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TMI Blog2010 (1) TMI 1099X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pointed the appellant as Work Munshi in the pay scale of Rs.400-600 for a period of three months. Though, the tenure specified in the second order ended on 4.5.1987, the appellant was continued in service till 5.7.1988 i.e., the date on which the Managing Director of the corporation issued one month's notice seeking to terminate his service by way of retrenchment. However, the implementation of that notice was stayed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Writ Petition No.8723 of 1988 filed by the appellant. The writ petition was finally dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the appellant to avail remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act'). After two months, the Managing Director of the corporation issued notice dated 26.11.1992 for retrenchment of the appellant and 21 other workmen by giving them one month's pay and allowances in lieu of notice as per the requirement of Section 25F(a) of the Act. 4. As a sequel to withdrawal of the writ petition, the appellant raised an industrial dispute which was referred by the Government of Punjab to the Labour Court. In the statement of claim filed by him, the appellant pleaded that the action taken for terminati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ith the services of the workman while retaining juniors. Even it is so mentioned in the appointment orders Ex. WI to W3 that seniors of the workman can be terminated on ten days notice, does not mean principle of "last come, first go" as envisaged in sec. 25G of the Act are not required to be complied with. Reliance is placed upon a Supreme Court case reported as 1999 (2). SCT. Page 284: Samishta Dube vs. City Board: Etaway: that wherein it was held that "rule of`first come, last go' could be deviated by the employer in cases of lack of efficiency or loss of confidence-But burden is on the employer to justify deviation. No such attempt made by the respondent Employer High Court was not correct in stating that rule of seniority is not applicable to daily wagers. There is clear violation of sec. 25 G of the Act. Appellant is entitled for reappointment. There is also no evidence that the workman was appointed for specific period and for specific job and the further that the nature of job was casual one and as such the workman is entitled to reinstatement. Therefore, I hold that the termination of services of the workman is in contravention of sec.25G of the I.D. Act." 6. The corporat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the High Court was not at all justified in entertaining the new plea raised for the first time during the course of hearing of the writ petition. 9. Learned counsel for the corporation supported the impugned order and vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge did not commit any error by setting aside the award of reinstatement because the appellant's appointment was for a fixed period and his service was terminated after complying with Section 25-F of the Act. Learned counsel repeatedly emphasised that the initial appointment of the appellant was contrary to the Punjab State Warehousing Corporation Staff Groups C and D Service Regulations, 2002 (for short `the Regulations') and argued that the learned Single Judge rightly set aside the award of reinstatement because the appellant was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the relevant regulations. 10. We have considered the respective submissions. In our opinion, the impugned order is liable to be set aside only on the ground that while interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdicti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque 1955 (1) SCR 1104, Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam 1958 SCR 1240 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh AIR 1960 SC 1168). It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction -- by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction -- by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." A reading of the impugned order shows that the learned Single Judge did not find any jurisdictional error in the award of the La ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Rs.355-525 and then in the scale of Rs.400-600. This was not even the case of the corporation that the appellant was employed on daily wages. It seems that attention of the learned Single Judge was not drawn to the relevant records, else he would not have passed the impugned order on a wholly unfounded assumption that the appellant was a daily wager. 13. It is true that in the writ petition filed by it, the corporation did plead that the dispute raised by the appellant was not an industrial dispute because he had not worked continuously for a period of 240 days, the learned Single Judge rightly refused to entertain the same because no such argument was advanced before him and also because that plea is falsified by the averments contained in para 2 of the reply filed on behalf of the corporation to the statement of claim wherein it was admitted that the appellant was engaged as work charge Motor Mate for construction work on 5.3.1986 and he worked in that capacity and also as Work Munshi from 3.10.1986 and, as mentioned above, even after expiry of the period of three months' specified in order dated 5.2.1987, the appellant continued to work till 5.7.1988 when first notice of