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TMI Tax Updates - e-Newsletter
April 18, 2013
Case Laws in this Newsletter:
Income Tax
Customs
Corporate Laws
Service Tax
Central Excise
CST, VAT & Sales Tax
News
Notifications
Circulars / Instructions / Orders
Case Laws:
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Income Tax
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2013 (4) TMI 380
Depreciation claim for on intangible assets acquired in earlier year - Held that:- Decided against assessee as relying on assessee's own case for the A.Y.2000-01 Disallowance u/s 14A - Held that:- AO is directed to calculate disallowance u/s. 14A as directed by the CIT(A), considering decision of in the case of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. Vs. DCIT (2010 (8) TMI 77 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) - TDS not made on Courier charges, Transport expenses, Audit Fees, Labour charges - Held that:- Sec.40(a)(ia) were not applicable to year end payments - in favour of assessee.
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2013 (4) TMI 372
Reopening of assessment - The only point of the petitioner for filing this Writ Petition is that the first respondent has reopened the assessment by changing the method of accounting from completed contract method to percentage completion method without assigning valid reasons and, therefore, the impugned order is non-est in law. - Held that - The change in method and the reasons for the change are the matters which can be seriously looked into by the appellate authority, if the petitioner moves the concerned forum in accordance with law. It is true, reasons are to be given for change in the accounting system, but the same cannot be a ground to waive the appellate remedy when the appellate forum can very well within its jurisdiction and powers adjudicate the matter on the questions and issues raised by the petitioner. When such an appellate remedy is very much available to the petitioner before the appellate forum, without availing the same, the petitioner is before this Court. It is also true that waiver of appellate remedy is available to the petitioner in circumstances where there is an infringement of fundamental right, a violation of principles of natural justice or when there is anything ultra vires the law. In this case, in the absence of any of the above elements, it is not proper for the petitioner to avoid the effective alternative appeal remedy. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained. - writ petition dismissed - Decided against the assessee.
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2013 (4) TMI 371
Levy of surcharge on Income Tax calculated U/s 113 - Addition on account of undisclosed income - Section 158BB(1)(ca) - Section 268-A - Regarding levy of Surcharge - Held that:- It was already covered by a judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court reported in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Suresh N. Gupta (2008 (1) TMI 396 - SUPREME Court )- The ratio of the said judgment appears to be that in case of block assessment, even prior to amendment made in Section 113 of the Act w.e.f. 01.06.2002, surcharge was leviable - Further it has been held that the amendment made w.e.f. 01.06.2002 was only clarificatory in nature. - Decided in favor of revenue.
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2013 (4) TMI 370
Bad debts U/s 36(1)(vii) - Amendment W.e.f. 01.04. 1989 - Held that:- We find that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has adequately addressed this issue by placing reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of T.R.F. Limited v. CIT(2010 (2) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT )- wherein the Supreme Court clearly held that after the amendment which took effect from 01.04. 1989, it was not necessary for the assessee to establish that a debt, in fact, had become irrecoverable. The Supreme Court further observed that it was enough if the bad debts were written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee. There is no dispute about this fact insofar as the present case is concerned. The assessee had written off the debts in question as irrecoverable in its accounts. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has merely confirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - We find no infirmity in the decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) or in the decision of the Tribunal -Appeal is dismissed in favour of Assessee.
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2013 (4) TMI 369
TDS u/s 194C - Assessee in default – According to the agreement between assessee and TNREL , the assessee would construct the building with technical assistance from TNREL, who would also incur the expenses on behalf of the assessee and get them reimbursed from the assessee. A.O proceeded that the assessee should have deducted the tax at source at 2% on the entire cost of construction. Thus, the Assessing Officer raised a demand under Section 201(1) and also charged interest under Section 201(1A). Held that - Going by the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage P.Ltd., Vs. CIT [2007 (8) TMI 12 – SC] what emerges is that the even though the appellant herein is held as assessee in default, tax cannot be recovered from them, if the same has been paid by the recipient viz., TNREL. It is needless to say that the Assessing Officer should find out as to what extent the recipient had paid the tax. If the entire tax amount as claimed from the assessee herein has been paid by the recipient, then there cannot be any further demand of the same from the assessee. On the other hand, if the recipient had only paid part of the tax amount, then rest of the same shall be recovered from the assessee. Insofar as the interest demand is concerned, the assessee is liable to pay the interest from the date of its liability till the date of actual payment made by the recipient. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer is directed to re-compute the liability of the assessee and pass fresh orders . The questions of law raised in both the appeals are answered accordingly.
