TMI Blog2007 (5) TMI 559X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ision for compensation for such vesting in the Act as ultra vires the Constitution of India, the State cannot be permitted to proceed with the said provision of vesting against the petitioners as long adequate provision is not made in the Statute for compensation. We, respectfully follow the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Paschim Banga Rajya Bhumijibi Sangha, which is still binding upon us as a valid precedent and consequently, set aside the order passed by the Tribunal on the ground that without making lawful provisions of compensation for vesting in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, the State cannot go on with the process of vesting against the writ petitioners. The order impugned thus, is, set aside. The writ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... contained in Section 14V vis-a-vis the definition of land as contained in Section 2(7) and Section 3A(3) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act as ultra vires Article 300A of the Constitution as the amount payable for acquisition of land was without and just principle and also illusory, the State cannot continue with the process of vesting in terms of Section 14T of the said Act. Dr. Mondal further relies upon a subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Harisadhan Bandopadhaya and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 1998(1) CHN 61 whereby relying upon the aforesaid decision in the case Paschim Banga Rajya Bhumijibi Sangha (supra), another Division Bench set aside the order of vesting. 5. By relying upon the said two decis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... regarding possession on spot should be maintained by both the parties it further appears from a subsequent order dated December 16, 1999 that another Bench in a different matter being special leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 1416 of 1997 passed an interim order directing that status quo regarding possession on the spot should be maintained by both sides in connection with the members of the petitioner-Sangha who were before the High Court in the writ petition out of which the said proceeding arose. By further order dated April 17, 2004 on various applications filed by about 13000 persons, the Supreme Court further ordered that if any order of vesting had been passed in respect of the lands of persons who were parties before the High Court out of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, the State cannot invoke the said ultra vires proceeding against the citizens of the country simply because an interim order of stay of operation order declaring the provision as ultra vires has been passed in an appeal against such order. The object of granting interim order is to see that the relief claimed in the appeal may not become inappropriate or the appeal does not become infructuous for not granting such interim order; but by mere grant of interim stay, the effect of a binding precedent is not destabilized. Over and above, the interim orders of the stay granted by the Supreme Court clearly indicate that the said Court never intended that notwithstanding the decision of the High C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an be reversed or modified only after granting leave and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before this Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage [See Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. and Sri Ramnik Vallabhdas Madvane and Ors. v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhavani 2004(8) Supreme 208]. (Emphasis supplied) 12. At this juncture, it will not be inappropriate to refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras while pointing out the difference between an order of stay of operation of the order impugned and an order quashing the ord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e authority dated January 7, 1991 does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated January 7, 1991 and it cannot be said that after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the appellate authority. 13. Therefore, the effect of the order of stay in a pending appeal before the Apex Court does not amount to 'any declaration of law' but is only binding upon the parties to the said proceedings and at the same time, such interim order does not destroy the binding effect of the judgment of the High Court as a precedent because while granting the interim order, the Apex Court had no occasion to lay down any proposition of law inconsistent with the o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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