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Central Excise - Case Laws
Showing 81321 to 81329 of 81329 Records
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1937 (11) TMI 2
Price attribution - whether the motor cars in question there was no such wholesale cash price ascertainable, that the duty should have been assessed under Clause (b) of Section 30?
Held that:- In the present case a number of sales have been made to different distributors in the ordinary course of an extensive importing business. It is difficult to think that the appellants’ practice to find out their distributors’ requirements in advance, and to place monthly orders with the manufacturers accordingly, would result in a perfect saturation of their “market”; but if it did, Clause (a) of Section 30 does not require the customs duty to be calculated upon any supposition that would involve over supply or any additional supplies.
Without assuming that for Ford cars there was any perfect “market” in Bombay at the time in question, it is quite reasonable to ask what such cars were fetching wholesale at that time and place, and quite reasonable to answer it by taking the prices fetched by the cars under assessment. That the wholesale price obtainable was higher than it would otherwise have been by reason of the appellants’ organisation and business methods is not a ground of exemption under Clause (a), though doubless their methods of business have improved the demand. That it was higher than it would have been, had not the appellants as monopolists carefully controlled the supply, may be equally true, but this again affords no escape from the clause if the case be otherwise within it. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
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1935 (12) TMI 1
Issues Involved:
1. Legislative competence of the Central Legislature under the Constitution Act of 1935.
2. Reasonableness of restrictions imposed on the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 19(6).
3. Legality of the orders passed by the Collector of Excise and their confirmation by higher authorities.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legislative Competence of the Central Legislature
The petitioner argued that Sections 6 and 8 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and the corresponding rules were beyond the legislative competence of the Central Legislature. The contention was that the Act, while imposing excise duties, also regulated trade and commerce, which falls under the provincial list (Items 27 & 29 of List II). The court examined the "pith and substance" of the Act and concluded that it primarily dealt with the imposition and collection of excise duties on tobacco, falling within Item 45 of List I. The court noted that incidental encroachments into the provincial field did not render the Act ultra vires, citing precedents such as Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British Columbia and United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum. The court emphasized that the Act's primary objective was fiscal, aimed at effective excise duty collection, and any regulatory measures were ancillary to this main purpose.
2. Reasonableness of Restrictions under Article 19(6)
The petitioner argued that the Act and the rules imposed unreasonable restrictions on his fundamental right to trade in tobacco. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Act and rules were designed to ensure effective excise duty collection, which is in the public interest. The court found that the procedures for levying penalties and confiscation were in line with natural justice principles, including the right to appeal and revision. The court held that the restrictions were reasonable and saved by Article 19(6) of the Constitution.
3. Legality of the Orders Passed by the Collector of Excise
The petitioner challenged two main orders: the confiscation of tobacco bags and the demand for a cash security deposit. The court found that the Collector acted within his powers under the Central Excise Rules. The first order involved the confiscation of tobacco bags and a penalty, which was upheld because the petitioner failed to deposit the penalty amount required for his appeal. The second order involved the demand for a cash security deposit after the petitioner's surety ceased to act. The court found that the Collector was within his rights to demand a fresh bond or additional security under Rule 140. The court dismissed the petitioner's claims of mala fide actions, noting that no such allegations were made in the petition.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition, holding that the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and the rules made thereunder were within the legislative competence of the Central Legislature. The restrictions imposed by the Act were deemed reasonable and in the public interest, and the orders passed by the Collector of Excise were found to be legal and within the scope of the Act and rules.
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1933 (10) TMI 1
Issues:
1. Whether crushing of mineral lumps into powder amounts to manufacture under Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act.
Analysis:
The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi arose from an order passed by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), New Delhi. The appellants, engaged in manufacturing mineral powders, were alleged to have contravened Rules 9 and 174 by crushing mineral lumps into powder without obtaining a Central Excise License after crossing the exemption limit. The Deputy Collector and the Collector (Appeals) upheld the demand and penalty imposed on the appellants. The appellants contended that crushing mineral lumps into powder did not constitute 'manufacture' as per Section 2(f) of the Act. They relied on various judgments to support their argument, emphasizing that the chemical composition and nature of the mineral did not change through the process. On the other hand, the department argued that the products obtained after crushing were marketable and had distinct characteristics, thus constituting 'manufacture.'
