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TMI Blog1952 (5) TMI 12X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he fact that he has not been able to persuade us to his view is not due to any defect in his presentation of the case. The petitioner was arrested on the 15th of November, 1951, and an order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was served on him the same day, and he was given the grounds of detention on the following day, the 16th. His case was placed before an Advisory Board and on the 8th of February, 1952, the Bombay Government "confirmed and continued" the detention under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950. This Act, as it originally stood, was due to expire on the 1st of April, 1951, but in that year an amending Act was passed which, among other things, prolonged its life to the 1st of April, 1952. The order of detention in this case was passed under the Act of 1950 as amended by the ,Act of 1951. According to past decisions of this Court, the detention would have expired on the 1st of April, 1952, when the Act of 1950 as amended in 1951 would itself have expired. But a fresh Act was passed in 1952 (Act XXXIV of 1952), the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1952. The effect of this Act was to prolong the life of the Act of 1950 for a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. This is the rule in England:see Craies on Statute Law, 5th edition, page 207; it is the law in Amenca: see Crawford on Statutory Construction, page 110; and it is the law which the Privy Council applied to India in Keshoram Poddar v. Nundo Lal Mallick()(1927) 54 I.A. 152 at 155). Bearing this in mind it will be seen that the Act of 1950 remains the Act of 1950 all the way through even with its subsequent amendments. Therefore, the moment the Act of 1952 was passed and section 2 came into operation, the Act of 1950 meant the Act of 1950 as amended by section 2, that is to say, the Act of 1950 now due to expire on the 1st of October, 1952. Turning now to section 3, whose vires is questioned, and examining it clause by clause we first get these words ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tial on the first and merely explains the effect of the first half. It is also relevant to note that it deals with four different kinds of orders, different, that is to say, in the form of the words used though in the end they all come to the same thing. It deals with the following kinds of order:- (1) an order in which the period of detention is not specified at all; in that event the detention would end at midnight on the night of the gist of March, 1952. It is clear that in this context the words "the principal Act" cannot mean the Act expiring on the 1st of October, 1952, because it envisages an order made before the Act of 1952 was in being and so on the date of its making the order could only refer to the Act then in being; (2) an order in which the period is stated to be "for the duration of the principal Act", that is to say, till the 31st of March, 1952 ,- (3) an order in which the period is specified to be until the expiry of the principal Act, which again brings us back to the 31st of March, 1952, as the last day of detention; (4) an order in which the period is specified to be till the 31st of March, 1952. In all these four cases the section says that the detention or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r with its concomitant fresh grounds and a fresh reference to the Advisory Board were not required; therefore, either way the petitioner must fail. Reference was made to the equality clause in article 14 of the Constitution but that argument is easily met because the classification which section 3 makes is reasonable. In one class it places all those whose cases have already been considered by the Advisory Board and in the other those whose cases have yet to go before it; also the law is fair, or at any rate as fair as detention laws can be, despite this distinction because power is left to the appropriate Government to revoke or modify these orders, or any of them, at any time. Substantially therefore there is no differentiation. Article 14 was considered at length in The Slate of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ()[1952] S.c.R.284), and according to the law laid down there, the Court must be satisfied on two points before it can strike at a law on the ground of unlawful discrimination. It must be satisfied (1) that the law in fact discriminates and (2) that such discrimination is not permissible on the principle of a rational classification made for the purposes of the legislatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etion of the State, and so there is no substantial discrimination. It was argued that however fair this may look on paper, in practice there will be grave discrimination because, as a matter of fact, the State will not apply its mind in the majority of cases like the petitioner's. That is an argument we cannot accept and no material Was placed before us t0 justify such a conclusion, We turn now to the next point. It was contended that sec- tion 3 offends the Constitution because article 22 (4) and (7) do not envisage the direct intervention of Parliament in a whole batch of cases. The protection guaranteed is that there shall be individual attention and consideration to each separate case by some duly specified and constituted authority. In our opinion, this is not accurate. Article 22 (4) guarantees that there shall be no preventive detention for more than three months unless the law authorising it makes provision for an Advisory Board and the Board after considering each individual case separately reports that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. To that extent there must be individual consideration of each case, but once the report is made and is unfavou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Act of 1950, the answer is that Parliament has the power. This was precisely the power exercised in the amending Act of 1951 and upheld by this Court in S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras([1951] S.C.R. 621). The present Act is no different from that in this respect. So far, we have dealt with the facts in petition No. 86 of 1952. The facts in the other three petitions naturally differ in their details but they all conform to the same general pattern so far as the points discussed above are concerned, so there is no need to discuss them individually. We hold that section 3 of the amending Act of 1952 is intra vires and that the detentions are not bad on any of the grounds discussed above. The rest of the points raised in each individual case are left open except for one point which arises in petition No. 155 of 1952. That point is as fol- lows. The first ground of detention given to the petitioner in this case reads: "Being the President of Jamat of Agris you have used your position as such to increase your influence over the residents of Uran Peta, have created a band of obedient and trusted associates, have inflicted heavy fines on villagers in Uran Peta who have disregarded ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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