2020 (4) TMI 430 - AT - Income Tax

Condonation of delay in filing of appeal before CIT (A) - delay in these appeal ranging between 101 days to 701 days in filing of appeal - main reason for delay is claimed as that the notice were received at the branch level of the bank. It was further submitted that the appellant being a public Sector bank, it has to take permission through proper channel for filing of appeals which consumes a considerable time. The delay beyond 30 days was due to the following approval procedure prevalent in bank - HELD THAT - None should be deprived of an adjudication on merits, unless the Court of law or the Tribunal/Appellate Authority finds that the litigant has deliberately and intentionally delayed in filing of appeal, that he is careless, negligent and his conduct is lacking bona-fides. In the case in hands, the branch has to act as per advice of Head Office, hence, which consumed sufficient period of time, therefore, it could not be regarded as negligence or of lacking of bona-fides. We are of the considered opinion that CIT (A) was not justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing of appeal, hence, we condone the delay in filing of appeal and remit back the appeal to CIT(A) to be decide on merits. Assessee has been vigilant in its approach and has not neglected the Income tax proceedings. The Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan 1998 (9) TMI 602 - SUPREME COURT has observed that the length of the delay is immaterial. The acceptability of the explanation is the only criteria for condoning the delay. In a given case and, delay of the shortest period of time may be uncondonable due to unacceptable explanation, whereas in certain other cases, delay of a long period can be condoned, if the explanation is satisfactory. In every case of delay, there might be some omissions of negligence on the part of the assessee Maxtor mind such omissions/negligence has to be weighed in the light of exist circumstances of each case. It would the negligence of commission is a byproduct of a deliberate attempt with mala-fide intention for delay the process of the litigation which could give some benefit to the litigant, then probably process of litigation which would view some benefit with the litigant then probably that delay would not deserved to be condoned. However, if no mala-fide can be attributed to the delay, that delay will be condonable. - the assessee has been able to demonstrate sufficient cause and reasons for filing an appeal before the CIT (A) - Delay condoned. - Appeal restored before CIT(A)

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Non-condonation of delay in filing the appeal before CIT (A).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Non-condonation of delay in filing the appeal before CIT (A):

The assessee, a public sector bank, faced delays ranging from 101 to 701 days in filing appeals for Assessment Years 2013-14 to 2015-16. The primary reason cited for the delay was the internal approval process required within the bank, which involved multiple levels of authorization from branch to regional and local head offices. The assessee argued that the delay was unintentional and due to procedural requirements.

The CIT (A) did not find the reasons provided by the assessee satisfactory, noting the lack of evidence supporting the claim of procedural delays. The CIT (A) emphasized that the appellant failed to substantiate the timeline of receiving the order under section 154 and the subsequent approval process. Consequently, the CIT (A) refused to condone the delay, treating the appeal as nonest.

Upon appeal to the Tribunal, the assessee reiterated the procedural constraints and the necessity of following a proper channel for approvals, which contributed to the delay. The Tribunal acknowledged the settled legal principle that courts and quasi-judicial bodies can condone delays if sufficient cause is demonstrated. Citing various precedents, including the Supreme Court's decisions in cases like State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, and N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, the Tribunal highlighted that the expression "sufficient cause" should be liberally construed to advance substantial justice.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee, being a public sector bank, had to navigate through a multi-tiered approval process, which was further complicated by frequent transfers and promotions of the approving authorities. The Tribunal found that the delay was not due to negligence or lack of bona fides but was a result of the procedural framework within which the bank operated.

The Tribunal concluded that the CIT (A) was not justified in refusing to condone the delay. Emphasizing the importance of deciding appeals on merits rather than technical grounds, the Tribunal condoned the delay and remitted the appeals back to the CIT (A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal's decision was guided by the principle that substantial justice should prevail over technicalities, especially when no mala fides are attributable to the delay.

For the assessment years 2013-14 to 2015-16, the Tribunal directed the CIT (A) to admit the appeals and decide them de novo in accordance with the law. This applied to both the Vyara and Ahwa branches of the bank.

Conclusion:

The appeals for the assessment years 2013-14 to 2015-16 were allowed for statistical purposes, with the delay in filing condoned and the matters remitted back to the CIT (A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The Tribunal emphasized the need for a liberal approach in condoning delays to ensure substantial justice.