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2013 (4) TMI 368
Addition in income - Maistries Due – Revenue expenditure matching concept - Held that - As it is explained by the assessee that they have shown in the books of account as work-in-progress and especially under the circumstances of following the mercantile system of accounting, we find force in the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the assessee. Accordingly, the first issue is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. As far as the next issue, namely, absence of materials to prove the expenses, is concerned the A.O has not found anywhere in the assessment order that the expenses made by the assessee towards the Maistry dues is not supported by any material documents. It is only when the matter was remitted back from the first Appellate Authority to the A.O during the pendency of the appeal, the assessee was not in a position to produce those vouchers, reason is that the vouchers were damaged during 2005 floods. - Decided in favor of assessee.
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2013 (4) TMI 367
Notice U/s 148 of the Income Tax Act, 196 - Exemption of towards long term capital gain U/s 10(23g) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 - Approval for claiming the exemption was not received from the Government - The assessee company has furnished wrong evidence as the name of the assessee company appears on the certificate of M/s. RPG Cellular Services Ltd and not RPG Cellular Investment and Holding Pvt Ltd - Held that:- In the present case, this has reference to the investee company which is M/s. RPG Cellular Services Limited. Therefore, the respondents were wrong in requiring the petitioner to furnish an approval with regard to the petitioner company, which is the investor company. Insofar as the investee company is concerned, the petitioner had already placed on record an approval under Section 10(23G) dated 18.11.2004 In the aforesaid circumstances, there is absolutely no reason for reopening the assessment under Section 147 of the said Act. The purported reason for re-opening does not exist. Consequently, we set aside and quash the notice dated 30.03.2011 as also the order dated 21.11.2011 - Decided in favor of assessee.
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2013 (4) TMI 366
Search U/s 132 of Income Tax Act - Section 253 (1B) of the Act - A block assessment order U/s 158BC - Held that:- We agree with the reasons given by the Five-Members Bench of the Tribunal in Promain Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (2012 (5) TMI 107 - DELHI HIGH COURT) that the satisfaction to be reached by the Authority issuing warrant of authorisation is an administrative function - The fact, that the plea has to be entertained by the Authority issuing the warrant only after satisfying itself about the existence of the conditions on which the satisfaction has to be arrived at on the basis of the opinion in their possession and that such satisfaction has to be objective and not subjective, may prompt one to conclude that the power to initiate a search is only a quasi-judicial function - The Assessing Authority cannot go into such questions and consequently the Appellate Authority which has to look into the validity of the assessment order cannot question the validity of the search. We entirely agree with the reasoning given in Promain Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (2012 (5) TMI 107 - DELHI HIGH COURT), Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax as well as the decisions of Punjab & Haryana High Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court, Rajasthan High Court, and Delhi High Court which have on more than one occasion held that in hearing an appeal against the order of the assessment, the Tribunal cannot go into the question of validity or otherwise of any decisions for conducting search and seizure. This decision can be challenged in an independent proceedings where the question of validity of order may be gone into. - Decided in favor of revenue.
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Customs
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2013 (4) TMI 363
Non release of the imported goods - Bill of Entry filed by the petitioner for Home Consumption and sought for clearance of the good – Neglected by the department as the goods in question were undervalued and seized under the Customs Act Held that - The reason for non-release of goods is that the petitioner has under-valued the goods in question. The respondents, on investigation, found that the differential duty has to be paid even for the provisional release of goods. The investigation has to be completed and thereafter, adjudication has to be done for assessment of the value of the goods in question. In the light of the above the goods in question are not prohibitory items under the provisions of the Customs Act, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the foregoing reasons and discussions, provisional release of the goods in question, is ordered subject to the following conditions. The petitioner shall deposit with the customs authorities the duty payable on the value declared by them. The petitioner shall deposit with the customs authorities, 50% of the differential duty i.e., the difference between the value declared by them and the value provisionally assessed by the Department. The investigation is yet to be completed and adjudication is also to be done. Therefore, it is needless to state that this order shall not stand in the way of the respondents to proceed with the investigation and also the adjudication process. With the above observations and directions, the Writ Petition is disposed of.
