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TMI Blog1957 (2) TMI 54X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 14, 1950, dismissing the suit. The plaintiff appealed. 0 In October 1, 1953, the Andhra State was formed and a new High Court was established under a. 28 of The Andhra State Act, 1953 (Act XXX of 1953), and apparently the appeal stood transferred to the High Court of Andhra under the provisions of s. 38 of the same Act. On March 4, 1955, the High Court of Andhra accepted the appeal, reversed the decree of the trial court and decreed the suit. The application for leave to appeal to this Court was dismissed on the ground, inter alia, that the value of the property was only Rs. 11,400 and did not come up to the amount of Rs. 20,000. In this application the petitioner contends that the judgment being one of reversal and the value being above Rs. 10,000, he was entitled, as a matter of right, to come up to this Court on appeal and as that right has been denied to him by the High Court, this Court should, in exercise of its discretion, grant him special leave to appeal to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. It will be convenient at this stage to refer to the statutory provisions relating to appeal from any final judgment, decree or order of a High Court in India to a superi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or of any other law immediately in force after the appointed day and with the special leave of the Federal Court in any other case and that no direct appeal would lie to His Majesty in Council either with or without special leave from any such judgment. "Judgment to which this Act applied" was defined by s. 2(b) as meaning any judgment, decree or final 'order of a High Court in a civil, case from which a direct appeal could have been brought to His Majesty in Council, either with or without special leave, if that Act had not, been passed. By s. 4 all proceedings and steps taken in, and orders made and certificates granted by, a High Court. in connection with an appeal to His Majesty in Council, unless the records had been transmitted, were to be deemed to be proceedings and steps taken and orders made and certificates granted in connection with an appeal from that judgment to the Federal Court under the Act and would be concluded, or as the case may be, have effect, accordingly. Under s. 5 every application to His Majesty in Council for special leave to appeal from a judgment to which the Act applied remaining undisposed o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uty on 6,700 tons of sugar. The appellants disputed the claim. So they deposited the 'money with the Collector and then brought an action in the Supreme Court of Queensland against the Collector for recovering the sum so deposited. The writ in the action was issued on October 25, 1902. At the date of the institution of the action the Order in Council of June 30, 1860, gave a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from the judgment of the Supreme Court. A special case having been stated for the opinion of the Full Court, that Court on September 4, 1903, gave judgment for the Collector. In the meantime the Judiciary Act, 1903 had been passed and it received the royal assent on August 25, 1903, that is to say about 10 days before the judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court. By s. 38 the jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia' in certain specified matters was made exclusive of the jurisdiction of the several Courts of the States and by s. 39 it was made exclusive in all other matters except as therein provided. Sub-section 2 of s. 39 provided that the several Courts of the States would be invested with Federal jurisdiction in all matters above mentioned except those specifi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the wellknown general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested." This proposition of law has been firmly established in English jurisprudence and this decision is accepted as sound and cited with approval in leading text books. As will be presently seen, it has been followed and applied in numerous decisions in England and India and its correctness or authority has not been questioned by any of the learned counsel appearing before us on the present occasion. The principle of the above decision was applied in India by Jenkins C.J.in Nana bin Aba v. Skeku bin Andu [1908] I.L.R. 32 Bombay 337 and by the Privy Council itself in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co.Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 421; I.L.R.9 Lah. 284.. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi (supra) two assessment or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders which, when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which touch existing rights. Accordingly, if the section now in question is to apply to orders final at the date when it came into force, it must be clearly so provided. Their Lordships cannot find in the section even an indication to that effect. On the contrary, they think there is a clear suggestion that a judgment of the High Court referred to in sub-s. 2 is one which under sub-s. 1 has been. pronounced by " not less than two judges of the High Court ", a condition which was not itself operative, until the entire section came into force. In their Lordships' judgment, therefore, the petitioners in these cases have no statutory right of appeal to. His Majesty in Council. Only by an exercise of the Prerogative is either appeal admissible." The question of finality of order was considered. by this Court in the case of Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacue ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l parties interested and directed the Custodian to decide the case on notice to all parties interested. The petitioner obtained special leave to appeal to this Court against the order of the Custodian General of Evacuee Property. At the hearing of the appeal the learned counsel for. the appellant contended that according to the principle ,laid down by the, Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. V. Irving (supra), she had, on the filing of her application for confirmation in 1948, acquired a vested right to have it determined under. s. 5-A with the attribute of finality and conclusiveness attaching to the order when made just as a litigant acquired a vested right of appeal on the commencement of his suit or proceeding and that vested right could not be taken away by subsequent statute except by express provision or by necessary- intendment. There was, according to the appellant, nothing in s. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Central Act XXXI of 1950), which expressly or by necessary intendment took away that vested right. It will' be noticed that at the date. of the commencement of the Central Act XXXI of 1950 no order had actually been made to whic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely, sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of such court or of some other court to which such court is subordinate; or After the amendment came into force the respondent received notice of the prosecution already instituted against her. In 1924 she filed another petition for revocation of the sanction. The magistrate revoked, the sanction. The complainant petitioner filed this petition against this order of revocation of sanction. In dismissing this application a Full Bench of five Judges of the Madras High Court presided over by Courts Trotter C. J. referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (supra) and quoted the passage in Lord Macnaghten's judgment as laying down the principle in clear language. At page 629 Coutts Trotter C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, stated as follows :- "The question we have to decide is whether this was a right of entering the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o the amendment of the Court Fees Act, lie to the High Court or to the District Court The Full Bench consisting of three Judges held that the appeal had properly been brought before the High court. The Full Bench observed: " It is argued that this section does not confer any right of appear to the High Court in definite classes of suits, but that the right of appeal is merely given to the Court authorised to hear appeals and the question of whether the Court is the District Court or the High Court depends on the valuation. of the suit at the time of filing the appeal. It is difficult to treat this argument as in any way distinguishing the case from that of Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving ) [1905] A.C. 369., for, in both cases there was, when the suit was filed, a vested right of appeal to a particular tribunal, which is taken away by a subsequent enactment. According to the argument, when the right is taken away by a subsequent alteration in a mere fiscal enactment, the case is not the same as when the right depends on substantive law. This is untenable. It Has been held by the Privy Council that this cannot be done and we are bound by that general expression of the law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Justice Sulaiman, then Acting Chief Justice of Allahabad, expressed the following opinion: " In our opinion the point is concluded by the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving [1905] A.C. 369. In that case, ordinarily an appeal lay to their Lordships of the Privy Council from an order of the Supreme Court. While the matter was pending in that court, the law was amended so as to allow an appeal to the High Court. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the new Act could not deprive the party of his right to appeal to the Privy Council. Lord Macnaghten remarked at page 372: ' To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure'." "That principle was reaffirmed by their Lordships it the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner[1927] I.L.R. 9 Lah. 284. The principle has been followed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Daivanayaga Reddiar v. Renukamba, Ammal [1927] I.L.R. 50 Mad. 857. Dalal J. has taken the same view in the case of Bala P ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the High Court. At that time el. 15 of the Letters Patent permitted a further appeal to the High Court from the judgment of a single judge of the High Court, except in certain cases which are not material for our present purpose, without any leave of the single judge. During the pendency of the second appeal cl. 15 of the Letters Patent was amended and the amendment came into force on January 14, 1928. The amended Letters Patent imposed a condition that a further appeal would lie only " where the judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal." It is well-known that this amendment was made in order to reduce the number of Letters Patent Appeals from the judgments of single judges which had assumed alarming proportions in every High Court. After the Letters Patent were amended the second appeal was dismissed by the single judge on April 4, 1928. The learned single judge declined to grant leave under the amended Letters Patent. On 30, 1928, the appellant filed an appeal on the strength of el. 15 of the Letters Patent as it stood before the amendment and obtained a rule calling upon the respondent to show cause why his appeal should not be accepted an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ow the reasoning of the Judicial Committee in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company's case [1905] A.C. 369 is a Conclusive authority, to show that rights of appeal are not matters of procedure; and that the right to enter the superior court is, for the present purpose deemed to arise to a litigant before any decision has been given by the inferior court. If the latter proposition be accepted, I can see no intermediate point at which to resist the conclusion that. the right arises at the date of the suit. It does not arise as regards Court B alone, when the suit is instituted in Court A and as regards Court C when the first appeal is lodged before Court B. A " present right of Appear " (cf. section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure) is a different matter. The principle must, I think, involve that an admixture of different systems is not to be applied to a single case. It is quite true that the suitor cannot enter Court C without going through Court B, but neither can he enter Court B till Court A has given its decision. The right must be a right to take the matter to Court C in due course of the existing law." Further down the Special. Bench posed before them a question : "Whether ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eason of the amended Letters Patent and the case was placed before the Full Bench consisting of five judges under the orders of Coutts Trotter C. J. for the determination of the question. Coutts Trotter C. J. entirely concurred in the reasoning of Rankin C. J. and had no answer to it. He adverted to the argument that the result would be that cl. 15 of the amended Letters Patent will remain a dead letter for many years to come and repelled it in the following sentence: " The result is regrettable, because it makes the amended Letters Patent, which were doubtless brought into being to relieve the heavy burden of Second Appeals, which in this Court have now reached the startling figure of 5,000 cases, unable to effect any substantial relief to us for five years." For the moment we pass over his observation in connection with the case of Canada Cement Co. v. East Montreal (Town of) [1922] 1 A.C. 249 and will refer to it later on. The point for our present purpose is that the Full Bench did not think that the opinion expressed in that case was in conflict with the earlier decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (supra), which was authoritatively adopted and reconfirmed in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... annot now be seriously disputed. It is not a mere matter of procedure. Prior to the amendment of 1928 there was an appeal against an order refusing to set aside a sale (for that is the effect also where the application to set aside the sale is dismissed for default) under the provisions of Order 43, rule (1), of the Code of Civil Procedure. That right was unhampered by any restriction of the kind now imposed by section 174 (5), proviso. The Court was bound to admit the appeal whether appellant deposited the amount recoverable in execution of the decree or not. By requiring such deposit as a condition precedent to the admission of the appeal, a new restriction has been put on the right of appeal, the admission of which is now hedged in with a condition. There can be no doubt that the right of appeal has been affected by the new provision and in the