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VAT / Sales Tax - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 27658 Records
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2025 (2) TMI 617
Demand of surcharge, despite the absence of an assessment and recovery mechanism - demand of purchase tax, without establishing that the Petitioner has violated the condition precedent, namely, that the goods purchased have been used for purposes other than for use in manufacture or for resale - HELD THAT:- Though ordinarily it is agreed that recovery of taxes ought not to be stayed, and which is stipulated in Section 21 (7), it is found that there is an inherent inconsistency in the argument canvassed on behalf of the State. If the State contends that surcharge is different from tax, then, the statutory bar as referred to in Section 21 (7) cannot apply because the Section clearly stipulates that what should not be stayed is only the recovery of tax. On the other hand, if one were to treat surcharge as tax, then, at least prima facie, the Petitioner would be entitled to the benefits set out in Rule 15 (2) (b) and would make the recovery itself vulnerable to challenge.
The Petitioner has certainly made out a case to have the recovery proceedings stayed pending the disposal of the Reference Applications filed by it before the MSTT. This is said because the Petitioner-HPCL is a Public Sector Undertaking and it is not as if the Petitioner would be unable to pay the tax, if finally decided, either by the Tribunal or by this Court. In these circumstances, it is opined that even the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Petitioner.
Conclusion - The MSTT is directed to decide the Reference Applications filed by the Petitioner expeditiously and stay the recovery proceedings until a decision is reached.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (2) TMI 475
Revision of assessments of the assessee-respondent made for the assessment years 2002-2003 to 2004-2005 - refund the exempted portion of the tax as per the provision of Package Scheme of Incentives 1993 on the sale of goods effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce - HELD THAT:- The State Government though continues to have the power in public interest to grant exemption/partial exemption of tax on inter- State sale, trade or commerce but the same is subject to fulfilment of the requirements laid down under Sub-Section (4) of Section 8 of the CST Act which means that henceforth the exemption so granted would be admissible only if Form ‘C’ and ‘D’ are supplied by the dealer in context with the aforesaid interstate sale, trade and commerce.
The absolute power initially conferred under Section 8(5) upon the State Government to grant exemption/partial exemption of tax in connection with inter-State sale, trade or commerce with the amendment was circumscribed and restricted to the fulfilment of the requirement of Section 8(4) of the CST Act which prescribes for the submission of Form ‘C’ and ‘D’ only w.e.f. 11.05.2002. However, such restrictions are prospective in nature and would not apply retrospectively to cases where absolute exemption was permitted much prior to the amendment.
In the instant case, the assessee-respondent was granted tax benefits under the PSI 1993 issued in exercise of power under Section 8(5) of the CST Act as per the eligibility and entitlement certificates dated 20.02.1998 and 24.03.1998 respectively and that said benefit was available to the assessee-respondent up to the period of 2012 or to the extent of Rs.273.54 crore, whichever was earlier. The said benefit granted to the assessee-respondent was not with any restriction, much less the condition of submission of Form ‘C’ and ‘D’. Thus, on the basis of such exemption granted by the petitioner vide Eligibility Certificate dated 20.02.1998 and Entitlement Certificate dated 24.03.1998, a substantive right had accrued to the respondent to claim the said benefit up to the year 2012 or to the extent of Rs.273.54 crore - in view of the amendment of Section 8(5) by the Finance Act, 2002, the State Government ceases to have power to grant exemption in respect of sale of goods covered under Section 8(2) but that is not the issue herein. The precise issue in the present case is whether the aforesaid amendment would take away the right which had accrued to the assessee-respondent under the Eligibility/Entitlement certificates wherein absolute exemptions were granted without any condition of submission of Form ‘C’ and ‘D’.
In the case at hand, the assessee-respondent was held eligible for absolute exemption under the PSI 1993 issued in exercise of power under Section 8(5) of the CST Act as per Eligibility certificate dated 20.02.1998 and Entitlement certificate dated 24.03.1998 granting exemption to it from payment of tax under the BST Act and CST Act to the extent of Rs. 273.54 crore or up till 2012, whichever is earlier. The said exemption granted to the assessee-respondent was much prior to the enforcement of the Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 11.05.2002. Therefore, by virtue of the unamended Section 8(5) and the Notification issued thereunder as well as under the aforesaid Eligibility and Entitlement certificates, a substantive right of exemption from payment of tax had accrued to the assessee-respondent - The requirement for fulfilling the condition of Section 8(4) of the CST Act for getting the benefit of tax exemption came subsequently after the amendment of Section 8(5) with effect from 11.05.2002 and would apply prospectively to transactions in respect of which eligibility and entitlement certificates are issued subsequently.