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2013 (4) TMI 362
Classification dispute - Eligibility for availing the benefit of Notification No. 4/2006-CE Relying on the expert opinion the goods which were imported i.e. Zircon sand are nothing but the Zircon Ore, and the said expert opinion having been not rebutted by any other opinion from any other expert, and specifications of imported goods seems to match with specification of the ISI standard for Zirconium Ore, we have to hold that the goods imported by the appellant are eligible for the benefit of Notification. Appeal allowed.
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Corporate Laws
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2013 (4) TMI 365
Prospectus containing untrue statements - Petitioners seek quashing of the complaint under Section 63 r.w.s. 628 of the Companies Act, 1956 filed against them by ROC on the premise that they being signatory to the prospectus which contained untrue statements - Held that:- The certified copy of the prospectus obtained from Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd. shows that the three Petitioners were the directors and signatories of the prospectus. Thus, it cannot be said that the ACMM while taking cognizance and issuing the process was misled by the averments made in para 2 of the complaint or that the averments were false. It has to be borne in mind that at the stage of issuing the process, the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons. Moreover, it is very well settled that inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code though very wide have to be invoked sparingly and with circumspection only (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. At this stage, the prospectus deposited with the Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd. has to be presumed to be meant for the public at large which was signed by the Petitioners. Thus, the order dated 07.06.2002 taking cognizance of the offence under Sections 63 and 628 of the Act of 1956 against the Petitioners cannot be faulted. The observations made above were necessary for disposal of the instant Petition and shall not be taken as expression of any opinion on merits of the case.
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2013 (4) TMI 361
Arbitration and Conciliation - the petitioner seeks review of the order and judgment dated 1st February, 2013 passed by this Court in Arbitration Appeal NO. 6 of 2007 and in particular paragraphs 35, 36 and 46 thereof holding that claim nos. 1 and 2 are barred by limitation - Held that:- On perusal of the records including the written arguments filed by both parties, it is clear that the State Government has not disputed the statement made by the review petitioner in the review petition that the State Government had not raised issue of limitation in respect of the claim nos. 1 and 2 in their written arguments and had addressed the court on the issue of limitation only in respect of claim nos. 3 to 5. The only submission made in the affidavit in reply is that under section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is duty cast upon the court itself to consider as to whether or not any suit, proceeding or claim is within the period of limitation or barred by the statutes of limitation. The duty so cast upon the court under aforesaid section 3 is mandatory, peremptory and is not whittled down for the lack or absence of pleadings or oral submissions made in this regard by a contesting party. Thus Mr.Chinoy, the senior counsel is right in his submission that in absence of any such plea raised by the respondents on the issue of limitation in respect of the claim nos. 1 and 2 either in the written submission or across the bar, the review petitioner had no opportunity to deal with any such plea which was not raised by the respondents. Merely because the “High Court” is not described as persona designata in section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would not mean that if any such appeal is entertained by the High Court under section 37 (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it would not be the High Court exercising its power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and would not be the court of record. There is no substance in the submission made by Mr.Kumbhakoni that while exercising power under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, High Court would not be the court of record under Article 215 and would not have plenary jurisdiction including procedural review relating to the errors apparent on the face of the record. The provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not exclude the powers of High Court to exercise its plenary powers and to exercise procedural review in case of error apparent on the face of the record with a view to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. As the respondents not having pressed the issue of limitation in respect of claim nos. 1 and 2, there was no opportunity given to the review petitioner to address this court on issue of limitation in respect of those two claims. There is error apparent on the face of the record in paragraphs 35, 36 and 46 of the judgment holding that claim nos. 1 and 2 also barred by law of limitation and were set aside on the ground of limitation. By the present review petition, the review petitioner seeks procedural review of the order passed by this court, thus the procedural review can be exercised under the plenary jurisdiction which this court has. Provisions of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be applied to the proceedings in court to the extent the provisions thereof are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. None of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 bars High Court from exercising power to have procedural review by exercising plenary jurisdiction. The present review petition thus filed by the review petitioner for seeking procedural review by praying this court to exercise plenary jurisdiction for correcting an error apparent on the face of the record is maintainable.
