1971 (1) TMI 46 - HC - Income Tax

Petitioner challenges the notice issued under section 148 - When depreciation on machinery was claimed and allowed, if subsequently it is learned that the machinery did not exist, whether the assessment can be reopened it would be unreasonable to say that the petitioner had disclosed truly and fully all primary facts. In that view of the matter the conditions precedent required for the issue of the notice have been fulfilled - held that that there was reasonable ground for reopening the assessment

Summary

Issues:
Challenge to notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment year 1960-61 based on alleged non-disclosure of primary facts during original assessment.

Analysis:
The petitioner challenged the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1960-61, claiming that there were no materials or reasons for the Income-tax Officer to believe in any under-assessment or non-assessment of income. The petitioner had received development rebate for certain machinery in the original assessment, asserting that these machines were brought into use in the year preceding the relevant assessment year. The officer who issued the notice stated that materials produced during the original assessment were found to be false, leading to the initiation of reassessment proceedings (paragraphs 1-3).

The petitioner's counsel argued that no reasons were disclosed to support the Income-tax Officer's belief, citing relevant case law. The court directed the income-tax department to produce the reasons and records. The information received from the Fraud section indicated discrepancies in the company's machinery purchases, leading to a prima facie belief that income had escaped assessment for the assessment year 1956-57. The recorded reason stated that the company had claimed depreciation on non-existent machinery, justifying the initiation of reassessment proceedings (paragraphs 4-7).

The court rejected the petitioner's contention that the alleged non-disclosure pertained to an inferential fact, emphasizing that the existence of machinery and their use were primary facts. The court clarified that non-disclosure of primary facts, even if inferred, constituted a ground for reassessment. The court found the grounds for non-disclosure reasonable and upheld the validity of the reassessment proceedings (paragraphs 8-10).

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, discharged the rule nisi, and denied any costs. The court declined to grant a stay of operation in the case (paragraph 11).