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TMI Blog1961 (4) TMI 82X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, (to be called the Act, in this judgment), a notification was issued, applying Part II of the Act to the area where the property is situated. The appellants claimed protection of s. 12 in Part 11 of the Act, which deprived the landlord of the right of possession under certain circumstances. The Civil Judge framed three preliminary Issues, which were as follows: "1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit? 2.Whether the plaintiff's suit for possession of the suit property is maintainable in view of the Notification issued by the Government of Bombay on 16th August, 1958, applying Part II of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act? If not, what order should be passed? 3. What order?". These Issues were decided against the appellants. They filed a revision petition before the High Court of Bombay, which was dismissed by the order under appeal. Naik, J., who heard the revision, followed a previous Full Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court reported in Nilkanth Ramachandra v. Rasiktal (1949) 51 Bom. L.R. 280. In that case, Chagla, C. J. (Gajendragadkar and Tendolkar, JJ., concurring) had held that s. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (3)(a) Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession. (b)In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ermitted increases, if any, and is also observing the other conditions of the tenancy in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, applies to the present case and the tenants are protected.. It is also contended that if the first proviso to s. 50 was limited to such suits only as were pending on the date of the passing of the Act, s. 12(1), on its own terms, is applicable to the present case, and being retrospective in character, leads to the same result. These two contentions were apparently raised in the Court of the Civil Judge and before the High Court. The High Court, however, ruled that s. 12 was prospective in character and did not apply to pending suits or proceedings. It is contended by the learned Attorney-General what the construction placed by the High Court upon the first proviso to s. 50 is erroneous. Though he S. concedes that the proviso must be read as qualifying what the substantive part of s. 50 enacts, he urges that the proviso goes beyond that purpose and enacts a substantive law of its own. He relies upon the following observations of Lord Loreburn, L. C., in Rhondda Urban Council v. Taff Vale Railway [1909] A.C. 253, 258, where a p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Bombay. If nothing more had been said, s. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would have applied, and all pending suits and proceedings would have continued under the old law, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. The effect of the proviso was to take the matter out of s. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and to provide for a special saving. It cannot be used to decide whether s. 12 of the Act is retrospective. It was observed by Wood, V. C., in Fitzgerald v. Champneys (1861) 2 J. & H. 31:70 E.R. 958 that saving clauses are seldom used to construe Acts. These clauses are introduced into Acts which repeal others, to safe. guard rights which, but for the savings, would be lost. The proviso here saves pending suits and proceedings, and further enacts that suits and proceedings then pending are to be transferred to the Courts designated in the Act and are to continue under the Act and any or all the provisions of the Act are to apply to them. The learned Solicitor-General contends that the savings clause enacted by the proviso, even if treated as substantive law, must be taken to apply only to suits and proceedings pending at the time of the repeal which, but for the proviso, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d performs the other conditions of the tenancy. In other words, no decree can be passed granting possession to the landlord, if the tenant fulfils the conditions above mentioned. The Explanation to S. 12 makes it clear that the tenant in case of a dispute may make an application to the Court under sub-s. (3) of S. 11 for fixation of a standard rent and may thereafter pay or tender the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order to be made by the Court. The tenants, in the present case, have expressed their readiness and willingness to pay, and it is clear that they fulfil the requirements of sub-s. (1) of S. 12, and the landlord is, therefore, not entitled to the relief of possession. Both the High Court as well as this Court in their previous decisions, referred to above, were not called upon to interpret sub-s. (1) of the Act. They were dealing with appeals arising out of decrees already passed. The observations that S. 12 was prospective were made with reference to sub-ss. (2) and (3) and not with respect to sub-s. (1), which did not even find a mention in those judgments. The question then was whether S. 12 by itself or read with the proviso to S. 50 was appli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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