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2013 (4) TMI 360
Appointment of an arbitrator - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - main contention of the respondent that the petitioner has unconditionally exited from the agreement dated 22nd March, 2011 and asked for return of the bank guarantee for an amount of Rs.1.30 crores dated 19th December, 2011 who has, therefore, accepted the demand and returned the bank guarantee in question, thus, there is no live dispute raised by the petitioner & also referred the two letters dated 12th April, 2012, 13th April, 2012 written by Media On Track Entertainment, a Unit of the petitioner - Held that:- It is the admitted position that both the letters were acknowledged by the respondent who has issued the letter dated 27th April, 2012 to the petitioner by which the respondent had returned the bank guarantee dated 4th November, 2011 for Rs.1.30 crores and also admittedly paid the sum of Rs.50 lac to the petitioner, as in the said letter it is alleged that the same were returned in view of the amicable acceptance of the petitioner’s intention to exit from the contract with the respondent. Also admitted position that Section 9 petition filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by order dated 23rd August, 2012 wherein the interim order passed on 22nd June, 2012 was vacated. While disposing of that petition, the Court also made the inquiry from the petitioner whether after return by the respondent the said bank guarantee which was received by the petitioner, had the petitioner written any letter to the respondent or any complaint given to the authority, to the effect that the petitioner was forced to exit the contract due to coercion. The answer of the petitioner before the Court was negative. Thus petitioner's grant of prayer made is rejected as after examining the above mentioned documents, this Court is satisfied that there is no question or issue remaining to be decided between the parties in view of the admission made by the petitioner in the letters dated 12th April, 2012 and 13th April, 2012. Thus, the reliefs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted as there is no live claim. The petition is dismissed.
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Service Tax
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2013 (4) TMI 376
Point of limitation U/s 73(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 - Valuation of Taxable Services - Held that:- The order which is impugned before us deals with both the issues, that is, the issue of valuation of taxable services as also the issue of limitation. The mere fact that the appellant is only aggrieved by the decision on the point of limitation would not make an appeal from the impugned order maintainable before this Court because it is not the issues raised in the appeal which are material but the nature of the order which is appealed against which is relevant for the purpose of determining whether an appeal would lie in this Court or not. In view of the fact that the impugned order deals with the question of valuation apart from the question of limitation, this appeal would not be maintainable under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 - The objection taken by the learned counsel for the respondent is well founded - It is for this reason that we dismiss this appeal as being not maintainable.
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2013 (4) TMI 375
Demand of duty - SCN was issued after 10 years – Time barred - Held that - It is evident from the above law laid down by the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in CCE, Vadodara vs. Eimco Elecon Limited [2010 (7) TMI 477 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] the issue, only the appellant cannot be held responsible for not having filing a return when the matter was within the knowledge of the department and the issue was under litigation. Respectfully following the ratio of the judgments, it is held that the demand is hit by limitation and appeal filed by the appellant is allowed by setting aside the order-in-Revision dated 31.1.2011.
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2013 (4) TMI 374
Stay - erection, commissioning or installation service - 65 (39a) of the Finance Act 1994 as amended. – Commissioner (appeals) oredered party deposit - Held that - With regard to the undue hardship and other difficulties expressed by the petitioner, much less what is now claimed, the respondent himself has come to a conclusion while ordering the pre-deposit amount with a lenient approach. Therefore, in my considered opinion, there is no merit in this writ petition. However the petitioner made a plea that time may be given for payment of pre-deposit amount. Taking into account the above submissions made by the petitioner, he shall pay the pre-deposit amount as ordered by the respondent in the impugned order, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, and on such payment, the respondent shall dispose of the appeal itself, on merits and in accordance with law, within a period of four weeks thereafter.
