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TMI Blog2001 (10) TMI 1044X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rd, under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('the 1996 Act'). 2. The award in this case was made by the Arbitrator on 29-8-1998. Under the impression that the Arbitration Act, 1940 applied, the Arbitrator forwarded the original award to the appellant with a request to file the award in the High Court of Bombay so that a decree could be passed in terms of the award under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. The award was accordingly filed by the appellant in the Bombay High Court on 29-3-1999. The appellant filed an application challenging the Award on 19-4-1999 under section 30 read with section 16 of the Arbitration Act. Subsequently, the application was amended by inserting the words 'Arbitration and Conciliation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." On an analysis of the section, it is clear that the provisions of sections 4 to 24 will apply when: (i)there is a special or local law which prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application; and (ii)the special or local law does not expressly exclude those sections. 4. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099 rejected the argument that section 5 of the Limitation Act had been excluded: "27. It was then said that section 116A of the Act provided an exhaustive and exclusive code of limitation for the purpose of appeals against orders of tribunals and reliance is placed on the proviso to sub-section (3) of that section, which reads: 'Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the Tribunal under section 98 or section 99. Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for, not preferring the appeal within such period.' The content ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary implication stood excluded.- Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai [1992] (4) SCC 264. 6. As far as the language of section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would, therefore, bar the application of section 5 of that Act. The Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct which deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 34 is contained in Part I and is, therefore, subject to the sweep of the prohibition contained in section 5 of the 1996 Act. Furthermore, section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award 'in accordance with' sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application 'in accordance with' that sub-section. Consequently, by virtue of section 34(1), recourse to the Court against an arbitral award cannot be made b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erence to the 1996 Act. But that is an apparent error as the reasoning clearly indicates that the provisions of section 30 of the Arbitration Act, and not section 34 of the 1996 Act were under consideration. In order to clarify the position, we have scrutinised the original record of Civil Appeal No. 1953 of 2000 decided on 6-3-2000. We have found that that was indeed a case which dealt with an award passed and challenged under the Arbitration Act. No question was raised with regard to the applicability of the Limitation Act to the 1940 Act. The only issue was whether the High Court should have refused to condone the delay of 2 months and 22 days in filing the objection to the award. This Court found that sufficient cause had been shown to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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