of the deceased claimant No. 11. The delay in filing the appeal was 5659 days. The High Court dismissed the application for condoning the delay, finding the explanation unsatisfactory.

3. Application of the Limitation Act:
The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay. The law of limitation is based on public policy to put an end to litigation. Section 3 of the Limitation Act mandates that any appeal filed after the prescribed period should be dismissed unless exceptions under Sections 4 to 24 are applicable. The use of the word "shall" in Section 3 indicates mandatory dismissal of time-barred appeals.

4. Discretionary Power to Condon Delay:
Section 5 of the Limitation Act allows courts to condone delays if "sufficient cause" is shown. However, this power is discretionary and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established, based on factors like negligence and lack of due diligence. The courts should adopt a pragmatic approach to advance substantial justice but not at the expense of defeating the law of limitation.

5. Public Policy on Limitation:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the law of limitation is founded on public policy to ensure finality in litigation. Even though liberal interpretation is given to Section 5, Section 3 must be strictly construed. The court must balance between adopting a liberal approach and implementing the statute as it stands.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay. The petitioners were negligent in pursuing the reference and filing the appeal. Most claimants accepted the reference court's decision, and the petitioners did not show due diligence. The appeal was dismissed, and the Special Leave Petition lacked merit.

Summary:
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court's refusal to condone a delay of 5659 days in filing an appeal against the dismissal of a land acquisition compensation reference. The court emphasized the mandatory nature of Section 3 of the Limitation Act and the discretionary power under Section 5, stressing that public policy requires finality in litigation. The petitioners' negligence and lack of due diligence justified the High Court's decision.