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TMI Blog2009 (12) TMI 697X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... J. have fallen for consideration. The reference to Full Bench was occasioned on account of the two Learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, principally not agreeing with another Division Bench Judgment reported in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra [2000 II CLR 279] in its interpretation of the term "unprotected worker" provided by Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'Mathadi Act') and term "worker" provided by Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. The referring Bench was of the opinion that the interpretation given to those two terms in the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) was in conflict with the statutory provisions enacted by the Legislature in the said Mathadi Act. The question referred to the Full Bench was as under:- "In view of the statutory definition of the expression "unprotected worker" in Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 is the interpretation placed by the Division Bench in Century Te ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... manual workers employed in certain employments in the State of Maharashtra to make provision for their adequate supply and proper and full utilization in such employments and for matters connected therewith. This Bill was first introduced in the Winter Sessions of Maharasthra Legislature at Nagpur. It was then referred to the Joint Committee for its report. The basic idea behind bringing this legislation, as it is reflected in Statement of Objects and Reasons, was that persons engaged in occupations like mathadi, hamals, fishermen, salt pan workers, casual labour, jatha workers and those engaged in similar manual work elsewhere, were not receiving adequate protection and benefits within the ambit of existing labour legislation. Therefore, with a view to studying the conditions of the work of the persons engaged in these occupations, the Government had appointed a Committee on 15.7.1965 to examine whether relief could be given to these workers within the ambit of the existing labour legislation and make recommendation as to how such relief could be given. The Statement of Objects and Reasons mentions that report was made by the Committee to the Government on 17.11.1967. In that repo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Schedule and that it shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different areas, and for different provisions of the Act. The Act was amended from time to time by Maharashtra Act Nos. 27 of 1972, 40 of 1974, 27 of 1977, 62 of 1981, 28 of 1987 and 27 of 1990. To begin with, it came into force in Thane District in various areas. (Emphasis supplied) 9. It will be better to see a few provisions of the Act. Section 2, which is the definition clause, defines "Board" in sub-Section (1), to mean a Board established under Section 6. Some other sub-Sections of Section 2 runs as under:- 2(2) "contractor", in relation to an unprotected worker, means a person who undertakes to execute any work for an establishment by engaging such workers on hire or otherwise, or who supplies such worker either in groups, gangs (tollis), or as individuals; and includes a subcontractor, an agent, a mukadum or a tolliwala; 2(3) "employer", in relation to any unprotected worker engaged by or through contractor, means the principal employer and in relation to any other unprotected worker, the person who ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for the registration of employers and unprotected workers in any scheduled employment or employments and provide for the terms and conditions of work of registered unprotected workers and make provision for the general welfare in such employments. 3 (2) In particular, a scheme may provide for all or any of the following matters that is to say:- (a)-(c) x x x x x x (d) for regulating the employment of registered unprotected workers, and the terms and conditions of such employment, including rates of wages, hours of work, maternity benefit, overtime payment, leave with wages, provision for gratuity and conditions as to weekly and other holidays and pay in respect thereof; (e) for securing that, in respect of periods during which employment or full employment is not available to registered unprotected workers though they are available for work, such unprotected workers will, subject to the conditions of the scheme, receive a minimum wage; (f) for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling the employment of unprotected workers to whom the scheme does not apply, and the employment of unprotected workers by employers to whom the scheme does not apply; (g) for the welfare of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... believe, is an unprotected worker employed therein or an unprotected worker to whom work is given out therein; (c) require any person giving any work to an unprotected worker or to a group of unprotected workers to give any information, which is in his power to give, in respect of the names and addresses of the persons to whom the work is given, and in respect of payments made, or to be made, for the said work; (d) seize or take copies of such registers, records of wages or notices or portions thereof, as he may consider relevant, in respect of an offence under this Act or scheme, which he has reason to believe has been committed by an employer; and (e) exercise such other powers as may be prescribed: Provided that, no one shall be required under the provisions of this section to answer any question or make any statement tending to incriminate himself. 15(3) Every Inspector appointed under this section shall be deemed to be public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. 21. Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any rights or privileges, which any registered unprotected worker employed in any scheduled employment is entitled to, on the date on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d not be termed as 'unprotected workers'. It was held specifically that the Mathadi Act did not deal with the employees engaged on monthly basis, as such workers were protected under the Shops and Establishments Act and other enactments. It was further held that it was only the casually engaged workmen, who would come within the purview of the Mathadi Act. The High Court further said that where the material produced on record clearly show that the workmen are protected workmen, more particularly, with reference to the Agreement under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Act in question would not apply. Therefore, the referred question was whether it was only casually engaged workers, who came within the purview of the Act. The majority judgment gave a straight answer to this question that the meaning of the term 'unprotected worker' was only the casual workman, was not correct, while the Learned Single Judge did not stop at that and gave a broader answer interpreting Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and held that every manual worker engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective of whether he is protected by other labour legislations or not, wo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as as to what was the true scope of the definition of the expression 'unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Considering the clear language and the questions considered in the referring judgment by Hon'ble F.K. Rebello and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ., we feel that the Learned Single Judge did not exceed the question referred in considering the full scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and the term 'unprotected worker'. We will, therefore, proceed on the basis that the Full Bench had to decide the true scope of the term 'unprotected worker' as defined in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and to point out as to who could be covered under that definition. 11. Basically, the contentions raised by the parties are as follows: Legal Submissions on behalf of the Appellants A. Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act cannot be interpreted independently of Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, which is the definition of 'worker' and conjoined reading of these two Sections in the light of other provisions of the Act would clearly bring out that those workers who are regularly employed and who have the protection of other labour legislations, cannot be termed as 'unprotected wor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r Counsel, the Full Bench should have considered how the authorities themselves construed and understood the law. In that behalf, the ruling in Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [2004(7) SCC 68] was relied upon heavily. Reference was made by the Learned Senior Counsel to few letters to show as to how the authorities themselves understood the term 'unprotected worker'. In this behalf the judgment in Irkar Sahu's & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust [1994 I CLR 187] was heavily relied. D. Reference was also made to Article 254 of the Constitution of India and it was suggested that in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, the Central Legislation will supersede the State Legislation if both cover the same field. It was suggested that there was no need for direct conflict between the two enactments and the repugnancy arises even if obedience to both laws is possible. Further, the Learned Senior Counsel suggested that specific contradictions between the two Statutes is not the only criteria. It is enough if Parliament had evinced the intention to cover the whole field. It was also suggested that the Presidential assent given to this Act was irrelevant ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e various labour laws, he could still be governed by the Mathadi Act. Same argument was in respect of Section 22 of the Mathadi Act, providing that a manual worker, who is in receipt of better benefits from his employer either on the date of commencement of this Act or at any time thereafter, he could seek exemption from all or any of the provisions of the Mathadi Act. Reference was made to Clauses 4(c), 11(3), 16(3), 16(4), 16(5), 33, 35(6) and 36 of the Scheme framed under the Mathadi Act. B. It was further contended that the argument on behalf of the appellant that the intention of the Legislature should be ascertained with reference to the history of legislation, the reports of the Committee, notes on the Clauses of the Bill and debates in Assembly, was erroneous as the plain meaning of the Section was not susceptible to any other meaning. It was, however, further contended that the language of the Section was clear and unequivocal and even if such extraneous aids of the interpretation were to be relied upon, no other interpretation could be obtained. It was pointed out that though in the Bill, as originally introduced, the words "is not adequately protected by legislation" we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erchants Unprotected Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1972 and in that sense, the question of interpretation of Section 2(11) did not fall for consideration in those cases. Similarly in the matter of Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on 16.1.1980, the Division Bench was not called upon to decide the interpretation of Section 2(11). Therefore, it could not be said that that case depended upon the interpretation of Section 2(11). Even as regards the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), the question was limited to the extent whether a manual worker engaged by the petitioner therein through a contractor was an unprotected worker although he was covered by various labour acts. It was pointed out that the referring judgment itself differed with the view expressed in the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra). It was, therefore, pointed out that it could not be said that there was a breach of doctrine of stare decisis in giving a contrary meaning of Section 2(11) as it was point ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in construing the provisions of the Act. It is not open to the Court to adopt a meaning of the expression 'unprotected worker' at variance with what has been legislated by the competent legislature." It was pointed out further that if the legislature intended that the benefit of Act could not be available to workers who were otherwise governed by some other industrial legislation, it was open to the legislature to legislate accordingly and it was, therefore, that the Division Bench did not agree with the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra). It was also pointed out by the Division Bench that the notes on Clauses appended to the Bill did not override express statutory provisions. A reference was then made to Section 22 of the Mathadi Act and the same logic was used as was relied and argued by the Learned Counsel for the respondents before us. 14. On these conflicting claims, we have to interpret Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and also the scope of the definition in the Section. We have already quoted the provisions of Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act in the earlier part of the judgment. There can be no dispute that the t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t of Objects and Reasons, as also the legislative history of the legislation. