1992 (2) TMI 243 - AT - Customs

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the penalty imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Validity and reliability of the confessional statements of co-accused.
3. Requirement of independent corroboration for the confessional statements.
4. Contradictions in the statements of co-accused.
5. Applicability of legal precedents regarding the use of co-accused confessions.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of the Penalty Imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962:
The appeal was filed against the order passed by the Collector of Customs (Preventive), Calcutta, imposing a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh on the appellant under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962. The Tribunal had to determine whether the imposition of this penalty was in accordance with the law.

2. Validity and Reliability of the Confessional Statements of Co-accused:
The appellant's case was built primarily on the confessional statements of co-accused, which were later retracted. The appellant contended that these statements were extracted under threat and coercion, making them unreliable. The Tribunal noted that the confessions of co-accused are considered weak evidence and require independent corroboration to be deemed reliable.

3. Requirement of Independent Corroboration for the Confessional Statements:
The Tribunal emphasized that the evidence of a co-accused is not sufficient to convict unless corroborated by independent evidence. This principle was supported by several legal precedents, including Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (AIR 1949 Privy Council 257), which held that "the evidence of one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice." The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1977 SC 1579), which stated that "a conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice provided the Judge has the rule of caution in mind."

4. Contradictions in the Statements of Co-accused:
The Tribunal found significant contradictions in the statements of the co-accused. For instance, Govindlal Modi gave two different versions on 29-3-1984 and 31-3-1984. In his first statement, he did not implicate the appellant, but in his second statement, he introduced the appellant as the person responsible for the smuggling. Similarly, the statements of Mrinal Saha and Kanwarlal Jain were contradictory and inconsistent. These contradictions cast doubt on the reliability of the confessions.

5. Applicability of Legal Precedents Regarding the Use of Co-accused Confessions:
The Tribunal referred to several legal precedents to support its decision. For example, in Haroom Haji v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968 SC 832), the Supreme Court held that "a retracted confession is admissible against a co-accused by virtue of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, but as a matter of prudence and practice, a court would not ordinarily act upon it to convict a co-accused without corroboration." The Tribunal also cited the case of Pradhan Singh v. Collector of Customs (1983 (12) E.L.T. 650), which held that "the proceedings before the Revenue authorities are quasi-criminal in nature, and therefore, the confession of a co-accused must be corroborated in material particulars before finding a person guilty."

Conclusion:
The Tribunal concluded that the evidence against the appellant was insufficient to sustain the penalty. The statements of the co-accused were contradictory and lacked independent corroboration. The Tribunal held that "the evidence of the co-accused is extremely weak type of evidence and there cannot be any conviction without the fullest and strongest corroboration of the same in material particulars." Consequently, the penalty of Rs. 1 lakh imposed on the appellant was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with consequential reliefs.