Conclusion - The State Government was not competent to issue the impugned notices for revising the assessment of the assessee-respondent and to demand the exempted tax only for the reason that the assessee-respondent has not submitted Form ‘C’ and ‘D’ in support of inter-State sale, trade & commerce. The requirement of submission of Form ‘C’ and ‘D’ would apply prospectively after 11.05.2002 i.e., after the Finance Act of 2002.
The appeal lacks merit and hence dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 474
Dismissal of second appeal - Denial of entire input tax credit and special rebate claimed - absence of any separate account, for raw materials traceable to products transferred outside the state, maintained by the assessee - HELD THAT:- It is found that inasmuch as the Tribunal has merely accepted the findings of the First Appellate Authority on facts that were not disputed by the State in the appeals before the Tribunal, there is no substantial question of law that arises for consideration in these OT. Revision petitions. The subjective satisfaction arrived at by the First Appellate Authority, based on records and data produced before him, would suffice to hold that the revenue has not made out a case warranting interference with the impugned order of the Tribunal.
Conclusion - The revenue did not establish a case warranting interference with the Tribunal's order, leading to the dismissal of the OT.
These OT. Revisions are dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 473
Addition of sale turnover by relying on the income disclosed under the head 'Income from Other Sources'/ 'Other Income’ in the trading profit and loss account for the relevant assessment year - estimating the sales turnover for the purpose of assessment under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act - estimating the sales turnover from the income disclosed under the head 'Income from Other Source' in the trading profit and loss account, without any independent finding - estimating the sale turnover by adopting the turnover at 8% as gross profit as the benchmark without any comparable data - benefit of the sub clause (3) of Section 25AA of the KVAT Act - HELD THAT:- Section 25 (1) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 prescribes the power of the assessing authority to complete the assessment on best judgment basis, if it is found that any income has escaped the assessment. It is now trite law that even when an intelligence officer initiates proceedings for penalty under Section 67 of the KVAT Act and finalises a report, the said report cannot form the basis of reopening of the assessment. The above principle equally applies to the proceedings initiated under Section 25. The assessing officer is bound to conduct an independent enquiry as regards the materials available, which according to him requires reopening of the assessment or completing the assessment on a best judgment basis.
The assessing officer proceeded clearly on an assumption, which is impermissible under the scheme of the Act. The infirmity which had crept into the assessment order was not considered in proper perspective by the first appellate authority as well as by the appellate tribunal.
Conclusion - None of the authorities have considered the case in hand in its true perspective and applied the law correctly. Thus, the order of assessment as confirmed by the first appellate authority and the tribunal cannot be sustained.
The O.T. Revision is allowed by setting aside the order of assessment dated 17.10.2017 as confirmed by the first appellate authority as well as by the tribunal and answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2025 (2) TMI 472
Disallowance of input tax credit claimed by the Respondent on purchases effected from dealers who had failed to discharge their tax liability on such sales - disallowance of input tax credit claimed by the Respondent, despite the fact that the Respondent had utterly failed to discharge his burden of proving the correctness and genuineness of such claim - levy of penalty under Section 70(2)(a) of the KVAT Act - HELD THAT:- The Revenue officials have power to investigate and for that, they can summon any person as witness or otherwise cannot be gainfully disputed. The Assessment Officer having undertaken the investigation has formed an opinion as to there being a clandestine case of Bill Trading with the connivance. Once such an opinion is available in the very Assessment Order, it was open to the Assessee to dispel/dilute the same by producing evidentiary material. In fact, he had undertaken in writing to bring the representative of dealers to depose in his favour - No explanation is offered why he did not avail that facility. To this needs to be added one militant fact that the selling dealers enumerated in the Reassessment Order have not deposited the tax component claimed to have been paid by the Respondent Assessee on its purchase of goods.
The goods in question were copper/GI strips, sheets, patties, plates & wires. How such heavy things could have been transported in two-wheelers & three wheelers, remains to be a mystery wrapped in enigma. The reasoning of the Tribunal that in only one instance of transports, Kinetic Honda two-wheeler was used and other vehicles were autos/trucks, does not make much sense. If a dealer does not offer explanation as to why he militantly lied even in respect of one single vehicle, that would cast shadow on the truthfulness of his other statements. We hasten to add that we are not invoking the maxim falses in uno, falses omnibus i.e., proof of falsity in one thing raises a strong presumption of falsity in everything - There is force in the submission of learned AGA that the version of officials of the Tax Department, founded on evidentiary material as to the unscrupulous transactions cannot be lightly interfered for askance. Therefore, the Tribunal is not justified in upsetting the findings recorded by the Assessing Authority. Even the First Appellate Authority committed an error in upsetting the levy of penalty inasmuch as, there was absolutely no material warranting the same.
