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TMI Blog1956 (9) TMI 27X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court for the compulsory winding up of this company. On the 1st February, 1952, the High Court made a subsequent order appointing respondent No. 3, Mr. Dhansukh Lal Mehta, as liquidator. On the 3rd of December, 1954, the High Court granted permission to the official liquidator to execute a lease of the sugar factory at Guraru in favour of the petitioner for the period from the 5th December, 1954, up to the 14th of November, 1955. It is said that the petitioner took possession of the sugar factory from the official liquidator on the 6th of December, 1954, and commenced working of the factory. It appears that a few days before, that is, on the 2nd of December, 1954, the State Government had referred an industrial dispute between the Gaya Sugar Mills Ltd., and certain workmen employed in the sugar factory to the Industrial Tribunal under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The award of the Tribunal was given on the 25th of March, 1955, but there was an appeal taken to the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the appeal was decided on the 31st of August, 1956. On the 7th of April, 1955, the petitioner received notices from the Industrial Tribunal to the effect that respondents 4 to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Act. It was held by the Federal Court that the expression "legal proceeding" should not be construed in a narrow sense as the "proceedings in a court of law". It was further held that the expression should be construed as "any proceeding prescribed by law and in pursuance of a law or a legal enactment" and, therefore, action taken by the revenue authorities under section 46 (2) of the Income-tax Act would be hit by section 171 and it was incumbent upon the Income-tax Department to apply to the High Court under section 171 before taking action under section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act. On behalf of the respondents Mr. Ranen Roy relied upon two decisions, namely Shakuntla v. Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd. [1941] 11 Comp. Cas. 309 and Benares Bank Ltd. v. Sashibhushan Mishra [1948] 18 Comp. Cas. 279 for the proposition that the expression "legal proceeding" under section 171 of the Companies Act must be construed ejusdem generis, that is to say, as referring to original proceedings in a court of first instance, analogous to a suit, initiated by means of a petition similar to a plaint. But I cannot accept this argument because the decision in Shakuntla v. Peoples Bank of North ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced." It should be noticed that under section 10(1) power is granted to the State Government to make a reference of an industrial dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication "where the State Government is of the opinion that such a dispute exists or is apprehended". The only condition imposed by the statute for making the reference is the opinion of the State that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No other condition is imposed for the exercise of the statutory power. If the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice of a strike or lock-out has been given under section 22, the State Government is under a duty to make a reference under the proviso to section 10(1). A statutory duty is imposed upon the State Government to make a reference if the conditions mentioned in the proviso to section 10(1) are satisfied. I see no reason why the power of the State Government under section 10(1) or the statutory duty under the proviso to that sub-section should be controlled by anything in the language of section 171 of the Companies ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bject-matter of reference by the State Government under section 10(1), and, therefore, the petitioner could not be proceeded against under section 33 or section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The submission made by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner was that the expression "employer" in section 33 and section 33A should be construed to mean as the employer concerned in the industrial dispute which was the subject-matter of reference. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the reference under section 10(1) was made by the State Government on the 2nd of December, 1954, and the petitioner had taken lease of the sugar factory from the lessor subsequently, that is on the 3rd of December, 1954. It was also pointed out that the petitioner was not impleaded as a party before the Industrial Tribunal and it was argued that no proceeding could, therefore, be taken against the petitioner under section 33 or section 33A on behalf of the aggrieved workers. I am unable to accept this argument as correct. The expression "employer" in section 33 and section 33A is unqualified and there is no reason why any limitation should be imposed on the plain meaning of the expre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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