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TMI Blog2004 (10) TMI 328X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cial institutions to the individual accounts of brokers. The other objectives of the Act are to punish the guilty and to restore confidence in and maintain the basic integrity and credibility of the banks and financial institutions. With these objectives in view the Act provides for the appointment of one or more Custodians to take action against any person involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities for the period after 1-4-1991 upto and including 6-6-1992. In terms of sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act, the Custodian may notify the name of the such person in the Official Gazette. From the date of such notification, any property movable or immovable or both, belonging to any person so notified stands attached under sub-section (3) of section 3. Such attached properties may be dealt with by the Custodian in such manner as the Special Court may direct. 3. The Special Court was established under section 5 of the Act. It has the same jurisdiction as a Civil Court inter alia in relation to any matter relating to any property attached under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act as well as in relation to transactions in securities entered into during the afore ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -section (2) of section 4. 6. The appellant has contended that the Custodian had issued the notification under section 3(2) of the Act almost 10 years after coming into force of the Act. It is submitted that the notification was also otherwise invalid. According to the appellant the right of notified persons to object to a notification under section 4(2) was a valuable right, since the consequences of being notified were drastic viz., the attachment of all properties both immovable and movable. It is submitted that the notified persons could not be deprived of the right merely on the ground of limitation. It is submitted that the rule of limitation was a procedural requirement and like all matters of procedure should serve to further the ends of justice and not defeat it. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the decisions of this Court in Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Trans- port Corpn. v. Consumer Protection Council [1995] 2 SCR 1, Syndicate Bank v. Prabha D. Naik [2001] 4 SCC 713 and C. Beepathumma v. V.S. Kudambalithaya [1964] 5 SCR 836 in support of this submission. According to the appellant the provision prescribing a period of limitation in Section 4(2) was directory ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he provisions of the Limitation Act were excluded because the Act did not provide for any period of Limitation. It is pointed out that the Act was not a complete code since sections 4(2) and 10(3) did provide for a period of Limitation. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Custodian has stated that the period of limitation prescribed under section 4(2) could not be said to be merely directory. The decision in Topline Shoes Ltd's case (supra) was said to be distinguishable and in any event not good law in view of the subsequent decision of a larger Bench in Dr. J.J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi [2002] 6 SCC 635. It is submitted that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would have no application to the Act because it is clear from the object and scheme of the Act that the period prescribed under section 4(2) of the Act was not extendable by Court. The conferment of such power expressly in connection with appeals under section 10 according to the learned counsel for the Custodian necessarily implied the exclusion of such power in the Court under section 4(2). This fact coupled with section 13 which gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Act, it was submitted, a c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mere fact that the Special Court may have been imbued with the same status of a High Court would not alter the situation. We are of the view that it was not necessary for section 4(2) of the Act to use additional peremptory language such as 'but not thereafter' or 'shall' to mandate that an objection had to be made within 30 days. The mere use of the word 'may' in sections 4(2) of the Act does not indicate that the period prescribed under the section is merely directory. The word 'may' merely enables or empowers the objector to file an objection. The language in section 4(2) of the Act may be compared with sections 4 and 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides : "4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed-Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court re-opens." [Emphasis supplied] Certain sub-sections of section 6 of the Limitation Act also provide for the period within which a minor or insane or an idiot may institute suits. It cannot be contended that the word 'may' in these sections ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (2) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 directed the Tribunal to follow the procedure prescribed for trials under the Civil Procedure Code. It was found on a construction of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as they then stood, that the Court had the power to allow a defendant to participate in the proceedings even after the passing of an order that the trial should be proceeded with ex parte. Both the cases i.e. Syndicate Bank's case and C. Beepathumma's case (supra) have been cited as authorities for the proposition that the law of limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of the suit would apply. We have no quarrel with this proposition but we fail to see the relevance of the decisions to the question to be decided in this appeal. None of these decisions touch the question whether a statutory provision such as section 4(2) of the Act should be treated as mandatory or directory. 15. The decision which does deal with this question is Topline Shoes Ltd's case (supra). The subject-matter of interpretation in that case was section 13(1)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides that a person opposing the complaint under th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ocal Act does not expressly exclude the application of the Limitation Act.1 It has been held in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [2001] 8 SCC 470 that the word 'exclusion' also includes 'exclusion by necessary implication'. This proposition of law is not in dispute. The only question is - does the Act expressly or necessarily exclude the provisions of Limitation Act? We think it does. The fact that it has provided for a power to condone delay under section 10(3) of the Act, shows that Parliament had consciously excluded the power of the Court in relation to section 4(2). This view also finds support in the decision of this Court in Gopal Sardar's case (supra). The statutory provision under consideration in that case was Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. It was held : ". . . When in the same statute in respect of various other provisions relating to filing of appeals and revisions, specific provisions are made so as to give benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and such provision is not made to an application to be made under section 8 of the Act, it obviously and necessarily follows that the Legislature consciously excluded the application of sect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he date of an order of the Tribunal to the High Court, but also provided that the High Court could entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period only if it was satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal within such period. The sub-section under consideration in Vidya Charan Shukla's case (supra) was, therefore, substantially similar to section 10(3) of the Act which is re- quired to be construed by us. But that is where the similarity ends. The Court in that case held that the proviso did not amount to an express or implied exclusion because of the wording of section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, 1908. Section 29(2)(a) of the 1908 Act is dissimilar from the provisions of section 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The earlier version of section 29 made the provisions of Sections 4, 9 to 18 and section 22 applicable to a Special or Local Act unless the Special or Local law expressly excluded such applicability. In other words, even in the absence of any exclusionary clause in the Special or Local Act, the other provisions of the Limitation Act including Section 5 would not apply. It was, therefore, held that the proviso in sub-section (3) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pply to the Act may not have, by itself, concluded the question formulated by us at the outset. That case was, as has been rightly contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, limited to a consideration of section 11 of the Act and the proceedings by the Special Court thereunder. It was in that context that the Court had said that the Act had not provided for any period of limitation. But for the reasons already stated by us we concur in the final conclusion reached by the Court in L.S. Synthetics Ltd.'s case (supra) to the extent that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application in relation to a petition under section 4(2) of the Act. 22. Finally, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act speaks of application of the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 "only insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local laws". This language, together with our earlier reasoning, particularly with regard to L.S. Synthetics Ltd.'s case (supra) would answer the further question raised by the appellant, namely, whether the question of exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act must be separately considered ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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