Penalty - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal was swayed away by the documents such as purchase –sale invoices, statement of accounts, purchase & sale register extract coupled with copies of cheques, it missed a very two important factors i.e., the requirement of proof of movement of goods, especially when the Revenue had pleaded that the tax component had not reached the Public Exchequer. Lastly, it needs to be stated that there are no basis on which the First Appellate Authority could quash the Penalty Order u/s.70 (2) of the Act.
Conclusion - i) The burden of proof lies with the dealer claiming input tax credit and that mere production of invoices or payment by cheques is not sufficient to discharge this burden. ii) The Tribunal is not justified in upsetting the findings recorded by the Assessing Authority. Even the First Appellate Authority committed an error in upsetting the levy of penalty inasmuch as, there was absolutely no material warranting the same.
The impugned order of the Tribunal is set at naught in its entirety - appeal of revenue allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 471
Challenge to Assessment Order revised by the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes - HELD THAT:- It is not inclined to grant interference in the matter inasmuch as the question as to revisability of Assessment Order of the kind is no longer res integra. In KIRLOSKAR POWER SUPPLY CO. LTD. VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA [2006 (6) TMI 490 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], it is observed 'Jurisdiction is clearly defined under section 15 of the Act. In the case on hand, it is seen that the Additional Commissioner has rightly invoked his power under section 15 of the Act for the purpose of revising the order passed by the Joint Commissioner. However, while passing the final order he has chosen to set aside the subsequent assessment order passed by the assessing authority. This could not have been done by him in terms of section 15 of the Act.'
It is difficult to countenance the contention of learned AGA that the expression ‘any proceedings’ employed in Section 15 would include the order of the Commercial Tax officer and therefore, the impugned order is sustainable.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 313
Refusal of the assessing authorities to receive ‘H’ Forms that were sought to be produce after the assessment proceedings had been completed - time limit for receipt of ‘H’ Forms - HELD THAT:- Rule 12 (7) states that ‘C’ forms or ‘F’ forms would have to be filed, before the prescribed authority, within three months after the end of the period to which the declaration or the certificate relates. However, the proviso to Rule 12 (7) states that the prescribed authority could permit processing or filing of such declaration or certificate beyond the time set out in Rule 12 (7), if sufficient cause is made out as to why the forms could not be filed within time.
Under Rule 12 (10) the declaration in Form ‘H’ can be furnished to the prescribed authority only up to the time of assessment by the first assessing authority. There is no proviso to this provision, akin to Rule 12 (7) of the Rules. This would mean that the time frame set out under Rule 12 (10) is absolute and there is no leeway for grant of any further time by the authority - a closer look at Rule 12 (10) (b) shows that the said view may not be correct. Rule 12 (10) (b) states that if any rules are made by the respective State Governments, relating to the filing of Form ‘H’, then the rules as they applied to the declaration in Form ‘C’, prescribed under the CST (R&T) Rules, would mutatis mutandia apply to filing of a certificate in Form ‘H’.
Thus, filing of Form ‘H’ would not be mutatis mutandia with the filing of Form ’C’ and ‘F’.
Conclusion - In the absence of specific state rules, 'H' Forms cannot be accepted post-assessment.
It would only be appropriate that the matter is placed before the Hon’ble The Chief Justice for reference to a Full Bench to resolve this issue.
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2025 (2) TMI 312
Challenge to assessment order - movement of goods from the manufacturing unit of the appellant in Rajasthan to its depots in Bihar - inter-state supply of goods or inter-state stock transfers? - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the order dated 28.12.2015 passed by the Rajasthan Tax Board shows that it has reproduced the observations of the Rajasthan Tax Board in Appeal No’s. 1229-1233 decided on 24.11.2014. It is these five appeals which were assailed by M/s United Breweries Ltd. in Central Sales Tax No’s. 16/2014, 17/2014, 18/2014, 19/2014 and 20/2014 that to were allowed by this Tribunal by order dated 21.10.2024 [2024 (10) TMI 1124 - CESTAT NEW DELHI].
Conclusion - The movement of goods was a stock transfer, not an inter-state sale, and thus not subject to central sales tax.
The order dated 28.12.2015 passed by the Rajasthan Tax Board in Appeal No. 2210 of 2014 which has been assailed in this appeal deserves to be set aside and is set aside. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 253
Challenge to orders of attachment of the bank account and the immoveable property - time limitation for issuing an assessment order under Section 21 (4) of AP VAT Act - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the impugned order would show that the entire order goes on the basis of best judgment assessment, relying upon the returns filed by the petitioner. There is nowhere any mention of suppression of facts, much less, willful suppression of facts, resulting in willful evasion of tax, which is the sine qua non, for invoking Section 21 (5) of the Act. In such circumstances, the provisions of Section 21 (5) of the Act would not be applicable and the period of limitation would be four years, as set out under Section 21 (4) of the Act.
