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TMI Blog1975 (2) TMI 86X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t, M/s. Parson Tools and Plants (hereinafter referred to as the assessee), carries on business at Kanpur. The Sales Tax Officer assessed tax for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 on the assessee by two separate orders. The assessee filed appeals against those orders before the appellate authority. On May 10, 1963, when the appeals came up for hearing, the assessee was absent. The appeals were, therefore, dismissed in default by virtue of rule 68(5) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules. Sub-rule (6) of rule 68 provided for setting aside such dismissal and readmission of the appeal. On the same day (May 10, 1963), the assessee made two applications in accordance with sub-rule (6) for setting aside the dismissal. During the pendency of those applications, sub-rule (5) of rule 68 was declared ultra vires the rule-making authority by Manchanda, J., of the High Court who further held that the appellate authority could not dismiss an appeal in default but was bound to decide it on merits even though the appellant be absent. When these applications under rule 68(6) came up for hearing, on October 20, 1964, the appellate authority dismissed them outright in view of the ruling of Manchanda, J ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld not be invoked to extend the time beyond the maximum fixed by the Legislature in sub-section (3-B) of section 10 of the Sales Tax Act. Sub-section (2) of section 14, Limitation Act, runs thus: "In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it." (emphasis added) It will be seen that this sub-section will apply only if- (1) both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party; (2) the prior proceedings had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; (3) the failure of the prior proceedings was due to a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature; (4) both the proceedings are proceedings in a court. Mr. Karkhanis, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, does not dispute the view taken by the High Court that the proceedings ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is maintains that the answer to this question, also, must be in the negative because definite indications are available in the scheme and language of the Sales Tax Act, which exclude the application of section 14(2), Limitation Act, even in principle or by analogy. The learned counsel further submits that the ratio of the Privy Council decision in Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D. Sassoon & Co. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 103., relied upon by the majority judgment of the High Court is not applicable for computing limitation prescribed under the Sales Tax Act. Reference in this connection has been made to Purshottam Dass Hassaram v. Impex (India) Ltd. A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 309., wherein a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court explained the rule of decision in Ramdutt's case' and found it to be inapplicable for the purpose of computing limitation for applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The material part of section 10 runs thus: "(3)(i) The revising authority.........may, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order made by any appellate or assessing authority under this Act, in its discretion, call for and examine, either on its own motion or o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ere an aggrieved party, despite sufficient cause, is unable to make an application for revision within this maximum period of 18 months. Such harsh cases would be rare. Even in such exceptional cases of extreme hardship, the revising authority may, on its own motion, entertain revision and grant relief. Be that as it may, from the scheme and language of section 10, the intention of the Legislature to exclude the unrestricted application of the principles of sections 5 and 10 of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear. These provisions of the Limitation Act, which the Legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the Sales Tax Act, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it". "The will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience." See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pages 1, 2 and 251. "Judicial power is never exercised", said Marshall, C.J., of the United States, "for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... excluded on the analogy of section 14. This contention was also negatived on the ground that since the decision of the Privy Council, the legislature had in section 37(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, provided as to what extent the provisions of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings before the arbitrator. Section 37(5) was as follows: "Where the court orders that an award be set aside or orders, after the commencement of an arbitration, that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with respect to the difference referred, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the difference referred." The reasons advanced, the observations made and the rule enunciated by Chagla, C.J., who spoke for the Bench in that case, are apposite and may be extracted with advantage: "...we have now a statutory provision for exclusion of time taken up in arbitration proceedings when a suit is filed, and the question arises of computing the period of limitat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. We have said enough and we may say it again that where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the lawgiver; more so if the statute is a taxing statute. We will close the discussion by recalling what Lord Hailsham Pearlberg v. Varty [1972] 2 All E.R. 6 at 11., has said recently, in regard to importation of the principles of natural justice into a statute, which is a clear and complete code by itself: "It is true of course that the courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly fair. But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statute merely because in one view of the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger degree of say in the making of a decision than a statute accords him. Still less is it the functioning of the courts ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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