absence of an express enactment this amendment cannot apply to proceedings pending at the date when the new amendment, came into force. It is true that the appeal was filed after the Act came into force, but that circumstance is immaterial-for the date to be looked into for this purpose is the date of the original proceeding which eventua ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e were two winding up proceedings regarding two companies, namely, the Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd. and Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. The Official Liquidator settled the list of contributories in both cases. On June 4, 1946, payment order for Rs. 24,005-7-3 was made by the court in the case of Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd. At that time Patiala States Judicature Firman of 1999 was in force. Under s. 44 of that Firman a certificate of fitness was required for an appeal from a judgment of a single judge only if the judgment, decree or order sought to be appealed from was made in the exercise of Civil Appellate Jurisdiction. After the payment order had been made Pepsu Ordinance (X of 2005) was promulgated. Section 52 of the Ordinance required a certificate of fitness for appeal in all cases, including the winding up cases. On February 2,1950, an application was made in respect of the Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd. under s. 152 of the Civil Procedure Code for amendment of the payment order by substituting Rs. 21,805-7-3 for Rs. 24,005-7-3. On March 16, 1950, the above application was dismissed by the judge, who refused to grant the certificate of fitness. An appeal against ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 543; In re Reference under section 5 of Court Fees Act I.L.R. 1955 Bom. 530; Sawaldas Madhavdas v.. Arti Cotton Mills Ltd. A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 332; 57 Bom. L.R. 304. 515. There are certain other decisions which also adopted the same principle but reference will be made to them later on in connection with the question of construction of Art. 133 of the Constitution. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge: (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved, to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay [1951] S.C.R. 228 and finally in Dajisaheb Mane and Others v. Shankar Rao Vithal Rao [1955] 2 S.C.R. 872 at pp. 876-877 to which reference will be made in greater detail hereafter. In the next place we must take into account the surrounding circumstances that existed at the time when our Constitution makers framed the Constitution and for which provision had to be made by them. In construing the Articles relating to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court it is well to remember the several categories of persons who were at the date of the Constitution, interested in the right of appeal from judgments, decrees or final orders of a High Court to a superior court in one way or another. There were seven categories of persons so interested, namely- (1) Those who were aggrieved by a judgment of a High Court in what was British India passed before the commencement of the Constitution in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted before the Constitution and who. had preferred an appeal from such judgment to the Federal Court or whose appeal from such judgment to the Privy Council had stood transferred to the Federal Court and w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the court of first instance and not on the date of the passing of the judgment by the trial court or the High Court or of the filing of the appeal in the High Court or the Federal Court. In other words the Constitution makers knew that the right of appeal to the Federal Court had already vested in persons falling within categories (i) to (iv) at the date of the institution in the court of first instance of the suit or proceeding to which they were parties, no matter when the judgment of the High Court was passed or was likely to be passed in future. The Constitution makers also knew that this vested right was governed by cl. 39 of the Letters Patent read with the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 and the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act,'1949 and ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Constitution makers were also aware of the rights of persons who fell within categories (v) and (vi). With full knowledge of all. these rights the Constitution makers made such provision as they thought fit. The question is,-has the Constitution, expressly or by necessary intendment, taken away this vested right of appeal from any of these categories of p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the High Court issues the requisite certificate. Article 135 is in the terms following: 135. Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the Supreme Court shall also have jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter to which the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do not apply if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matter were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing law. Article 136 authorises this Court in its discretion to rant special leave to appeal in certain cases. Article 37 confers power of review upon this Court to review as own judgments. Provision is made for the enlargement of the jurisdiction or conferment of additional or ancillary powers under Arts. 138 to 140. Article 372 of the Constitution provides for the continuance in force of the existing laws and for their adaptation. The relevant portions of Art. 372 are as follows: 372.(1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... immediately below the Court passing such judgment, decree or final order, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law. This adaptation, however, was subject to the provisions of cl. 20 of the Order itself, which runs as follows :- 20. Nothing in this Order shall affect the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under, any existing law, or any right, privilege, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued, or incurred under any such law, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred ill respect of an offence already committed against any such law. The result of the foregoing provisions 'may here be shortly summarised. The Constitution by Art. 395 repealed the Government of India Act and thereby abolished the Federal Court. It, however, continued he Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, which directed that the Federal Court in addition to he powers conferred on it by the Federal Court (Enlargenent of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, would have all the appelate powers exercised by the Privy Council. Though the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, being an Act amending or supplementing the Government of India Act, 19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... titution to the Supreme Court to be disposed of by it. This saved the right of appeal of persons falling within categories (v) and (vi). Persons falling within category (vii) may clearly avail themselves of Art: 133. The only question that remains is whether the right of appeal from the judgment of a High Court passed after the date of the Constitution in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted before the Constitution which