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TMI Blog2001 (10) TMI 1044X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e exclusion of the operation of section 5 of the Limitation Act. - CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6997 OF 2001 SLP (C) NO. 2145 OF 2001 - - - Dated:- 5-10-2001 - G.B. PATTANAIK AND RUMA PAL, JJ. K.N. Rawal, P.S. Narasimha, P. Sridhar and B.V. Balaram Das for the Appellant. D.A. Dave, Nandini Gore, Kavin Gulati and Bhadra Dalal for the Respondent. JUDGMENT Ruma Pal, J. - Leave granted. The question which arises for determination in this case is whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to an application challenging an award, under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ( the 1996 Act ). 2. The award in this case was made by the Arbitrator on 29-8-1998. Under the imp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tted that the language of section 34 plainly read, expressly excluded the operation of section 5 of the Limitation Act and that there was as such no scope for assessing the sufficiency of the cause for the delay beyond the period prescribed in the proviso to section 34. 3. The issue will have to be resolved with reference to the language used in sections 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and section 34 of the 1996 Act. Section 29(2) provides that: "(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty days, but not thereafter." Had the proviso to section 34 merely provided for a period within which the Court could exercise its discretion, that would not have been sufficient to exclude sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act because "mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of section 5" Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [1976] 1 SCC 392 at p.397. 5. That was precisely why in construing section 116A of the Representation of People Act, 1951, the Constitution Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099 rejected the argument that section 5 of the Limitation Act had been excluded: "27. It was then ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... essarily implied. As has been said in Hukum Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [1974] (2) SCC 133: "If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefit conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act." Thus, where the Legislature prescribed a special limitation for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days was to be computed after taking the aid of sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary implication ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process". 4( v ) of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This objective has found expression in section 5 which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms: " Extent of judicial intervention. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part." 9. The Part referred to in section 5 is Part I of the 1996 Act which deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 34 is contained in Part I and is, there ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oubt on the interpretation of the language used in section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the Court s powers by the exclusion of the operation of section 5 of the Limitation Act. 10. The appellant then sought to rely on a decision of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1953 of 2000 Union of India v. Hanuman Prasad Bros. AIR 2000 SCW 3934(2) to which one of us (Ruma Pal, J.) was a party. It is contended that the decision is an authority for the proposition that section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to objections to an award under the 1996 Act. It is true that in the body of that judgment, there is a reference to the 1996 Act. But that is an apparent error as the reasoning clearly ind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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