Conclusion - As the impugned assessment order has been passed beyond the period stipulated under Section 21 (4) of the Act, it must be held that the impugned order is beyond limitation and non-est.
Both the writ petitions are allowed setting aside the impugned assessment order of the Commercial Tax Officer, Addanki Circle, dated 24.08.2021 and penalty notice dated 16.09.2021.
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2025 (2) TMI 178
Assessment and refund of taxes under the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (AVAT Act) and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - non-compliance to the Circular No. 15/2010 - HELD THAT:- This Court had duly perused the Circular No. 15/2010 dated 23.08.2010. The said Circular is in respect to carrying out VAT Audit Assessment and do not prescribe any instructions or directions in so far as the Revisional Authority is concerned. Under such circumstances, the question of challenging the revisional order dated 26.02.2020 on the basis of the Circular No.15/2020 is totally misconceived.
This Court had perused the impugned orders dated 26.02.2020. It is seen that the Revisional Authority while deciding the said revision applications filed by the petitioner firm had made necessary enquiries as is apparent from a perusal of the contents of the revisional orders. The necessary enquiries were made on the basis of the Excise Documents, Certificates from officers of receiving States of Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, proof of the existence of the purchasing dealers, the facts of sales and facts of goods reaching other States proved by excise documents - There is nothing on record to show that the impugned orders dated 26.02.2020 are result of fraud or is on account of collusion. This Court has also duly taken note of the impugned orders dated 26.02.2020 and there is nothing to show that the impugned orders suffers from any perversity. Under such circumstances, the question of issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari to set aside the impugned orders dated 26.02.2020 do not arise.
This Court therefore finds no merits in the instant batch of writ petitions so filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes, Tinsukia challenging the impugned orders dated 26.02.2020 passed in respect to the Act of 2003 and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 for which the same stands dismissed.
Conclusion - i) The pre-deposits for revision admission are not duty payments and must be refunded upon successful revision. ii) The tax authorities are directed to issue fresh assessment orders within six weeks and process refunds within four weeks thereafter. iii) The petitioner firm was entitled to a refund of pre-deposits with interest at 9% per annum from 08.05.2021.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 138
Requirement to supply declaration in Form-F - transfer of promotional products such as Physician’s Samples as well as ‘Brand Reminders’ free of cost to depots or branches of the appellant located in other States or for supply of promotional products free of cost to the medical representatives of the appellant posted in other States, sales in the course of inter-State trade had not taken place - applicability of provisions of section 6A of the CST Act - HELD THAT:- Under article 246(1) of the Constitution, Parliament has the exclusive power to make laws with any of the matters enumerated in List 1 of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 92A of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule deals with taxes on the sale or purchase of goods, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. This entry was inserted by Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956. The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was, accordingly, enacted.
Section 6 of the CST Act is contained in Chapter III and deals with “inter-State sales tax”. Sub-section (1) of section 6, in particular, deals with “liability to tax on inter-State sales”. It provides that subject to the provisions contained in the Act, every dealer shall be liable to pay tax on all sales effected by him in the course of inter-State trade or commerce during any year.
The contention of the appellant is that the transfer of promotional products are not capable of being sold and, in fact, have not been sold and, therefore, such a transfer would not amount to “sale” as defined in section 2 of the CST Act. Elaborating this submission, learned counsel pointed out that the taxable event for levy of central sales tax under the charging provisions of section 6 of the CST Act is that a “sale” has been effected by a dealer in the course of inter-State trade and as the jurisdictional condition constituting a “sale” is not fulfilled, central sales tax cannot be demanded from the appellant - In view of amendment made in sub-section (1) of section 6A of the CST Act w.e.f. 11.05.2002, the filing of Form-F no longer remains optional.
Section 6A provides for the only manner in which a dealer can substantiate that transfer of goods was otherwise than by way of sale and that is by furnishing a declaration in Form-F. It is not a case of the appellant that movement of goods had not taken place from the State of Maharashtra to other States. The contention is that the movement of goods was not by reason of sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. It was, therefore, imperative for the appellant, in terms of section 6A of the CST Act, to have furnished the declaration in Form-F.
The Bombay High Court in Johnson Matthey Chemicals India Pvt. Ltd. vs. The State of Maharashtra through the Government Pleader, High Court, Mumbai and others [2016 (2) TMI 543 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] examined the amended provisions of section 6A of the CST Act and held that for discharging the burden the dealer would have to produce and furnish to the assessing authority a declaration in Form-F and if the dealer fails to furnish the declaration, then the movement of goods shall be deemed for all purposes of the CST Act to have occasioned as a result of sale.