had vested in persons falling within category (iv) is to, be governed by Art. 133 or by the old law under Art. 135. In Radha Krishna v. Shridhar (supra), Nandalal v. Hira Lal I.L.R. 1950 Nag. 830, Mahant Sidha Kamal Nayan v. Bira Naik I.L.R. 1950 Cut. 663, Ramaswami v. Ramanathan I.L.R. 1951 Mad. 125, Daji Saheb v. Shankarrao I.L.R. 1952 Bom. 906, Mt. Murtu v. Paras Ram A.I.R. 1952 Him. 14 and Bhagwantrao v. Viswasrao I.L.R. 1953 Nag. 822, it has been held that Art. 133 of the Constitution is not retrospective and that the vested right of appeal is governed by the conditions laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure which were in force previous to the adaptation there. of and this Court was by Art. 135 substituted for the Federal Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the expression " matter " under Art. 135 excluded civil and criminal proceedings and should be understood as meaning a matter which is neither civil nor criminal and, therefore, by applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the word "matter" in Art. 135 should be deemed to exclude both civil and criminal proceedings and the hardship imposed on the litigant by adopting this construction was mitigated by conferment of discretionary power on this Court to grant special leave under Art. 136. On this construction litigants, who come within categories (iii) and (iv) will all have to depend upon the discretionary powers of this Court to grant special leave under Art. 136. This will be a poor consolation to those litigants, for they will have no appeal as a matter of right, which they formerly possessed under the Code of Civil Procedure but will have to seek a favour entirely dependent on, the discretion of this Court. We do not think any other High Court has gone to this length and, indeed, this decision has been expressly dissented from in Bhagwantrao v. Viswasrao (supra) and we are not prepared to accept that Madras deci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... own of) (supra) and the passage from the judgment of Coutts Trotter C.J. in In re Vasudeva Samiar (supra) was quoted as an excellent summary of the effect of that decision. The conclusion was thus expressed at page 1086: "Now, the suit in the present case was instituted in 1945. On that date the final Court of Appeal was the Privy Council. Strictly speaking, if any right was vested in the parties to the suit on the date of its institution, it was a right to finally appeal to the Privy Council. But from 1st February, 1948, such a right was expressly abolished. There was no doubt no abolition of a Court as such, but substantially that was the result. From that day the Privy Council ceased to be a Court of Appeal from the Indian High Courts. Such right as was vested in the parties to the suit to appealto the Privy Council, therefore, came to an end on that day. Instead, the parties may be said to have obtained an alternative right of appeal to the Federal Court But what must not be overlooked is that this is not because the parties had a vested right, but because the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act specially provided for the substitution of the final appellate forum ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to the King's Bench (Appeal Side) for the Province of Quebec. The respondent applied for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it was not maintainable. On April 26, 1921, the King's Bench (Appeal Side) held that no appeal lay and the judgment of the Circuit, Court was final. The appellant thereupon appealed to the Privy Council. The respondent applied to the Privy Council to quash the appeal on the ground that the appeal to the Privy Council was incompetent. Three points were urged before the Judicial Committee. The first was that as the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was derived from the Cities' and Towns' Act, 1909, all right of appeal must be found in that Act and as no right of appeal was given by that Act no appeal lay. This point was rejected by the Judicial Committee on the ground that the power that was given to take proceedings to the Circuit Court under art. 5755 enabled these proceedings to be taken as part of the ordinary business of the court and the right of appeal that existed from the judgment given by that court was applicable to such proceeding. The second point urged was that the Circuit Court was governed by the Civil Procedure Code and so it had to be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the sections of the Code in which the provisions relating to the Circuit Court and rights of appeal found place to be replaced by other provisions and those other provisions having completely dropped out the provisions relating to the appeal from the Circuit Court, it was held that the statute "had otherwise provided In other words his case illustrates that the matter really came within the first exception, namely that the vested right of appeal had been taken away expressly or by necessary intendment rather than within the second exception where the court to which the appeal lay had been abolished simpliciter. This case, therefore, can give no support to the conclusion of the Full Bench. Apart from what, with respect, appears to us to be an erroneous reading of that Canadian case, the judgment of this Madras Full Bench seems to have been founded on the idea that the Constitution simply brought about an abolition of the Federal Court simpliciter and consequently the old vested right of appeal thereto ceased to exist and that as no new right of appeal was given to the new court, i.e., the Supreme Court, no appeal lay to it. If this reasoning of the Madras High Court were correct ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted before the commencement of the Constitution. Does the article, then, disclose any necessary intendment to that effect? It is said that that article gives a right of appeal from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court passed after the date of the Constitution, provided it satisfies the conditions therein mentioned and this provision impliedly negatives the right of appeal from judgments passed after the Constitution if the conditions are not satisfied, no matter when the proceedings had been instituted in the court of first instance. Article 133 only speaks of any judgment, decree or final order of a high Court. It does not say judgment, decree or final order passed after the Constitution. Therefore, when an application for leave to appeal from a judgment, decree or final order of a High Court is made after the Constitution then, at the date of the application, surely the judgment, decree or final order passed before the Constitution can also , be described literally and correctly as a judgment, decree or final order of a High Court. But it is said at once that the Constitution is prospective and, therefore, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is dissatisfied with a judgment passed by the High Court in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding filed in the court of first instance before the Constitution, has a right of appeal which had accrued to him at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding in the court of first instance according to the. law then in force and it is immaterial whether the judgment is passed before or after the Constitution. The right to go from court to court in appeal is the right which