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the acceptance of such plain meaning would result in rendering some other provisions of the Act, otiose. Further, such interpretation would also hit doctrine of stare decisis, as the interpretation of this doctrine prior to the impugned Full Bench Judgment and more particularly given in various judgments of the Bombay High Court including judgment in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) has remained intact for more than 25 years, which is a long period. The further contention is that such interpretation would also be violative of the doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege, since the relevant authorities have consistently understood the meaning of that definition in a particular way and now, there would be no justification to disturb that understanding. It was also suggested by Shri Cama that the provisions of State Act cannot survive if the Central Act covers the same category of workers and in this case, such workers who were covered by the other Central Acts could not have been brought under the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is clear and unambiguous, the external aids for interpretation should be avoided. In Cable Corporation of India Vs. Addl. Commissioner of Labour [2008 (7) SCC 680], this Court observed in Para 16 that when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. There can be no dispute that the language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is not capable of any other meaning since it is clear and unambiguous. Some debate went on about the use of the word "means", which is to be found in the concerned Section. It was contended by Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that when a definition of the word begins with "means", it is indicative of the fact that the meaning of the word is restricted, that is to say, it would not mean anything else, but what has been indicated in the definition itself. In support of this proposition, he relied on the decision in Feroz N. Dotivala Vs. P.M. Wadhwani [2003(1) SCC 433]. The Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that in the decision in P. Kasilingam & Ors. Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology & Ors. [AIR 1995 SC 1395], it has been held b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... x Officer & Ors. [1994 (2) SCC 434]. About the principles to be borne in mind while interpreting a definition, the Learned Senior Counsel has relied on the decision in K.V. Muthu Vs. Angamuthu Ammal [1997(2) SCC 53], wherein in para 11, this Court has observed that the interpretation placed on a definition should not only be repugnant to the context, but it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose, which is sought to be served by the Act. This Court further held that a construction which would defeat or is likely to defeat the purpose of the Act, has to be ignored and not accepted. The Learned Senior Counsel also relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. [1980(2) SCC 593] and contended that the statutory construction, which fulfills the mandate of the statute, must find favour with the judges, except where the words and the context rebel against such flexibility. This Court, in this case observed:- "We would prefer to be liberal rather than lexical when reading the meaning of industrial legislation which develops from day to day in the growing economy of India." Once it is held that the meaning of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he labour through Mukadam or Toliwala and such Mukadam or Toliwala engaged his men or the workers with him and paid wages to them and, therefore, technically, there was no direct relationship of the employer and employee, as between the merchants or concerns and the workers. It was also argued that if the direct relationship was established, such benefits would flow to the Mathadi workers. From this, the Learned Senior Counsel argued that where there is a direct relationship in case of the monthly workers, there would be no question of applying this broad definition to such workers. It was also pointed out that the Committee considered that there was a positive reluctance to appoint these workers as the direct employees and only a few merchants expressed their willingness to accept the workers as their direct employees, and there was also reluctance on the part of the workers to be employed directly. This was obviously with a view to argue that what was contemplated by the Committee was not for the direct workers and, therefore, the directly appointed workers would be outside the definition of "unprotected worker". Shri Singh also carried on his argument further relying on the para ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed worker" should be interpreted to exclude all the directly appointed workers employed in the factories, even if they are working in the scheduled employments. 24. We were also taken through the Objects and Reasons and Preamble and a very strong argument was advanced that if the definition is read in that light, there would be no question of accepting the literal interpretation. In our opinion, in view of the clear and settled law of interpretation, it would really not be necessary to go into these contentions, particularly, because the law is very clear that where the language is clear and admits of no doubts, it is futile to look for the meaning of the provision on the basis of these external aids. It is possible where the plain meaning rungs counter to the objects or creates absurdity or doubts by attributing that plain language. In our considered opinion, it is very difficult to find out any such absurdity or contradiction if the plain language of the Section 2(11) is accepted and acted upon for the purposes of interpretation. It must, at this juncture, be noted that inspite of Section 2(11), which included the words "but for the provisions of this Act is not adequately prote ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ". The other decision in U.P. State Electricity Board Vs. Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr. [2004(8) SCC 402 (Para 11)] would be of no consequence in the present controversy. The omission of the words as proposed earlier from the final definition is a deliberate and conscious act on the part of the legislature, only with the objective to provide protection to all the labourers or workers, who were the manual workers and were engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment. Therefore, there was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge the scope of the definition and once we accept this, all the arguments regarding the objects and reasons, the Committee Reports, the legislative history being contrary to the expressed language, are relegated to the background and are liable to be ignored. 25. Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants relied on decision in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2003(4) SCC 200], in which observation in para 16 was relied upon, which is as follows:- "16. ...........If certain provisions of law, construed in one way, would make them consistent with the Constitution and another interpretation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... law is to provide for the welfare, health and safety measures, where such employments require those measures. From this, it was suggested that it is only where the other legislations are unable to provide for the welfare and the better conditions, then alone this Act (Mathadi Act) would be brought into and, therefore, necessarily the unprotected workmen would be such workmen, who are deprived of the better conditions of service and further, therefore, if the workers were adequately protected, there would be no question of applying the provisions of the Mathadi Act to them and they cannot be covered under Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. The argument is clearly incorrect for the reason that the mention of "unprotected manual workers" is clearly in the wider sense and even the Preamble of the Mathadi Act displays the intentions of the State Government to make better provision for the unprotected manual workers. Merely because some workmen are manual workers and not casual workers, that by itself, would not make any different. It is to be noted that in the Preamble, terminology of "casual workers" is not to be found. Therefore, even on this basis, the definition cannot be restricted ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel, Ms. Lata Desai, Ms. Pallavi Divekar and Shri Vimal Chandra S. Dave, Shri Nitin S. Tambwekar, Shri B.S. Sai, Shri K. Rajeev, Ms. Bharathi, Ms. Mehak G. Sethi, Shri Naveen R. Nath, Shri Arun R. Pendekar, Shri Sanjay Kharde, Ms. Asha Gopalan, Shri Vishnu Sharma, Shri Shrish Kumar Misra and Shri Rajesh Kumar, Learned Counsel invited our attention to Section 21 of the Mathadi Act and pointed out that there was absolutely no inconsistency because where a directly appointed worker was having better rights or privileges, then those rights or privileges remains unaffected and in that case, such worker would have the choice for those more favourable rights and privileges under other beneficial legislations, the only rider being that such worker would not be entitled to receive any corresponding benefit under the provisions of the Mathadi Act and the scheme. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, this provision was enough to repel the arguments of the appellants that the directly employed workers were enjoying the better benefits and they would be deprived of the same in case they are included in the wider definition under Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ressed that Section 15(2)(b) would become redundant if we accept the interpretation put forward by the respondents. Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 provides for the appointment of Inspectors, possessing prescribed qualifications for the purposes of the Mathadi Act or of any scheme. Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 and more particularly, clause (a) thereof defines the powers of the Inspector. Clause (b), on which great stress was led by Shri Cama runs as under:- "15(2)(b) examine any person whom he finds in any such premises or place and who, he has reasonable cause to believe, is an unprotected worker employed therein or an unprotected worker to whom work is given out therein." According to Shri Cama, when all the persons working in a scheduled industry, doing manual work, become the unprotected workers, then there is no question of the Inspector examining any such person, because everybody would be an unprotected worker. The argument is clearly wrong. What is required is that every unprotected worker has to be registered with the Board. If the Inspector suspects that any such worker, though an unprotected worker, is either not registered or does not get the protection of the Board an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , which in turn is used in Section 2(11) further. Therefore, they would not be identical under any circumstances. 34. It was argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that as per Sections 3(13) and 3(14) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, all the employees are covered and any reduction from those employees has to be only after the notice of change is given. Our attention was also invited to Section 44 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. We have no difficulty with the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, as that Act operates in different spheres altogether. We do not think that there is any relevance of those provisions, particularly, while interpreting the terms of the Mathadi Act and more particularly of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. All the Learned Counsel for the appellants expressed their apprehension about the working of Section 3 of the Mathadi Act and posed a question as to who will decide as to whether an industry has or has not adequate employees, whether it would be Board or employer or employee union. In our view, such argument is clearly incorrect for the simple reason that such question does not come within the sco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... construction rule, that when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment would give effect to the legislative intention, the Court should presume that the legislator intended common sense to be used in construing the enactment. 1477. Nature of presumption against absurdity: It is presumed that Parliament intends that the Court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing construction of an enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find against a construction which produces an absurd result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Here 'absurd' means contrary to sense and reason, so in this context the term 'absurd' is used to include a result which is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless, artificial or productive of a disproportionate counter-mischief. 