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2013 (4) TMI 373
Demand of entertainment tax on DTH (direct to home) broadcast provided to the respective customers on payment of subscriptions - whether on the basis of the provisions of the 1936 Act, it is permissible or possible for the State of Madhya Pradesh to levy on what in the lexicon of broadcasting is called direct-to-home or in short DTH - Held that:- On a careful examination of the 1936 Act as a whole, and more particularly on a conjoint reading of clauses “Admission to an entertainment”,“Entertainment” and “Payment of admission” along with section 3 creating the charge and section 4 providing the collection machinery, agreement with the submission made on behalf of the appellants that the provisions of 1936 Act are applicable only to place-related entertainment. Thus the provisions of the 1936 Act cover an entertainment which takes place in a specified physical location to which persons are admitted on payment of some charge as defined under clause (d) of section 2 of the 1936 Act. On behalf of the State the imposition of levy on DTH justified on the basis of sub-clause(4) of clause (d) of section 2 is untenable as section 2(d)(iv) is only the measure of tax and it does not create the charge which is created by section 3. Under section 3 read with section 2(d) and section 2(a), the charge or levy of tax is attracted only if an entertainment takes place in a specified place or locations and persons are admitted to the place on payment of a charge to the proprietor providing the entertainment. In the present case, as DTH operation is not a place-related entertainment, it is not covered by the charging section 3 read with section 2(a) and 2(b) of the 1936 Act. Consequently, the question of going to section 2(d)(iv) does not arise. Moreover, even if section 2(d)(iv) is to be read as an extension of section 3 and, thus, as a part of the charge, it does not make any difference at all because section 2(d)(iv) refers to “entertainment” which takes us back to section 2(b) and finally to section 2(a). The machinery for collection of duty provided under the 1936 Act has no application to DTH. It is well settled that if the collection machinery provided under the Act is such that it cannot be applied to an event, it follows that the event is beyond the charge created by the taxing statute. See: Commissioner of Income Tax v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty, (19811981 (2) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT), Commissioner of Income-Tax Ernakulam, Kerala v. Official Liquidator, Palai Central Bank Ltd.. (1984 (10) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT), PNB Finance Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax I, New Delhi (2008 (11) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT) Thus the 1936 Act cannot be extended to cover DTH operations being carried out by the appellants.
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Central Excise
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2013 (4) TMI 364
Penalty u/s 11AC – short levied – Held that - After hearing both the sides, it is observed from the SCN that penalty under Section 11AC has been proposed by indicating that there is suppression of facts with intention to evade payment of duty. However no facts are disclosed in the SCN as to show the same. When the appellant has honestly paid the entire duty along with the interest before the issuance of the SCN and no such evidence showing intention to evade is relied upon by the Revenue, it is a fit case where penalty under Section 11AC is not attracted.
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2013 (4) TMI 359
Admissibility of Cenvat credit - service tax paid with respect to the after sales, repairs and maintenance service provided by the service provider during the warranty period. Held that - In the judgment of CCE Vadodara Vs. Danke products [2009 (7) TMI 137 – CESTAT Ahmedabad] it was held that repair and maintenance of transformers during warranty period is an activity related to the sale of goods and cenvat credit was accordingly held to be admissible. In the present appeal also the input services are obtained by appellant within the warranty period and cenvat credit is rightly admissible to the appellant.
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2013 (4) TMI 358
Dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution - application for restoration of appeal is filed by applicant – Held that - Held that - We find that in the case of Darshak Ltd. [2006 (3) TMI 397 (Tri.-Mumbai)], in an identical situation, we have recalled our order of dismissal for non-prosecution and restored to its original No. In these facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the appellant has been able to make out a case for being not present before the Tribunal. Accordingly, in the interest of justice, we recall our final Order and restore the appeal with original number with direction to the registry. The Registry is also directed to note the new address of the appellant/assessee which is mentioned in the affidavit filed by the appellant. Application for restoration of appeal is allowed.