In Ashok Leyland [2004 (1) TMI 365 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court also examined the provisions of the amended section 6A of the CST Act and held that whereas prior to the amendment in sub-section (1) of section 6A, a dealer had an option of filing a declaration in Form-F but after the amendment w.e.f. 11.05.2002 a dealer does not have any option and if the dealer fails to file such a declaration, the transaction would be deemed to be an inter-State sale. The Supreme Court emphasised on the use of the expression “deemed” and held that if this is interpreted differently, an incongruity would ensue.
Thus, if a dealer intends to take up a case that transfer of goods was otherwise then by way of sale, he has to submit a declaration in Form-F, otherwise the deeming fiction contained in sub-section (1) of section 6A will come into play and the movement of goods shall be deemed for all purposes of the CST Act to have been occasioned by reason of sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
Conclusion - The appellant must produce Form-F declarations for transfers to depots or branches in other states. For transfers to medical representatives, where obtaining Form-F is impractical, the assessing authority is to consider the specific circumstances and make a determination based on the merits of each case.
There is no infirmity in the order passed by the State Tribunal that may call for any interference in these appeals. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
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2025 (2) TMI 99
Vires of the West Bengal Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2012 as it stood prior to its amendment - constitutional validity of the original Act and the amendments.
What is the effect of the ratio of Jindal Stainless Ltd. [2016 (11) TMI 545 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] on the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated June 24, 2013? - HELD THAT:- Although, Jindal Stainless Ltd has held that, all judgements that follow Atiabari [1960 (9) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT], Automobile Transport [1962 (4) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT] and Jindal Steel Ltd [2016 (11) TMI 545 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] stands overruled, nonetheless, the appeals directed against the impugned judgement and order of the learned Single Judge remained pending without a formal order of disposal of the same. The appeals therefore are required to be formally disposed of an Appeal Court. A finding has to returned as to whether, the impugned judgement and order of the learned Single Judge following the overruled decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in Atiabari, Automobile Transport and Jindal Steel Ltd, in deciding the constitutional validity of the Entry Tax Act, 2012 should be sustained or not.
A finding is returned that, learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgement and order dated June 24, 2013 proceeded on the basis of the ratio laid down in Atiabari, Automobile Transport and Jindal Steel Ltd to decide on the constitutional validity of the Entry Tax Act, 2012. Consequently, the impugned judgement and order dated June 24, 2013 cannot survive, subsequent to the pronouncement of Jindal Stainless Ltd. - the impugned judgement and order dated June 24, 2013 passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside.
Are the impugned orders of the learned Tribunal correct? - HELD THAT:- Interim order passed by the Appeal Court on July 31, 2013 had permitted the assessment under the Entry Tax Act, 2012 to be continued. It had also restrained refund of the tax already collected. Appeal Court did not vacate the stay granted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgement and order. Appeal Court had regulated the implementation of the Entry Tax Act, 2012 in the manner noted in its order dated July 31, 2013. Therefore, it cannot be said that, the Appeal Court had decided on the vires of the Entry Tax Act, 2012 finally on either side of the divide. In fact, Appeal Court had made the interim arrangements as done by the interim order dated July 31, 2013 on the basis that the Entry Tax Act, 2012 subsists. It had therefore allowed the assessment under the Entry Tax Act, 2012 to continue with no refund being made.
Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. [1992 (4) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT] has considered the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and held that, when the High Court passes an interim order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority exercising powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985, the same does not revive the appeal which had been dismissed as no such proceedings was pending before the Appellate Authority.
There are no position to arrive at a finding that, the Entry Tax Act, 2012 came to be declared ultra vires on the expiry of 6 weeks from the date of the impugned judgement and order of the learned Single Judge being June 24, 2013 and consequently stood obliterated. Consequently, it cannot be held that, the amendments sought to be introduced by the West Bengal Finance Act, 2017 to the Entry Tax Act, 2012 are invalid simply on the basis that, the Entry Tax Act, 2012 stood obliterated on the expiry of 6 weeks from the date of the impugned judgement and order.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the amending act does not take away any benefit which has accrued to any assessees by the amendments introduced retrospectively. At least now materials have been placed before us to suggest so.
Was the Entry Tax Act, 2012 in force at the time of its amendment on March 6, 2017 in view of the impugned judgment and order dated June 24, 2013 of the learned Single Judge? - HELD THAT:- Entry Tax Act, 2012 was in force at the time of its amendment on March 6, 2017.