vests at the date of the institution of the proceedings in the court of the first instance. It is true, as pointed out by Rankin C.J. that the litigant cannot go from Court A to Court B or from Court B to Court C unless and until an adverse order actually is made but the right to go up to Court C vests, not at the date of the adverse judgment or the date of the filing of the appeal but, at the date of the institution of the original proceedings. If this is, as we apprehend it is, -the correct view. then to construe Art. 133 as covering all judgments, decrees and final orders made after the Constitution irrespective of the date of the initiation of the proceedings in the original court will be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt seem to have been oppressed by the feeling that to hold that Art. 133 did not apply to all judgments passed by a High Court after the date of the Constitution in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted in the court of first instance prior to that date will make the article a dead letter for many years to come. We need only point out that the Special Bench in Calcutta and the earlier Full Bench of Madras, which dealt with the cases relating to the amended cl. 15 of the Letters Patent were not deterred by any such feeling of oppression from giving effect to the principle which undoubtedly was laid down by the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (supra). The learned judges of this later Full Bench of the Madras High Court may also have been oppressed by the feeling that if Art. 133 were not construed as covering all judgments, decrees or final orders of a High Court made after the date of the Constitution in a civil proceeding irrespective of whether such proceeding arose out of a suit or other proceeding instituted before or after that date it will be to deny a right of appeal to a litigant whose suit had been filed in a High Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... epeat the admonition given by this Court in Daji Saheb Mane v. Shankarrao Vithalrao Mane referred to above, namely, a construction which will have such an effect should not be adopted unless it is imperative. We see nothing imperative in Art. 133 in that behalf. There is another argument advanced against the correctness of this Madras Full Bench decision which may be noticed now. It is pointed out that the learned judges conceded that Art. 133 did not apply to a case in which the judgment. decree or final order of the High Court was made before the Constitution. This concession can only be explained on the footing that having been passed before the commencement of the Constitution such judgment, decree or final order did not comply with the requirements of Art. 133, which, being prospective, contemplated a judgment, decree or final order of the High Court passed after the date of the Constitution and that as Art. 133 did not apply the vested right of appeal was governed by Art. 135. Then, by a parity of reasoning why can it not be said that Art. 133 does not apply to a judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted in the court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l. 20. If ss. 109 and 110 must be read in this way why should not Art. 133 be read as covering all judgments, decrees or final orders of a High Court passed after the commencement of the Constitution other than those in respect of which a vested right of appeal existed from before the Constitution? It is said that there is no saving provision to Art. 133 like cl. 20 of the Adaptation Order and, therefore, Art. 133 cannot be read in a restricted way. This argument is unsound and here the observations of Rankin C.J. in the Special Bench case of Calcutta referred to above become apposite, namely, that the provision which takes away jurisdiction is itself subject to the implied saving of the litigant's right. Clause 20 'will be meaningless if Art. 133 is also not read in a restricted sense. This restricted% construction of Art. 133 will not be open to the objection that it deprives the aggrieved litigant who had filed his suit or proceeding in a princely State before the Constitution but against whom an adverse judgment, decree or final order has been made by the High Court of the corresponding Part.B State for the Privy Council to which that litigant had the right to go had been aboli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fore the Federal Court ceased to exist, but with respect to which no leave to appeal bad been obtained either from the High Court or from the Federal Court, for without such leave no jurisdiction or power was exercisable by the Federal Court in respect of those judgments, decrees or final orders. This Court has already held that the word " exercisable " should not be used in that limited and restricted sense. In our opinion jurisdiction and powers in relation to a judgment, decree or final order to be passed by the High Court after the Constitution but with respect to which a right of appeal had vested in the parties before the commencement of the Constitution must be 'held to have been " exercisable " by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. Such jurisdiction and powers were "exercisable " in the sense that they could be exercised as soon as a judgment, decree or final order was passed provided that with respect to it a litigant had already acquired a vested right of appeal. There is no reason why the operation of Art. 135 should be limited to cases where the right of appeal was not a mere potentiality but had actually arisen in a concrete form ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Rajasthan High Court in April, 1950, that is, after the Constitution by a High Court of a Part B State constituted under the Constitution and the respondent had no vested right of finality in relation to any judgment of the Rajasthan High Court,. The appellant's vested right of appeal to the Privy Council of that State came to an end as that authority was abolished and at the date of the suit he had no right of further appeal from the judgment of the Jaipur High Court to the Federal Court or to this Court. That being the position it *as a judgment with respect to which nobody had any vested right of appeal and, therefore, an appeal lay to this Court under Art. 133 as construed above. lt did not matter in that case whether the appeal was maintainable under Art. 133 or Art. 135 and the question that we are considering in the present appeal does not appear to have been urged by learned counsel or discussed by the court in that case and the cryptic observation quoted above cannot be taken as a considered and final expression of opinion that whenever a judgment, decree or final order is passed after the date of the Constitution it must come within Art. 133 no matter whether the proceed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as since been followed by the High Court of Calcutta in Prabirendra Mohun v. Berhampore Bank Ltd ) A.I.R. 1954 Cal. 289, by the High Court of Allahabad in Ram Sahai v. Ram Sevdk A.I.R. 1956 All 321 and Tajammul Hussain v. Mst. Quaiser Jahan Begum A.I.R. 1956 All. 638 and by the High Court of Punjab in The Indian Trade and General Insurance Ltd. v. Raj Mal Paharchand A.I.R.1956 Punjab. 