1480. Presumption against anomalous or illogical result: It is presumed that Parliament intends that the Court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which opposing constructions of an enactment corresponds to its legal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ier interpretation, though consistently upheld for a long time, may not strictly be correct or may produce two possible views. Our attention was invited to the decisions in Mishri Lal (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Dhirendera Nath (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. [1999 (4) SCC 11], Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors. [2002 (5) SCC 111], Union of India & Anr. Vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan & Anr. [2004 (10) SCC 1] and State of Gujarat Vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. [2005 (8) SCC 534]. It was urged by the Learned Senior Counsel that there was a consistent line of judgments starting from year 1974 right upto the present judgment of the Full Bench in 2006, covering period of 32 years, wherein the Bombay High Court has taken a consistent view in interpretation of the term "unprotected workers" to mean only casual workers, or as the case may be, the workers, who did not enjoy the protection of the other labour welfare legislations. It was pointed out that firstly, the challenge to the constitutional validity was rejected by Hon'ble Rege, J. in his two judgments cited supra, solely on the ground that the said Act applied to a special class of workmen, who needed special ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd S.B. More & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) nor was it before the Division Benches in Judgments in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra), Irkar Sahu's & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) including this Court judgment in Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and Central Kamgar Union Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra). The Learned Single Judge noted the argument that it was expressed in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) that the Act did not apply to the manual workers in the scheduled employment, who were protected by the other labour legislations and the said judgment was followed thereafter in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and, therefore, on principle of stare decisis, the settled position of law should not be disturbed. The Learned Judge has also noted the decision in State of Gujarat Vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. (cited supra). The Learned Single Judge then, relying on the judgment of this Court in M/s. Good Year India ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it." The Court further relied upon the decisions in Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [2003 (2) SCC 111], Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. N.R. Vairamani [2004 (8) SCC 579] and finally, the decision in British Railways Board Vs. Herrington [All ER 761] and has quoted the following observations therefrom:- "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper." Now, when we examine all the Bombay High Court's judgments on the basis of this ratio, it is clear that excepting the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra), such position could not be obtained. There can be no dispute about the importance attached by this C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll discern that any deviation from the straight path of stare decisis in our past history has occurred for articulable reasons, and only when the Supreme Court has felt obliged to bring its opinions in line with new ascertained facts, circumstances and experiences. (Precedent in Indian Law, A. Laxminath, 2nd Edn. 2005, P. 8)" In para 118, this Court observed that:- "118. The doctrine of stare decisis is generally to be adhered to, because well-settled principles of law founded on a series of authoritative pronouncements ought to be followed. Yet, the demands of the changed facts and circumstances, dictated by forceful factors supported by logic, amply justify the need for a fresh look." Tested on the basis of this logic in the celebrated decision of State of Gujarat Vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. (cited supra), we have no hesitation, but to hold that the application of doctrine of stare decisis cannot help the appellants in this case. We must express here that while rejecting the arguments of appellants, we have in our minds, those thousands of workmen who are otherwise exploited by Toliwalas, Mukadams and at times, the employers. The enactment is a beneficial ena ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... labourers of the employer doing loading/unloading work would not be covered by the said Act. Though these two letters were never procured, they were produced before us. Further, a reference is made to the letter of Mathadi Board (Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board) dated 17.11.1983, wherein the Mathadi Board understood and applied the Act only to that special class of workers doing loading and unloading operations in scheduled employments, who were in the regular employments of an employer and, therefore, were not protected by other applicable labour legislations. It was also urged that only after the impugned judgment was passed, the Mathadi Boards have started asking the employers to register them under the Act even if they are engaging regular full time workers. It was urged that in Irkar Sahu's & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), the Mathadi Board had taken such a position and they could not now turn back from their stance. From this, the Learned Senior Counsel urged that since the State Government itself understood the provision in a particular manner, such understanding should be honoured by the Courts. 40. The argument is clearly erroneous for the simple reason tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... raders Vs. State of Punjab [1991 (1) SCC 86]. Considering this settled position, we do not think we are in a position to accept the contention raised. Same logic applies that even if the Mathadi Board's stand was somewhat contradictory in the case of Irkar Sahu's & Anr. Vs. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), it did not really create a bar against it from changing its stance for a correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. 41. The next argument was based on Article 254 of the Constitution of India. It was suggested that the said Article prescribes that in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, any Central legislation, whether made before or after a State legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both cover the same field. An exception to this lies in sub-Article (2), which preserves and protects a State enactment to the extent it has received the assent of the Vice President. Needless to say that this challenge is in the nature of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of the State Act. Such was not the challenge. The appellants never urged that the Act was constitutionally invalid and in fact, the constitutional validity of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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