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2013 (4) TMI 357
Demand beyond the scope of Show Cause Notice - cenvat credit on the tin ingots - Option to pay reduced penalty equal to 25% - Held that - it is not open to a tribunal under the guise of moulding relief to pass order in respect of a demand which was never made. - order of Commissioner (Appeals) confirming the demand on a different account that what was the subject matter of show cause notice and adjudication proceedings, is bad in law and needs to be set-aside. There is also no evidence on record that Tin ingots received by the appellant were diverted elsewhere or that no Tin ingots were received and only documents were received by the appellant. Appellant has also brought on record to the effect that Tin ingots were consumed in their factory over a period of March 2005 to March 2006 and have not been consumed in a day, as held by Commissioner (Appeals). It is, therefore, held that cenvat credit with respect to Tin Ingots was rightly taken by the appellant and cannot be denied on the basis of presumptions and surmises. - Decided in favor of assessee.
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2013 (4) TMI 356
Levy of interest and penalty on Wrong availment of cenvat credit on inputs supplied by 100% EOU - the appellant had reversed the cenvat credit on 04/09/2009 when second audit checking of the documents took place and before the issuance of the Show cause notice. - first audit of the appellant took place on 17th to 19th August, 2009 and the audit party did not notice any thing wrong in availment of cenvat credit. - Held that:- The Division Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rajasthan State Warehousing Corp. (2011 (3) TMI 251 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI ) had in an identical situation held that when the demand for the extended period is not invocable, no demand for interest, imposition of penalty be sustained - In the case in hand, the law laid down by the Honble High Court of Karnataka and the Division Bench of the Tribunal would squarely apply as the appellant could not have been saddled with duty. The appellant has himself voluntarily paid the duty before the authority and also reversed the credit on being pointed out. This is a fit case wherein interest liability fastened on the appellant and the equivalent amount of penalty imposed under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 needs to be set-aside - The impugned order to the extent it challenges demand of the interest and imposition of penalty is liable to be set-aside and is set aside - The appeal is allowed to the extent as indicated herein-above.
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CST, VAT & Sales Tax
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2013 (4) TMI 379
Entry Tax on purchase of plant and machinery acquired - execution of work contract during the period 01.04.1987 to 31.03.1988 - petitioner contention that the revisional order passed is a non-speaking order and is liable to be quashed - Held that:- Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the minds of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Right of reason is an indispensable part of the sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. [See Steel Authority of India Limited v Sales Tax Officer, Rourkela Circle and others (2008 (7) TMI 551 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Also said in Assistant Commissioner Commercial Tax Department v Shukla and Brothers (2010 (4) TMI 139 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) non-recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities, firstly, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more particularly hamper the proper administration of justice - Thus remit the matter in the present case to reivisional authority to pass a fresh reasoned order, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner - in favour of assessee.
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2013 (4) TMI 378
Purchase tax on the purchase of paddy relying on Supreme Court decision - U.P. Trade Tax Act - Held that:- The Tribunal vide its impugned orders have deleted the addition in each case by observing that the obiter of the Hon'ble Apex Court is not pertaining to the State Trade Tax Act as it is related to the Central Sales Tax. Notification No. 2947 dated 11.12.1995 issued by the Government of U.P. has specifically granted the exemption from the tax on the purchase of paddy. So, each addition was deleted.
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2013 (4) TMI 377
limitation period - Invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Held that:- The learned counsel for the petitioner made a plea that because of the pendency of the Writ Petition, the limitation period to move the Appellate Authority expired and therefore, he requests time and prayed that the period of pendency of the Writ Petition may be excluded for the purpose of limitation to prefer the appeal before the appellate authority. Considering the said submission, this Writ Petition is disposed of, with liberty to the petitioner to move the Appellate Authority within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the Appellate Authority shall entertain the appeal, if the same is in order, and dispose of the appeal, on merits and in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as expeditiously as possible. However, the period of pendency of this Writ Petition from 23.02.2011 upto the date of filing of the appeal by the petitioner, shall be excluded for the purpose of limitation - Further, the petitioner-Company shall work out their remedy for contesting the delay, if any, for the period of limitation of 30 days prescribed as per law - The Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
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