retre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nless the application of Section 25-H is confined to the category of retrenched workmen to whom Section 25-F applies. We are unable to accept this contention. Rule 77 requires the employer to maintain a seniority list of workmen in that particular category from which retrenchment is contemplated arranged according to the seniority of their service. The category of workmen to whom Section 25-F applies is distinct from those to whom it is inapplicable. There is no practical difficulty in maintenance of seniority list of workmen with reference to the particular category to which they belong. Rule 77, therefore, does not present any difficulty. Rule 78 speaks of retrenched workmen eligible to be considered for filling the vacancies and here also the distinction based on the category of workmen can be maintained because those falling in the category of Section 25-F are entitled to be placed higher than those who do not fall in that category. It is no doubt true that persons who have been retrenched after a longer period of service which places them higher in the seniority list are entitled to be considered for re-employment earlier than those placed lower because of a lesser period of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... interpreted Section 6-P of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is pari materia to Section 25-G of the Act, and held: Now this provision is not controlled by conditions as to length of service contained in Section 6-N (which corresponds to Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947). Section 6-P does not require any particular period of continuous service as required by Section 6-N. In Kamlesh Singh v. Presiding Officer in a matter which arose under this very Section 6-P of the U.P. Act, it was so held. Hence the High Court was wrong in relying on the fact that the appellant had put in only three and a half months of service and in denying relief. See also in this connection Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam. Nor was the High Court correct in stating that no rule of seniority was applicable to daily-wagers. There is no such restriction in Section 6-P of the U.P. Act read with Section 2(z) of the U.P. Act which defines "workman". It is true that the rule of "first come, last go" in Section 6-P could be deviated from by an employer because the section uses the word "ordinarily". It is, therefore, permissi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that "the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State" - State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923. 18. In Y.A. Mamarde v. Authority under the Minimum Wages Act (1972) 2 SCC 108, this Court, while interpreting the provisions of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, observed: "The anxiety on the part of the society for improving the general economic condition of some of its less favoured members appears to be in supersession of the old principle of absolute freedom of contract and the doctrine of laissez faire and in recognition of the new principles of social welfare and common good. Prior to our Constitution this principle was advocated by the movement for liberal employment in civilised countries and the Act which is a pre-constitution measure was the offspring of that movement. Under our present Constitution the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tem. This concept gives meaning and significance to the democratic ways of life and of making the life dynamic. The concept of welfare State would remain in oblivion unless social justice is dispensed. Dispensation of social justice and achieving the goals set forth in the Constitution are not possible without the active, concerted and dynamic efforts made by the persons concerned with the justice dispensation system. In L.I.C. of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre and Others (1995) 5 SCC 482, K. Ramaswamy, J. observed that social Justice is a device to ensure life to be meaningful and liveable with human dignity. The State is obliged to provide to workmen facilities to reach minimum standard of health, economic security and civilized living. The principle laid down by this law requires courts to ensure that a workman who has not been found guilty cannot be deprived of what he is entitled to get. Obviously when a workman has been illegally deprived of his device then that is misconduct on the part of the employer and employer cannot possibly be permitted to deprive a person of what is due to him. 21. In 70s, 80s and early 90s, the courts repeatedly negated the doctrin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es for a certain period may not be an adequate compensation to the employee for non-employment. In other words, damages would be a poor substitute for reinstatement. The traditional rule has survived because of the sustenance it received from the law of contracts. From the contractual principle of mutuality of obligation, it was reasoned that if the employee can quit his job at will, then so too must the employer have the right to terminate the relationship for any or no reason. And there are a number of cases in which even contracts for permanent employment, i.e. for indefinite terms, have been held unenforceable on the ground that they lack mutuality of obligation. But these case demonstrate that mutuality is a high-sounding phrase of little use as an analytical tool and it would seem clear that