1970 (4) TMI 38 - HC - Income Tax

When the assessment of an HUF is set aside on appeal, what is the time-limit for initiating proceedings for reassessment of member

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the notice dated March 2, 1960, is time-barred under section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
2. Whether the limitation is saved by sub-section (4) of section 34.
3. Whether the limitation is saved by the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34.
4. Constitutionality of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34.
5. Existence of a finding or direction in the earlier Tribunal decision.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the notice dated March 2, 1960, is time-barred under section 34(1)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922:
The assessment year in question is 1950-51, with the last date of the assessment year being March 31, 1951. The notice under section 34(1)(a) was issued on March 2, 1960, which is more than eight years after the expiry of the assessment year 1950-51. According to the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 34, the notice is prima facie barred by time as it was issued beyond the eight-year limitation period.

2. Whether the limitation is saved by sub-section (4) of section 34:
The department argued that sub-section (4) of section 34, inserted by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1959, saves the limitation. The Supreme Court in Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas clarified that sub-section (4) does not cure the defect of delay in all cases. The amendment did not delete the provision contained in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 34. The main effect of the 1956 amendment was to remove the bar of limitation in cases of valuation of one lakh of rupees and upwards. Since the valuation of the case was far below one lakh of rupees, the case is not covered by sub-section (4) of section 34.

3. Whether the limitation is saved by the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34:
The department contended that limitation is saved by the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34. However, the Supreme Court in Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas held that the provisions of the second proviso to section 34(3) are unconstitutional to the extent they authorize the assessment or reassessment of any person other than the assessee beyond the period of limitation. Additionally, the Supreme Court in Income-tax Officer, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das clarified that the expression "any person" must be circumscribed by the scope of the subject-matter of the appeal or revision.

4. Constitutionality of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34:
The Supreme Court in Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas held that the second proviso to section 34(3) is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the assessment or reassessment of any person other than the assessee beyond the period of limitation. This ruling supports the contention that the second proviso cannot be used to save the limitation in the present case.

5. Existence of a finding or direction in the earlier Tribunal decision:
The department argued that the Tribunal's decision on October 7, 1959, contained a finding against Dhiraj Mal. However, upon examining the judgment, it was found that there was no specific finding that the sum of Rs. 21,079 represented Dhiraj Mal's income. The Tribunal's judgment merely stated that the amounts in question could not be treated as the income of the Hindu undivided family and should be deleted. Therefore, there was neither a finding nor direction as contemplated by the second proviso.

Conclusion:
The notice dated March 2, 1960, is not saved from limitation either by sub-section (4) of section 34 or by the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Consequently, the assessment proceeding is barred by time. The court answered the reference by stating that the notice dated March 2, 1960, was barred by time and awarded costs of Rs. 200 to the assessee.

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