228, while the contrary view has been taken by the Bombay High Court in Dajee Sahib v. Sankar Rao I.L.R. 1952 Bom. 906., by the Nagpur High Court in Bhagawantrao v. Viswasa Rao I.L.R. 1953 Nag. 822 and by the Patna High Court in N. P. Sukul v. R. K. Misra [1933] I.L.R. 32 Patna 400. We have had the benefit of a full and learned argument on the question, and having carefully reconsidered the matter, I have come to the conclusion that the view taken by the majority of the High Courts is correct. The judgment against which the present appeal is sought to be preferred was pronounced on February 10, 1955. The Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950, and Arts. 131 to 140 therein define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, original and appellate. It being settled law that an appeal does ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s been repeatedly held by this Court. But the only result of it is, as decided in Janardan Reddi and others v. State of Hyderabad [1951] S.C.R. 344, that appeals against judgments, decrees or final orders passed prior to January 26, 1950, will not be governed by Art. 133. And as prospective in character, there being no words' limiting its operation in any manner, it will apply to all judgments, decrees or final orders passed after the coming into force of the Constitution, and as the judgment in this case was pronounced on February 10, 1955, the right of appeal against it must be determined in accordance with Art. 133, and as the valuation of the suit was only Rs. 11,400, the present appeal would be incompetent, as the requirements of Art. 133(1) (a) are not satisfied. The answer of the petitioner to this contention might thus be stated: Under the law as it stood on April 22, 1949, when he filed the suit he had vested in him a right of appeal to the High Court and from the High Court to the Federal Court. That right has not been taken away by the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication, and the Articles of the Constitution should therefore be so interpreted. as to give ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... "The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested." It is on this decision that the entire argument in support of the petition is founded. But is it correct ? It may look a daring and almost fatuous adventure to canvass the correctness of the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (supra), especially when it has been followed by Courts in this country for well nigh ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (supra) does not disclose the reasoning on which it is based. Lord Macnaghten no doubt refers to " a long line of authorities from the time of Lord Coke to the present day ", and they are presumably what are referred to in the argument of counsel at page 370. But when examined, they do not bear on this point. Lord Coke, in commenting on the Statute of Gloucester (6, Edward I, Chap. 78, s. 3) which prohibited alienations of tenement, stated: " This extendeth to alienations made after the statute and not before; for it is a rule of law of Parliament that regularly nova constitutio futuris forman imponere debet, non praeteritis" (a new statute regulates future conduct and not past(1)). From this passage, one may say that legislation does not affect a right of appeal, which has accrued. But it throws no light on the question when that right accrues, whether at the commencement of the action or on the pronouncement of the decision. In Towler v. Chatterton (1829) 6 Bing. 253; 31 R.R., 411, the suit was to recover an oral loan, and the question was whether it was hit by Lord Tenterdon's Act, which required that, to take the case out ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... from a right of action, and that the creditor was therefore not affected by the change effected by s. 10 of the Judicature Act. The decision in In re Athlumney [1898] 2 Q.B. 547 is similar to the one in In re Joseph Suche, and Company Ltd. (supra), the question being whether the ,rights of a creditor who had proved for his debt could be affected by the provisions of a Bankruptcy Act, which came into force after proof of such debt. Following In re Joseph Suche Company Ltd., it was held that the right to prove a debt was a substantive one, and was not affected by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, which came into force after such proof. It may be taken on these authorities that a right of appeal is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure, and that a legislation subsequent to the accrual of such a right must not be construed as taking it away, unless it does so expressly or by necessary implication. But the question still remains when that right accrues or vests; and that did not arise for determination in the authorities cited above, and indeed, does not appear to have been the subjectmatter of any pronouncement prior to Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y question of stare decision, they have no independent value of their own, and no useful purpose will be served -by any detailed reference to them. Then, there is the question, whether in view of the fact that the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (supra) has been followed in this country for quite a long period, we should not decline to disturb it on the principle of stare decisis. But that principle is properly applicable only when there is a long course of decisions interpreting the law in a particular way and rights to property have been acquired and contractual relations entered into on the basis of those decisions. It cannot properly be invoked when the question is, when on the construction of a statute a right to appeal vests in a suitor. I 'should add that the petitioner did not seriously contend that the principle of stare decisis would apply to the decision of such a question. I must now refer to the decision of this Court in Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others [1953] S.C.R. 987, where the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining, Company v. Irving (supra) was followed. But the, it was assumed that the decision in Col ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (supra) is to be accepted as laying down the correct law, it does not go far enough to support the petitioner. It should be noted that the ,suit was there instituted in a Court from which but for the Judiciary Act an appeal would have lain to the Privy Council, and what the Judicial Committee decided was that the right to prefer an appeal became vested in the suitor when the action was commenced, and that no legislation subsequent thereto could impair or take away that right, unless it did so expressly or by necessary intendment. Giving full effect to that decision, the petitioner can only claim that when he instituted the suit in the Sub Court, Bapatla on April 22, 1949, he had on that date a vested right to file an appeal against any decision which might be given in that suit to the High Court of Madras, which was the Court to which an appeal lay from the Bapatla Sub Court on that date. That right is not in dispute. -The petitioner did file an appeal to the High Court of Madras, and that was heard and decided by the Andhra High Court, to which the appeal was transfer- red. What the petitioner now claims is something more. He ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is contention, Rankin C. J. who delivered the judgment of the Court, stated the ratio decidendi as follows: " Now the reasoning of the Judicial Committee in the Colonial Sugar Refining Company's case (Supra) is a conclusive