mutuality of obligation is not an inexorable requirement and that lack of mutuality is simply, as many courts have come to recognize, an imperfect way of referring to the real obstacle to enforcing any kind of contractual limitation on the employer's right of discharge, i.e. lack of consideration. If there is anything in contract law which seems likely to advance the present inquiry, it i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... udicial decisions and legislation, particularly in its application to persons in public employment, to whom the Constitutional protection of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 is available. The argument is therefore overruled. The doctrine of laissez faire was again rejected in Glaxo Labotratories (India) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer (1984) 1 SCC 1, in the following words: "In the days of laissez-faire when industrial relation was governed by the harsh weighted law of hire and fire the management was the supreme master, the relationship being referable to contract between unequals and the action of the management treated almost sacrosanct. The developing notions of social justice and the expanding horizon of socio-economic justice necessitated statutory protection to the unequal partner in the industry namely, those who invest blood and flesh against those who bring in capital. Moving from the days when whim of the employer was suprema lex, the Act took a modest step to compel by statute the employer to prescribe minimum conditions of service subject to which employment is given. The Act was enacted as its long title shows to require employer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the employer - public or private. 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the award passed by the Labour Court is restored. The appellant shall get cost of Rs.25,000/- from the corporation. ORDER BY ASOK KUMAR GANGULI, J. 1. I entirely agree with the views expressed by my learned Brother Justice G.S. Singhvi. Having regard to the changing judicial approach noticed by His Lordship and if I, may say so, rightly, I may add a few words. I consider it a very important aspect in decision making by this Court. 2. Judges of the last Court in the largest democracy of the world have a duty and the basic duty is to articulate the Constitutional goal which has found such an eloquent utterance in the Preamble. If we look at our Preamble, which has been recognised, a part of the Constitution in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and others vs. State of Kerela and another - [1973 SC 1461], we can discern that as divided in three parts. The first part is a declaration whereby people of India adopted and gave to themselves the Constitution. The second part is a resolution whereby people of India solemnly resolved to consti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion is primarily shaped and moulded for the common man. It takes no account of "the portly presence of the potentates, goodly in girth". It is a Constitution not meant for the ruler "but the ranker, the tramp of the road, The slave with the sack on his shoulders pricked on with the goad, The man with too weighty a burden, too weary a load."" [N. A. Palkhivala, Our Constitution Defaced and Defiled, MacMillan, 1974, p. 29] 7. I am in entire agreement with the aforesaid interpretation of the Constitution given by this Court and also by the eminent jurist. 8. In this context another aspect is of some relevance and it was pointed out by Justice Hidayatullah, as His Lordship was then, in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others vs. State of Maharastra and Anr. - [AIR 1967 SC 1]. In a minority judgment, His Lordship held that the judiciary is a State within the meaning of Art. 12. [See paras 100, 101 at page 28, 29 of the report]. This minority view of His Lordship was endorsed by Justice Mathew in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) [at page 1949, para 1717 of the report] and it was held that the State under Article 12 would include the judiciary. 9. This was again reiterated by Justice Mathew in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... titution which ensures rights of the common man to be interpreted in a meaningful way so that life can be lived with human dignity. 15. Commenting on the importance of Article 38 in the Constitutional scheme, this court in Sri Srinivasa Theatre and Others vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others [(1992) 2 SCC 643], held that equality before law is a dynamic concept having many facets. One facet- the most commonly acknowledged- is that there shall be not be any privileged person or class and that none shall be above the law. This Court held that Art 38 contemplates an equal society [Para 10, pg. 651]. 6. In Indra Sawhney and Others vs. Union of India and Others [1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217], the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that: "The content of the expression "equality before law" is illustrated not only by Articles 15 to 18 but also by the several articles in Part IV, in particular, Articles 38, 39, 39-A, 41 and 46." [at Paras 643, pg. 633] 17. Therefore, the Judges of this Court are not mere phonographic recorders but are empirical social scientists and the interpreters of the social context in which they work. That is why ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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