|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 321 to 324 of 324 Records
-
2025 (3) TMI 4
CENVAT Credit - fuel oil in engine parts of the vessel brought for breaking purposes - Whether the fuel oil in the engine parts of the vessel is considered part of the ship and thus not eligible for Cenvat Credit? - HELD THAT:- Division Bench of this Tribunal in the decision of Navyug Ship Breaking Company [2023 (3) TMI 636 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] has held that 'It has been rightly held by Learned Commissioner (Appeals) that removal of fuel and oil is the initiation of ship breaking activity and cannot be said as separate activity.'
Conclusion - The Cenvat Credit on the oil brought in the ship engine when used for ship breaking purposes to the extent of 85%.
Appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 3
Rejection of appeal on account of suppression of material facts - whether there was any material suppression of fact on the part of the appellant’s father while obtaining an insurance policy or not? - HELD THAT:- In the case of Satwant Kaur Sandhu [2009 (7) TMI 1375 - SUPREME COURT], there was suppression of material fact relating to health of the insured and in those circumstances, the respondent insurance company was held to be justified in repudiating the insurance contract.
An insurance is a contract uberrima fides. It is the duty of the applicant to disclose all facts which may weigh with a prudent insurer in assuming the risk proposed. These facts are considered material to the contract of insurance, and its non-disclosure may result in the repudiation of the claim. The materiality of a certain fact is to be determined on a case-to-case basis. The aforementioned judgements illustrate instances of material facts, wherein the non-disclosure of certain medical conditions was held to be material in the context of a Mediclaim policy.
In Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod [2019 (4) TMI 1454 - SUPREME COURT], the repudiation of the policy by the insurer was within a period of two years from the commencement of the insurance cover on the ground of nondisclosure of a material fact and suppressing/non-disclosing a pre-existing life insurance. In the said case, the expression “material”, in the context of insurance policy, was defined as any contingency or event that may have an impact upon the risk appetite or willingness of the insurer to provide insurance cover.
In the facts of this case the respondent-insurer decided to issue a policy to the father of the appellant herein even though it was aware that there was another policy for a higher sum assured which was taken by the insured from Aviva. Thus, the insurer was also aware of the fact that the insured had capability and capacity to pay the premium for the policy obtained from Aviva and was confident that the insured had the capacity to pay the premium in respect of the policy which was issued to the insured by the respondent-insurer for a sum lesser assured being Rs.25 lakh only. Consequently, the repudiation of the policy, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, was improper. Therefore, the appellant herein is entitled to the benefit of the policy which was issued by the respondent herein.
Conclusion - The concept of "material facts" in insurance contracts requires disclosure of information that would influence a prudent insurer's decision to accept the risk. Failure to mention about other policies does not amount to a material fact in relation to the policy availed and consequently, the claim could not have been repudiated by the respondent company.
Appeal allowed.
-
2025 (3) TMI 2
Gift Deed - Valid instrument or not - time limitation - seeking grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants/appellants from selling, mortgaging, encumbering or alienating the suit property on the strength of the said document - HELD THAT:- The entire impugned judgment does not reflect formulation of any issue at all, although issues have been supposedly decided by their respective numbers. The issues originally framed in the suit, which are a part of the paper book, also do not reflect any issue on violation of Clause II (6). Rather, the learned Trial Judge observed in her judgment that the “only” bone of contention between the parties was fraud, whereas she does not adjudicate in favour of the plaintiff on such count by holding that the deed was vitiated by fraud at all.
By such observation regarding the only bone of contention being fraud, the learned Trial Judge made it explicitly evident that she did not formulate the alleged violation of Clause II (6) as an issue for the parties to address.
Clause II (6) provides that the lessees shall not assign or transfer in any way or mortgage the subject land without the previous consent in writing of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the CIT. However, we do not find any clause within the four corners of the lease deed which invalidates such a transfer, even if made without such written prior permission.
The maximum consequence which might have visited the lessees in the event of breach of any of the covenants of the lease deed, including Clause II (6), would be non-renewal of the lease after the expiry of its normal tenure of 99 years - the violation of Clause II (6) is not otherwise fatal to the validity of such transfer, made without any prior written consent of the CIT.
In the gift deed itself, sufficient explanation for transfer of the property in favour of the donee in exclusion of the donor’s children was given. The donor stated that she had great love and affection for the done, who happened to be her daughter-in-law and the donee maintained great regards and esteem in her behaviour and dealings with the donor. It was further stated that the sons and daughters of the donor were well established in their lives. The husband of Rama, who subsequently shot off a letter which has been relied on by the respondent, was a confirming party to the deed and endorsed the transfer of the said land and premises in favour of the donee by way of gift by reason of natural love and affection for the donee, which is also recorded in the deed itself - in view of the intrinsic evidence available in the disputed deed itself, there is no reason why the court should go behind the deed and try to read into the mind of the donor any intention contrary to the execution of the deed.
Conclusion - The learned Trial Judge acted patently contrary to the law and materials on record in declaring the disputed gift deed to be void and not binding on the plaintiff and granting permanent injunction against the defendants from selling, mortgaging, encumbering, alienating the suit property on the strength of the said document dated May 22, 1985.
Appeal is allowed on contest without costs, thereby setting aside the impugned judgment and decree dated February 8, 2017 passed by the learned Judge, Second Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 1738 of 1992 and dismissing the said suit.
-
2025 (3) TMI 1
Dishonour of Cheque - respondent has been acquitted of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - misinterpretation and misapplication of the statutory presumption contained in sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act - complainant was competent to depose in relation to the matter or not - HELD THAT:- As per section 118 (a) of the NI Act, a statutory presumption must be drawn in favour of a complainant that every negotiable instrument (such as a cheque) is made or drawn for consideration until the contrary is proved by the accused person - Section 139 of the NI Act goes further to cast the onus on the accused of proving that a cheque was not received by a holder in discharge of a debt or other liability owed.
The learned Magistrate has opined that the defence sought to be raised by the respondent that the subject cheques were being held by the appellant as ‘security’ was “a sham defence”. Furthermore, the learned Magistrate has, in so many words, also recorded that the respondent admits to the issuance of the subject cheques and the signatures appearing thereon.
However, in what is evidently a complete misinterpretation, misconstruction and misapplication of the statutory presumption contained in sections 118 (a) and 139 of the NI Act, and as interpreted by the courts, the learned Magistrate then proceeds to hold that the appellant (complainant) had failed to establish that there was a legally enforceable debt. In the opinion of this court, this inference drawn by the learned Magistrate is at complete odds with the foundational presumptions contained in sections 118 (a) and 139 of the NI Act, which presumptions hold good unless and until the contrary is proved by the accused person.
The fact that the cheques were issued as ‘security’ is answered in the MoM dated 17.10.1997 and letter dated 08.11.1997, whereby the respondent has admitted to owing a debt of about Rs. 94 lacs to the appellant, which would entitle the appellant to encash the subject cheques for the sum of Rs. 30 lacs towards part-payment of the debt. Therefore, the respondent cannot be heard to say that the subject cheques, which were admittedly issued as ‘security’ towards a possible future debt, cannot be encashed to satisfy a part of such debt, which debt stands admitted in the afore-noted MoM and letter.
Conclusion - i) The statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act was not rebutted by the respondent, and the Magistrate's judgment was based on a misinterpretation of these provisions. ii) The defense of 'blank signed' cheques as security is invalid, as the cheques were issued towards a debt acknowledged by the respondent.
The dismissal of the criminal complaints by the learned Magistrate is unsustainable in law and deserves to be set aside - Appeal allowed.
....
|
9911796707