Are the amendments introduced to the Entry Tax Act of 2012 by the West Bengal Finance Act, 2017 valid? - HELD THAT:- The amendments introduced to the Entry Tax Act, 2012 by the West Bengal Finance Act, 2017 are valid.
Are the amendments introduced by the West Bengal Finance Act, 2017 to the Entry Tax Act, 2012 discriminatory? - HELD THAT:- The amendments introduced by the West Bengal Finance Act, 2017 to the Entry Tax Act, 2012 are not discriminatory.
Conclusion - i) The Entry Tax Act, 2012 was valid at the time of its amendment, and the amendments introduced by the West Bengal Finance Act, 2017 were lawful and non-discriminatory. ii) The taxes are not inherently unconstitutional unless proven discriminatory. iii) The decision in Jindal Stainless Ltd. was pivotal in shaping the Court's conclusions, particularly regarding the overruling of earlier precedents.
The writ petitions are disposed of by setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal.
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2025 (2) TMI 98
Challenge to Impugned Assessment Orders - no period of limitation prescribed - challenge to the Impugned Assessment Orders are primarily on the ground that confirmation of demand for the respective Assessment Years viz., 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 are long after the period covered by the Impugned Assessment Orders - HELD THAT:- The Entry Tax Act, 2001 is not a self contained enactment. It is dependent on the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (TNGST) Act, 1959 and later under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax (TNVAT) Act, 2006 after the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (TNGST) Act, 1959 was repealed and stood substituted with the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax (TNVAT) Act, 2006 - Assessment under the provisions of the Entry Tax Act, 2001 and under the provision of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (TNGST) Act, 1959 have to be made coterminously as the basic documents required for assessment are one and the same. These documents have to be maintained for a period of five years though separate returns have been filed under these enactments.
A reading of Rule 4(1) of the Entry Tax Rules, 2001, also makes it clear that, after the close of the year, for which the returns referred to in Sub- Rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Entry Tax Rules, 2001 have been filed or where an importer has discontinued the business the course of the year, the Assessing Authority has to finally assess the tax payable in a single order on the basis of the return for the year to which the return relates - Such assessment has to be completed after scrutiny of the accounts and making such enquiry as may be considered necessary to complete and finalize the assessment on the basis of a single order. Thus, the scheme of the Entry Tax Act is to finalize the assessment as expeditiously as possible although no time limit is prescribed.
Since no time limit has been prescribed for completing the assessment under Rule 3(4), Rule 4(3) of the Entry Tax Rules, 2001, assessment has to be completed within a reasonable period of time and thereafter assessment for escaped turnover under Section 16 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (TNGST) Act, 1959 within a period of 5 years.
Conclusion - i) There was no justification in passing the Impugned Assessment Orders belated in the year 2021 in respect of the Assessment Year 2003-2004 and the Assessment Year 2004-2005. It has to be assumed that the Department has accepted the returns filed by the petitioner for the respective Assessment Years and the assessment was completed under Rule 4(1) of the Entry Tax Rules, 2001. ii) The powers could have been invoked within 5 years after deemed assessment under Rule 4(1) of the Entry Tax Rules, 2001 and after the date of filing of returns.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (2) TMI 3
Rejection of application filed by the petitioner to rectify the Assessment Orders that were earlier passed on 17.12.2019 for the Assessment Years 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 - writ petition was earlier dismissed for default due to non prosecution - HELD THAT:- It is noticed that even as per the respondent, the correct method for determination of the classification would be either before the Appellate Commissioner or before the Advance Ruling Authority. Prima facie, it appears that the issue stands now covered in favour of the petitioner as the Appellate Commissioner has accepted the contentions of the petitioner that product manufactured and dealt by the petitioner was indeed animal supplement and was exempted in terms of Item No.5, Commodity Code No.705 of IV Schedule appended to TNVAT Act, 2006 in terms of the above mentioned orders of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner.
The impugned orders are set aside and the cases are remitted back to the respondent to pass a fresh order on merits and in accordance with the aforesaid order of the Deputy Appellate Commissioner (ST FAC). Needless to state, the Department is entitled to take up the issue before the Appellate Forum as has been done against the order of the Appellate Deputy Commissioner dated 17.03.2023.
Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (2) TMI 2
Revision of assessment - escaped turnover - specific case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was deemed to have been assessed in terms of Section 22(2) of TNVAT Act, 2006 on 31.10.2014 - HELD THAT:- A reading of the impugned order indicates that barring discussion on the limitation and a conclusion that there was a escaped turnover there is no clear discussion as to how the proposal contained in the revised notice dated 04.12.2020 was sustained. It is however made clear that equitable principles of estoppal will not apply on tax and equity are strangers like chalk and cheese. Therefore, merely the first revised notice dated 28.11.2017 proposed a sum of Rs. 3,15,489/- ipso facto would not mean the respondent was precluded for issuing a revised notice dated 04.12.2020 proposing to revised escaped turnover of Rs. 17,12,472/-. The order has to clearly discuss the same. Therefore, to balance the interest of the parties, Court is inclined to set aside the impugned order and the remits the case back to re-do the adjudication on merits within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Conclusion - The impugned order was deficient in addressing the merits and thus set it aside, remitting the case for re-adjudication on the merits within three months.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (2) TMI 1
Dismissal of appeal - appeal dismissed on the ground that the appellant had opted for composition under section 6 of the Delhi Sales Tax on Works Contract Act and so there was no need to examine whether the transaction of Rs. 2,59,19,818/- was in connection with inter-State sale or not - HELD THAT:- The preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the State of Delhi is that this appeal is not maintainable since an appeal shall lie only against an order passed by the highest Appellate Authority of a State under the CST Act determining issues relating to stock transfers or consignment of goods, in so far as it involves a dispute of inter-State nature.
The preliminary objection has merits. An appeal would lie to this Tribunal only against any order passed by the highest Appellate Authority of the State under the CST Act. “Authority” has been defined under section 19 of the CST Act. Prior to 31.03.2023 an appeal would lie to the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority, but after the amendment made by Finance Act No. 08 of 2023 w.e.f. 31.03.2023, appeal would lie to this Tribunal, namely, The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The assessment order was passed under the provisions of the Delhi Sales Tax on Works Contract Act, against which the appellant filed an appeal under section 43(1) of the Delhi Sales Tax Act before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeal) as the provisions of section 16(1) of the Delhi Sales Tax on Works Contract Act make applicable the provisions of appeals under the Delhi Sales Tax Act. A further appeal was filed by the appellant before the Appellate Tribunal under section 43(2) the Delhi Sales Tax Act. The said appeal was dismissed by order dated 30.06.2014.
The order dated 30.06.2014 was certainly not passed by the Appellate Tribunal under the provisions of the CST Act - the appellant did have a remedy against the order dated 30.06.2014 of the Appellate Tribunal under section 45 of the Delhi Sales Tax Act by requiring the Appellate Tribunal to refer the matter to the High Court on any question of law arising out of such order, but that remedy was not exercised by the appellant and instead this appeal was filed under section 20 of the CST Act, which appeal is clearly not maintainable.
Conclusion - i) The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable under Section 20 of the CST Act. ii) The appellant was held liable to pay tax under the composition scheme without deductions for inter-State sales.
This appeal would, therefore, have to be dismissed as not maintainable and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1435
Levy of penalty - evasion of tax under the Punjab VAT Act by not submitting the bills at ICC despite the fact that the details of bills are duly mentioned in the Statutory Form of Rajasthan (VAT 47) and was produced at the time of generation of information for other transactions - jurisdiction to check and detain the vehicles at the ICC premises - HELD THAT:- The undisputed fact is that the goods i.e. iron goods being transported in two vehicles were detained by the Excise and Taxation Officer (MW), Bathinda for verification on the grounds that the goods in transit were in excess by weight as was detected after weighment, and requisite information in respect of excess goods was not furnished at any ICC. After issuance of show cause notice, Shri Neeraj Kumar Manager of the firm M/s Shree Shiva Steels, Mandi Gobindgarh, appeared before the Detaining Officer who claimed himself to be the owner of the excess goods loaded in both the vehicles.
A perusal of the record further shows that the drivers of both the trucks did not produce any document in respect of excess goods and categorically stated that they have no other document relating to the goods in question. The explanation given by owner of the goods that since the TIN of the consignor firm was blocked, therefore, the drivers could not generate the information in respect of excess goods, cannot be believed since perusal of the record shows that GR No.980 and 981 alongwith retail invoices No.39 and 40 dated 19.08.2009 were produced by Sh. Neeraj Kumar stated to be Manager of the appellant-firm, after the show cause notice was issued to the owner of the goods. Further these documents should have been with the drivers at the time of furnishing information at ICC as per the requirement of Section 51 (2) of the Act as referred to above. This proves the intention of the appellant to evade tax.
A perusal of the record shows that the Ld. AETC (MW) Bathinda after conducting proper inquiry and after giving full opportunity of being heard to the appellant, has passed the penalty order under Section 51 (7) (c) of the Act.