The main issue for consideration was whether crushing and grinding of mineral lumps into powder amounted to 'manufacture' under Section 2(f) of the Act. The appellants argued that the mineral powders retained their original properties and were also marketed in lump form, thus not undergoing a substantial transformation to be considered 'manufacture.' However, the Tribunal observed that the minerals in their natural form were not marketable and required processing to become usable in industries like ceramics and refractories. The Tribunal noted that the products obtained after crushing were distinct in name, character, and use from the mined lumps, making them marketable commodities.
The Tribunal referred to the judgment in the case of Associated Soap Stone Distributing Co. (P) Ltd., where it was held that the conversion of soap stone lumps into powder constituted 'manufacture.' Relying on this precedent, the Tribunal held that the crushing and grinding of mineral lumps into powder or smaller lumps amounted to 'manufacture' under Section 2(f) of the Act. Despite the appellants' reliance on other judgments and decisions, the Tribunal found them distinguishable and not applicable to the current case. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-objection filed by the department.
In conclusion, the Tribunal upheld that the process of crushing and grinding mineral lumps into powder or smaller lumps of specified sizes constituted 'manufacture' under the Central Excises and Salt Act. The decision was based on the distinct marketability and characteristics of the processed minerals compared to their natural form, as established in previous judgments and the specific facts of the case.
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1932 (4) TMI 11
Iimported oils assessable to duty under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 - Held that:- For any proved overcharge of duty alleged in the plaint liability is admitted and while, if appellants’ oils are to be assessed under Section 30(b), the bills of entry value, for reasons already indicated, may not be fully adequate no other basis of value has on this footing been put forward, and to it no objection can in this action be taken. None, indeed, was taken to the acceptance by the learned trial Judge of that basis of value as the foundation of the relief to the appellants which he decreed and it was the basis accepted by the authorities themselves for many years. Their Lordships were informed that as a result of some change of procedure, operative as from 1st April, 1926, the question at issue on this appeal cannot again arise with reference to imports subsequent to that date. But the nature of the change was not explained in detail, and their Lordships have accordingly been careful in terms to confine their judgment to the respondent’s liability for the actual over-payments alleged by the appellants in their plaint.
For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the appeal should be allowed; that the decree of 5th August, 1930, should be discharged, and that of 5th April, 1929 restored.
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1930 (10) TMI 1
Issues Involved:
1. Determination of assessable value of electric fans for purposes of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
2. Inclusion of the value of regulators in the assessable value of electric fans.
3. Deduction of post-manufacturing expenses from the assessable value.
4. Whether Usha Sales Limited is a "related person" under Section 4 of the Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of Assessable Value of Electric Fans:
The primary issue concerns the determination of the assessable value of electric fans manufactured and sold by the petitioner for the purposes of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The respondents argued that the assessable value should be based on the price at which Usha Sales Limited (Usha) sold the goods to other dealers. The petitioner contended that the assessable value should be the price at which it sold the goods to Usha, not the resale price by Usha.
2. Inclusion of the Value of Regulators:
The petitioner argued that the value of regulators should not be included in the assessable value of electric fans until 18th June 1977, when the Tariff was amended to include regulators. The court agreed, stating that a speed regulator is not an integral or indispensable part of an electric fan. The court noted that ceiling fans could be sold without speed regulators and that the manufacture of electric fans could be complete without manufacturing speed regulators. The amendment effective from 19th June 1977 changed the position to include the cost of regulators in the assessable value of fans.
3. Deduction of Post-Manufacturing Expenses:
The petitioner contended that post-manufacturing expenses should be deducted from the price at which the goods were sold to Usha to determine the assessable value. These expenses included transport, godown charges, publicity, servicing, repair charges, interest, and the like. The court upheld this contention, referencing the judgment in Hindustan Milkfood Manufacturers Limited v. Union of India and Others, which supported the deduction of post-manufacturing expenses from the assessable value.