authority to show that rights of appeal are not matters of procedure, and that the 'right to enter the superior court is for the present purpose deemed to arise to a litigant before any decision has been.given by the interior court. If the latter proposition be accepted., I can see no intermediate point at which to resist the conclusion that the right arises at the date of the suit., It does not arise as regards Court B alone when the suit is instituted in Court A and as regards Court C when the first appeal is lodged before Court B...... It is quite true that the suitor cannot enter Court C without going through Court B, but neither can he enter Court B till Court A has given its decision. The right must be a right to take the matter to Court C in due course of the existing law." It will be noticed that the two propositions of law on which the judgment is based are, first, that a suitor in Court A should be held to have a right of appeal to Court B even before ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e lower grade to one of the higher grade, it will not be correct to regard those appeals as forming a single proceeding, or the right to file them as a single right. If a suit is institute in Court A and the law permits an appeal against its decision to Court B, add if the law further provides for an appeal from the decision of Court B to Court C, and there is again a right of further appeal provided against the decision of Court C to Court D, the successive appeals from Court A to Court B, from Court B to Court C and from Court C to Court D are distinct proceedings independent of one another. How then can the right of appeal from one Court to another be held to comprise within it the right of appeal from that Court to a, third Court? Section 96, Code of Civil Procedure, provides for an appeal from a decree passed by the trial court, and under that provision the decision in a suit instituted in the court of a District Munsif will be open to appeal to the, District Court.' Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure,' provides for further - appeal from the judgment of the District Court to the High Court; but this right of second appeal is much more limited than that given under section 9 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd second appeal were to be regarded as constituting one proceeding, that Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin mer, this principle on the decision in Colonial sugar refining Company v. Irving (supra), and that come to therein was therefore well placed on principle. These decisions, however, when examined, contain little that really supports the conclusion reached in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin. In fact, they are merely referred to in the judgment at pages 516 and 517 with out any discussion, as authorities relied on by counsel for appellant in support of his contention that the principle of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act was applicable in the construction of the Letters Patent. The first of these decisions is Ratanchand Shrichand v. Hammantray Shivbakas (1860) 6 Bom. H.C. R. 166. There, the facts were that 'a suit for Rs. 23,319 was instituted in the court of the Principal Sadar Amin of Dhulia, and that was substantially decreed on January 29, 1869. On March 19, 1869, the Bombay Civil Courts Act came into force, and under that Act appeals in suits exceeding Rs. 5,000 lay to the High Court of Bombay. But under the law as it stood prior to that date, the appeal against the judgment of the Principal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t therefore the proceedings for sale which were commenced under the Act of 1859 were governed by the provisions of that Act, and that the appeal was accordingly incompetent I do not we anything in this decision which touches the present controversy. In the course of the judgment, West J. stated that opinion had sometimes been expressed " that the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal, are really but steps in a series of proceedings connected by an intrinsic unity........ Are we to interpret this remark as meaning that under the law, suit, appeal, and second appeal all constitute but one proceeding ? The observation itself merely speaks of them as steps in a series of proceedings. That is to say, they are different proceedings, but are directed to a common purpose. And are we to build on this observation, reading it along with the decision in- Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (supra) the theory that when a right to file an appeal arises, it comprehends a right to file the whole series of appeals under the law ? That will be putting the observation to a use which could not have been contemplated. On the other hand, there are the following observations at ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ons did not come up for consideration before the Judicial Committee, as their effect was promptly nullified by a further amendment of the Letters Patent giving retrospective operation to the earlier amendment of 1928. But though these decisions themselves had thus been rendered obsolete, the theory enunciated therein of the right of appeal I in all its career' vesting in the suitor at the commencement of the action has continued to possess the field of law, until it has come to be regarded as an established doctrine of our jurisprudence. For the reasons already given, that theory cannot be accepted as sound. The decisions in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin (supra), and Vasudeva Samiar In re (supra) which expressed that theory, must be held to be erroneous, and the contention of the petitioner based on those authorities that he acquired on April 22,,1949, when he instituted the suit in the Bapatla Sub Court, a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court under the then law must be rejected. But that does not exhaust all the hurdles which the petitioner has to cross before he. can reach the Con- stitution as the holder of a vested right, seeking protection for the same therein. Assuming that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the respondent, inter alia, was that as the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which gave a right of appeal had been repealed before the appeal was filed and the new Act which was then in force gave no such right, the appeal was incompetent, and the Privy Council upheld this contention. I shall have to refer to this decision again, when I deal with the question as to whether Art. 135 is applicable. At this stage, it is only necessary to consider whether the criticism of the petitioner that there was no question of abolition of Court in Canada Cement Co. v. East Montreal (Town of) (supra), and that the decision in Veeranna v. Chinna Venkanna (supra) was mistaken in thinking that there was, is justified. It is true that the judgment in Canada Cement Co' v. East Montreal (Town of) (supra) does not mention that Court. B (Court of Review) was abolished. But nothing is mentioned in the judgment as to what happened to that Court. It is probable that it was abolished because Court B was under the Code of Civil Procedure merely a Court of under the and all the provisions in that Code providing for appeals from Court A to Court B had been repealed, and, instead, s. 42 provided t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efore the provisions of the Constitution must