TMI Blog2013 (4) TMI 107X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ocedure) Rules, 1982 (for short 'the Rules') need to be extracted. The same are as under: The Central Excise Act, 1944 "35F. Deposit, pending appeal, of duty demanded or penalty levied - Where in any appeal under this Chapter, the decision or order appealed against relates to any duty demanded in respect of goods which are not under the control of Central Excise authorities or any penalty levied under this Act, the person desirous of appealing against such decision or order shall, pending the appeal, deposit with the adjudicating authority the duty demanded or the penalty levied: Provided that where in any particular case, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal is of opinion that the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied would cause undue hardship to such person, the Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Appellate Tribunal, may dispense with such deposit subject to such conditions as he or it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the interests of revenue. Provided further that where an application is filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) for dispensing with the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied under the first proviso, the Commissio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... catory order. In support of his arguments, Mr. Sanjay Bansal relied upon Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. Vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (1999) 240 ITR 579, Visvas Promoters (P) Ltd. Vs. ITAT (2010) 323 ITR 114 and Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. Vs. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & others (2010) 329 ITR 564. Mr. Jagmohan Bansal also supported the arguments raised by Mr. Sanjay Bansal and also relied upon Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-II Vs. Shree Gobinddeo Glass Works Ltd. 2011 (263) ELT 178 and J.M.Ramachandra & sons Vs. CEGAT 2002 (139) ELT 36 in support of the argument that an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is not appealable. On the other hand, Mr. Sunish Bindlish, learned counsel for the Revenue relied upon Indoworth India Ltd. Vs. CESTAT, Mumbai 2010 (253) ELT 364, Auram Jewellery Export (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India 2010 (251) ELT 365 and Vijay Plas Fabs (P) Ltd. Vs. CESTAT, Chennai 2011 (273) ELT 183 to contend that an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal is an appealable order. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length, we find that an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal on an application to seek waiver of pre-deposit of duty imposed is an appealable ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Appellate Tribunal, which are appealable to the High Court. It observed as under: "28. In Black's Law Dictionary the word 'any' has been explained as having a 'diversity of meaning' and may be "employed to indicate all and every as well as some or one and its meaning in a given Statute depends upon the context and subject matter of Statute". The aforesaid meaning given to the word 'any' has been accepted by this Court in Lucknow Development Authority Vs. M.K.Gupta AIR 1994 SC 787. While construing the expression "service of any description" under Section 2(o) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 this Court held that the meaning of the word 'any' depends upon the context and the subject matter of the Statute and held that the word 'any' in Section 2(o) has been used in wider sense extending from one to all (para 4 at page 793 of the report). In the instant case also when a right is conferred on a person aggrieved to file appeal from 'any' order or decision of the Tribunal, there is no reason, in the absence of a contrary statutory intent, to give it a restricted meaning. 29. Therefore, in our judgment in Section 35 of FEMA, any 'order' or 'decision' of the Appellate Tribunal would ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on with the appeal. Therefore, unless it is specifically excluded under such Chapter, we do not find any thing contrary from the plain reading of Chapter XV, particularly, Section 130 of the Act made for appeal to High Court. Had it been the case of only final order, there was no scope for the Legislature to incorporate the aforesaid words under Section 130 that "every order passed in appeal" is appealable, because solitary final order is required for disposing the appeal. That apart, the order impugned necessitated deposit and in default, automatic dismissal of the appeal. Hence, the order impugned possesses essence of finality." In Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. and Visvas Promoters (P) Ltd. cases (supra), the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, the issue examined was in respect of an order passed in rectification application as not appealable in terms of Section 253 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The rectification applications are filed only after final decision of the Authority. Therefore, the judgments referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner have no applicability to the facts of the present case. In Shree Gobinddeo Glass Works case (supra) refe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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