There are no infirmity in the order dated 30.07.2010 passed by the Ld. VAT Tribunal, Punjab, Chandigarh, the same is upheld - appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 1434
Denial of input tax credit in terms of Section 19(5)(c) and 19(2)(V) of the TNVAT Act, 2006 - whether the petitioner was entitled to file a petition under Section 84 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 which is pari materia to Section 55 of the TNGST Act, 1959? - HELD THAT:- The application that was filed by the petitioner under Section 84 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 is in time. Even if the writ petition that were filed by the petitioner earlier challenging the Recovery Notice and the Assessment order dated 24.06.2016 were to be dismissed on account of latches, it cannot be construed that the application under Section 84 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 were barred. Even if the Appellate remedy is not available under Section 51 of the TNVAT Act, 2006, the remedy under Section 84 of the Act cannot be denied particularly when the law has been settled in favour of the assessee.
The impugned order dated 11.05.2022 stands quashed and the case stands remitted back to the respondent to pass a fresh order on merits - Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2025 (1) TMI 1433
Seeking quashing of FIR - prolonged trial - right to speedy trial - Petitioner has asserted that she was never involved in any illegal activity and cooperated during the investigations and had also provided all the documents to the Investigating Officer, but the facts were not presented in a correct manner before the Court - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the FIR had been registered in the year 1999 for the offences, punishable under Sections 406/420/468/471/120B of IPC, 1860 and Section 50 (1) of the DST Act and Section 9 of the CST Act along with the allegations of Forgery, Breach of Trust and use of False Documents. From the FIR, the Chargesheet and the Charges which have been framed, it is evident that the allegations made against the Petitioner are serious in nature.
In Hussainara Khatoon (I) vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar [1979 (2) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court observed that Article 21 of the Constitution of India confers constitutional right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty, except in accordance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law which should be reasonable, fair and just. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not fair, reasonable or just, such deprivation would be violative of Fundamental Right. It was further observed that deprivation of liberty of a person cannot be termed as reasonable, fair or just unless such procedure ensures a speedy trial for the determination of guilt of such person. Therefore, reasonably expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of the Fundamental Right and Liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was further observed that peculiar facts and circumstances of the individual cases may be considered for quashing of the proceedings.
The Apex Court in the matter of Santosh Dev [1994 (2) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT], it was observed that Article 21 of the Constitution of India recognises the constitutional right of speedy trial. It was also noted that the trial was not concluded within four years but in terms of Section 245 (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which was inserted in 1998, mandated that the trial be completed in four years.
In the present case, it cannot be denied that the FIR got filed in the year 1999, in which the Chargesheet came to be filed on 10.11.2003 and the Charges were framed in 2021. However, since then, testimony of 5 witnesses, out of 17 prosecution witnesses, has been recorded. None of the grounds as stated in the aforesaid judgments has been pleaded in the present case, aside from the fact that the Petitioner has appeared umpteen times before the Court and is now 71 years old and is ailing.
There is no case made out for quashing of the Chargesheet as well as of the FIR.
Conclusion - There was no basis for quashing the FIR or Chargesheet. The trial court is directed to expedite proceedings to ensure a timely conclusion.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 1368
Exercise of revisional powers vested in him u/s. 9 (2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 r/w Section 64 of Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 - levy of penalty u/s 10A r/w Section A3 (b) of the Act, 1956 - absence of ‘mens rea’ on the part of the appellant - HELD THAT:- The relevant form, namely Form-C is prescribed pursuant to Rule 12 of the CST (Registration & Turnover) Rules 1957. Thus, a Registered dealer purchasing the goods is eligible to avail concessional levy of CST by issuing C-Forms against the purchases of goods which are included in its Certificate of Registration and are intended for resale, for use in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale. The legislative intent is very clear. Such a concession cannot be availed if the goods bought by the Assessee are not included in its Certificate of Registration and are not used in the manner prescribed in Section 8 (3) (b). In the current context, the purchased goods ought to have been used in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale and not utilized in the construction of building or for office interiors of the Assessee.
The record does not show any effort on part of the Appellant Assessee to actually demonstrate that his purchases meet the test of “integral connection” to the ultimate production of goods. It is one thing to say so repeatedly and it is another to prove the integral connection. The test of integral connection is laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in JK COTTON [1964 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] - this judgment is placed by the Appellant Assessee himself in his compilation filed across the Bar. When the Apex Court has dealt with building material specifically in JK COTTON and held it to be ineligible for the purposes of Section 8 (3) (b) of the 1956 Act, there is very little room for the Appellant to maneuver.
Conclusion - The necessity of adhering to the specific categories of goods listed in the Registration Certificate for concessional tax rates under the CST Act. The goods must be used in manufacturing or resale to qualify for concessional rates.
The impugned order is justifiably structured and rightly has set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes - appeal dismissed.
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