be so construed as to effectuate that right. This argument proceeds on a misapprehension as to the true character of the right, which the petitioner had, assuming of course he had one. That right was not a right. in gross to appeal to some Court which is superior to the High Court. It was a right to appeal to the Federal Court against the decision of the High Court, and when that Court was abolished, the right which the petitioner had by its very nature perished with that Court, and there was accordingly nothing on which Cl. 20 could operate, nothing which could be kept alive by it. It was argued that this Court does the work which previously was done by the Federal Court, and must, in consequence, be regarded as its successor, and that would attract the operation of that clause. This contention is clearly untenable. This Court was established by the Constitution, and is a new Court deriving its jurisdiction and powers under the Constitution. Reference might, in this connection, be made to the following observation of Patanjali Sastri J. in State of Seraikella and other8 V. Union of India and another [1951] S.C.R. 474, 497:- " The Fed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... may be the consequences; for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature." per Lord Chief Justice Tindal in Warburton v. Love. land [1831] 2 Dow. CI. (H.L.) 480, 489; 6 E.R. 806, 809. 567. And where the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute is reasonably clear, the Court would so interpret it as to give effect to that intention, notwithstanding that the words used are defective, and for that purpose, it could add words which might have been omitted by mistake or accident. But where the language of the enactment is clear and its meaning unmistakable, it is not permissible to read into it a new provision, which will have the effect of enlarging or abridging its connotation. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 31, pages 497 and 498, para 635. Applying, these principles, the language of Art. 133 is crystal clear and unambiguous. Full effect can be given to it without reading into it any words which are not there, and according to all settled canons of construction, therefore, it will not be permissible to read into the Article words such as "instituted after the coming into force of the Constit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ticle itself is inapplicable. A second appeal presented to a High Court under s. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code does not cease to be an appeal under that section, because it does not disclose any grounds on which the Court could interfere under that section. The eligibility of a candidate to sit for an examination is not destroyed by reason of the fact that he fails to get through the examination. In the present case, the subject-matter of the intended appeal is the judgment of a Bench of the Andhra High Court, and that was given in an appeal against a decree passed in a suit. It therefore directly falls within the purview of Art. 133, and whether it satisfies the requirements laid down therein or not, does not destroy its character as a matter to which the provisions of that Article apply. If so, Art. 135 is inapplicable. There is another reason why we should not accede to the contention of the petitioner that an appeal against a judgment or decree which would fall within the purview of Art. 133 should be held to go out of it when it does not satisfy the requirements, contained, therein as to valuation. I Suppose that a judgment is passed after the Constitution, by a High Court i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l apply so as to nullify the prohibition enacted in Art. 133. In my opinion, the same result will follow on the language of Art. 133 as it stands, and it should be construed as enacting that no appeal shall lie unless the requirements of that Article are satisfied. If it was the intention of the legislature that an appeal should lie against judgments, decrees and final orders passed in civil proceedings instituted prior to the Constitution when the value of the subject-matter was Rs. 10,000 or above, nothing would have been easier than to say so, by enacting a proviso to that effect to Art. 133(1), which deals with that category of appeals, and not leave it to be gathered by a process of involved and debatable ratiocination. In this view, even if there be a right of appeal vested in the petitioner prior to the Constitution as contended for by him, it Must be held to have been taken away by necessary implication by Art. 133. It has been uniformly held in America that when a right of appeal is given conditioned on the subjectmatter being of a certain valuation, that provision must be interpreted as negativing a right of appeal where that condition is not satisfied. In Durousseau v. U ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provided that. "Unless otherwise provided by this Act, all cases, matters or things which, at the time of its coming into force were within the competence of the Court of Review shall be within competence of the Court of King's Bench, sitting in appeal." This corresponds in substance to Art. 135, the, only difference being that instead of the words " unless otherwise provided by this I Act ", we have " with reference to any' matter to which the provisions of Art. 133 do not apply ". In holding that the appeal was not competent under s. 64, the Privy Council observed: "Now this appeal had not been brought when the statute was passed, although, the proceedings before the Circuit Court had been instituted. Consequently the statutes giving whatever right of appeal may have existed were replaced by sections which gave none, and s. 64 of the Act which provided that matters within the competence of the Court of Review should be subject to the Court of King's Bench, must be regarded as qualified by the provision that the powers of the Court of Review with regard to the Circuit Court had been taken away, and consequently to that extent the statute I had otherwise provided"'. According ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... proposed appeal does not fall within the ambit of Art. 133 on the ground that that Article applies only to judgments, decrees and final orders pawed in proceedings instituted after the Constitution is untenable, firstly because it proceeds on the notion that a right to appeal to the Federal Court has vested in the suitor prior to the Constitution, for which there is no justification on principle or on the statute law of India; secondly because it involves reading into the Article words which are not there and which restrict the plain meaning of the enactment: and thirdly because it will lead to the anomalous result that there will be no right of appeal against judgments, decrees and final orders made after the Constitution in civil proceedings instituted prior thereto in the Courts of Part B States, whatever their valuation. The contention of the petitioner that appeals against judgments, decrees or final orders which would otherwise fall within the ambit of Art. 133 must be held to fall outside that Article for the reason that they have not the requisite valuation prescribed therein, and that, in consequence, they will be governed by Art. 135, is untenable, firstly because Art. 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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