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TMI Blog1961 (1) TMI 33X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Sri P.S. Tirumalai lyengar subsequently became a partner of the managing agency firm under a written agreement with the firm. One of the terms of that agreement was that Tirumalai lyengar should be the sole managing agent and should be the sole recipient of the remuneration provided for in the managing agency agreement with the company. He took charge of the management of the mills on June 10, 1948. The board of directors of the Srinivasa Mills Ltd. recognised the status of Tirumalai lyengar as the sole managing agent, and in recognition thereof passed appropriate resolution at a duly convened meeting of the board of directors. The original partners of the managing agency firm raised disputes calling in question the status of Tirumalai lyengar as the sole managing agent. They instituted a suit, O.S. No. 228 of 1949 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madurai, impleading the company as the first defendant and Tirumalai lyengar as the second defendant challenging the right of Tirumalai lyengar to function as the sole managing agent. In that suit the company supported Tirumalai lyengar, who contended that he was entitled to function as the sole managing agent of the company. Substantially ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e date of the winding up, unless an extended period of limitation is available under one or other provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act obviously can have no application to the facts of the present case. It cannot be said that the proceedings in O.S. No. 228 of 1949 (Sub-Court, Madurai) were founded on the same cause of action as the one on which the relief for the present claim is founded. Nor can it be said that the Sub-Court, Madurai, which dismissed the suit, O.S. No. 228 of 1949, was unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature as required under section 14. That suit was tried on the merits and was dismissed. The contention urged on behalf of the appellant invoking section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation in the matter of recovery of remuneration due to the appellant is totally devoid of substance and has therefore to be rejected. It was next contended by Mr. S.V. Rama Iyengar that the appellant is entitled to a charge on the assets of the company, and that, therefore, the claim should not be held to be barred by limitation by taking t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 00." This list of creditors, exhibit A-4, is dated March, 1954. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that exhibit A-4 constituted an acknowledgment of liability on behalf of the company in respect of the managing agency remuneration, and that, therefore, a fresh period of three years will have to be computed from March, 1954, and that on such computation the claim of the appellant will not be barred by limitation. The list was signed by the appellant whose status as the sole managing agent was of course recognised in O.S. No. 288 of 1949 (Sub-Court, Madurai). There is nothing to show in exhibit A-4 that the appellant filed the statement of the list of the creditors of the company on behalf of the company. The terms of the managing agency agreement show that the managing agents were not expressly authorised to acknowledge the liabilities of the company. Clause 2( m ) of the agreement no doubt enables the managing agent to borrow money on behalf of the company. That clause is as follows : "To raise or borrow or secure from time to time the payment of any sum or sums of moneys for the purpose of the said company with or without the security and upon such terms and conditions as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , to authorise the giving of a definite promise to pay to themselves." When that case was decided the position in England was that the Statute of Limitation, 1623, was in force and that contained no provision for keeping alive debts by mere acknowledgment of the debt. In Ledingham v. Bermejo Estancia Co. Ltd. [1947] 1 All. E.R. 749 ATKINSON J. had to consider whether in the matter of the applicability of the law of limitation there was a difference between an acknowledgment of liability and a promise to pay. The learned judge observed as follows : "There is a difference now because all you want now is an acknowledgment, and you have not to consider whether the circumstances are such as to amount to a promise to pay. You do not need the promise to pay. It is only an acknowledgment, an acknowledgment made to the creditor and upon that the principle of that decision ought not to apply. (The decision referred to is the one reported earlier). I have difficulty in seeing the distinction there. I think that, if a trustee, cannot rely on a promise to himself, it would be difficult to say he could rely on an acknowledgment which he makes to himself. So I am not disposed to draw ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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