4. Whether Usha Sales Limited is a "Related Person":
The court examined whether Usha could be considered a "related person" under Section 4 of the Act. The definition of "related person" includes those who have mutual interest in each other's business or are distributors of the assessee. The court found no material indicating that Usha and the petitioner had mutual business interests. The court also concluded that Usha could not be considered a distributor in the context of the Act, as the relationship between the petitioner and Usha was on a principal-to-principal basis, not an agency relationship. The court referenced several judicial decisions, including M/s. Hind Lamps Ltd. v. Union of India and S.M. Chemicals & Electronics v. R. Parthasarathy, to support its conclusion that Usha was not a related person.
Judgment:
The court directed the respondents to charge excise duty based on the price at which the goods were sold to Usha, excluding post-manufacturing expenses and the value of regulators for the period prior to 19th June 1977. The court also addressed a preliminary objection regarding the writ petition, stating that the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar the entertainment of a writ petition, especially when constitutional issues are raised.
Conclusion:
The writ petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to determine the liability of the petitioner to excise duty in accordance with the principles enunciated in the judgment. The petitioner was entitled to costs in the writ petition, with counsel's fee set at Rs. 500/-.
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1925 (8) TMI 2
Issues:
1. Legality of the search conducted by the Excise Inspector without a warrant and witnesses.
2. Admissibility of evidence obtained during an allegedly illegal search.
3. Compliance with procedural requirements under the U.P. Excise Act and Cr. P.C.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Legality of the search
The accused was found in possession of cocaine during a search conducted by the Excise Inspector without a search warrant from the Collector and without two search witnesses as required by law. The defense argued that the search was illegal due to the lack of a warrant and witnesses. The court noted that Section 53 of the U.P. Excise Act allows for searches without a warrant under certain circumstances, provided that the grounds for such belief are recorded. The Excise Inspector failed to record the grounds for his belief, constituting a serious irregularity. However, the court found that the evidence of the excisable article found in the accused's possession was clear and accepted by the lower courts, which mitigated the impact of the irregularity.
Issue 2: Admissibility of evidence
The court cited precedents to establish that the absence of a search warrant does not render a subsequent conviction illegal if satisfactory evidence of the excisable article's possession is presented. Even though procedural requirements were not fully met, the court emphasized that the primary consideration is the reliability and necessity of the search in the public interest. As long as the evidence of the offense is strong and reliable, the irregularities in the search process do not bar the conviction.
Issue 3: Compliance with procedural requirements
The defense also argued that the search was illegal under Section 103 of the Cr. P.C. as the Excise Inspector did not have two respectable inhabitants accompany him during the search. The court acknowledged the importance of complying with such provisions but highlighted that if due to circumstances, the required witnesses were unavailable, the search could still lead to a valid conviction based on the evidence presented. The court referred to a previous case where an illegal search did not prevent a conviction. Ultimately, the court found no reason to interfere with the conviction, deeming the sentence appropriate, and dismissed the application challenging the conviction.
In conclusion, the judgment upheld the conviction of the accused for possession of cocaine, despite procedural irregularities in the search process, emphasizing the importance of strong and reliable evidence in establishing guilt.
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1913 (3) TMI 1
The accused was convicted under Section 63 of the Excise Act for possessing cocaine without lawful authority. The search of the accused's house was deemed illegal, but evidence of cocaine possession was found. The High Court allowed the appeal, overturned the acquittal, and reinstated the conviction, reducing the sentence to time served and setting aside the fine. The court noted the importance of obtaining a search warrant in such cases.
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1908 (1) TMI 1
Issues:
1. Interpretation of the term "manufacture" under Section 25 of the Act of Congress.
2. Determination of whether the special treatment of corks imported from Spain qualifies them as articles manufactured in the United States.
3. Analysis of whether corks used in bottling beer for exportation are eligible for drawback under Section 25.
Analysis:
1. The judgment revolves around the interpretation of the term "manufacture" under Section 25 of the Act of Congress, which allows for a drawback on exported articles manufactured using imported materials. The court emphasized that while every change involves treatment, labor, and manipulation, not every change amounts to manufacture. The key criterion is transformation, where a new and distinct article emerges with a unique name, character, or use. This transformation is essential for an article to qualify as manufactured under the statute, as established in Hartranft v. Wiegmann. The court rejected the claim that the special treatment of corks in question amounted to manufacture, as the corks remained fundamentally unchanged in character and use after treatment.
2. The case also delved into whether the special treatment of corks imported from Spain rendered them articles manufactured in the United States. The claimant argued that the extensive treatment process, including washing, steaming, and chemical baths, transformed the corks into essential components for bottling beer for export. However, the court found that despite the treatment, the corks retained their basic nature and did not undergo a substantial transformation to qualify as articles manufactured in the United States. The court compared this scenario to a previous case involving bottles and corks for beer exportation, where a similar argument was rejected.
3. Lastly, the judgment addressed the eligibility of corks used in bottling beer for exportation to claim a drawback under Section 25. The court considered whether the exportation of beer, rather than corks or bottles, constituted an exported article entitled to a drawback. The court highlighted the meticulous process of treating corks to ensure the quality and safety of the exported beer, emphasizing the necessity of such treatment for successful exportation. Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the corks, despite the treatment, did not meet the criteria for articles manufactured in the United States eligible for a drawback under the statute.
In conclusion, the judgment provides a detailed analysis of the interpretation of the term "manufacture," the impact of special treatment on imported corks, and the eligibility of corks used in bottling beer for a drawback under Section 25 of the Act of Congress. The court's decision underscores the importance of transformation and distinctiveness in determining whether imported materials qualify as manufactured articles for the purpose of claiming drawbacks on exported goods.
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1800 (1) TMI 3
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of excise duty recovery.
2. Inclusion of tin-container and freight costs in the valuation for excise duty.
3. Exhaustion of remedies under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.
4. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of Excise Duty Recovery:
The respondents filed a suit contending that the Union of India had illegally recovered certain amounts as excise duties under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The trial court decreed in favor of the respondents, ordering a refund of Rs. 60,334.44. The respondents argued that the excise duty was improperly levied on a higher price, which included the cost of tin-containers and freight, thus inflating the value of the vegetable products.
2. Inclusion of Tin-Container and Freight Costs:
The respondents disputed the inclusion of the cost of tin-containers and freight in the valuation for excise duty. They contended that these costs should be deducted before the levy of excise duty. The appellants argued that the vegetable oil could not be sold without the container, making the packaging an ancillary part of the manufacturing process. However, the court noted that the product, hydrogenated vegetable oil, could be transported in bulk containers and sold without tin-containers. The court emphasized that only the value of the excisable product itself should be considered, excluding post-manufacturing costs like packaging and freight. The court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in A.K. Roy v. Voltas Limited, which stated that excise duty should be levied only on the manufacturing cost and profit, excluding post-manufacturing expenses.
3. Exhaustion of Remedies under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944:
The appellants contended that the respondents had not exhausted the remedies provided by the Act, such as filing an appeal under Section 35 and a revision under Section 36. They also argued that the suit was barred under Section 40 of the Act, which provided immunity for acts done in good faith under the Act. However, the court found that the levy of excise duty on the value of the tin-container and freight was not warranted by the Act, making it an illegal levy. The court held that Section 40 did not bar a suit for recovery of an amount levied illegally as duty.
4. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts:
The appellants argued that the jurisdiction of civil courts was barred by Section 40 of the Act. However, the court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., which stated that the jurisdiction of civil courts is not excluded unless there is an express bar or the statute provides an adequate remedy. The court concluded that Section 40 did not bar the jurisdiction of civil courts, as it only provided immunity for acts done in good faith under the Act. The court affirmed the trial court's decree and dismissed the appeal with costs.
Conclusion:
The court held that the inclusion of the cost of tin-containers and freight in the valuation for excise duty was illegal. It affirmed the trial court's decree ordering a refund to the respondents. The court also held that the suit was maintainable, and the jurisdiction of civil courts was not barred by the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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