9911796707
TMI Blog1998 (4) TMI 522X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd August 29, 1992 respectively. Its industry was set up with a capacity of 0.7 million tonnes of cement per annum at a project cost of about Rs. 80 crores at Kramira in the district of Sambalpur on or about August 1, 1993. It applied to the Director of Industries for necessary exemption certificate under the IPR through D.I.C., Sambalpur on September 6, 1983. The petitioner s industry started its commercial production on or about September 10, 1993. The finished products, i.e., cement was first despatched to its own cement project at Hirmi in the district of Raipur as inter-State transaction on September 10, 1993. The Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, was informed by the petitioner, Larsen Toubro Ltd. regarding the approach made by it to the Director of Industries for necessary exemption certificates under the I.P.R. on September 15, 1993 the petitioner requested the Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, to convert its provisional registration to permanent registration under section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act w.e.f. September 10, 1993. The petitioner, however, received a copy of the letter from the General Manager, D.I.C., opposite party No. 6, addressed to the Sale ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ary 7, 1995 as to why its application dated July 23, 1994 in form D for exemption of tax should not be rejected because it had filed such application after a lapse of ten and half months which contravened the provisions as stipulated in Government Notification No. 27665-CTA-56/90-F dated August 16, 1990. The petitioner on February 7, 1996 filed its reply to the show cause notice dated January 29, 1996. 5.. O.J.C. No. 1171 of 1996 has been filed challenging the assessment order for the year 1993-94 on February 9, 1996. The assessment order for the year 1994-95 was passed under the Orissa Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act on December 30, 1996. O.J.C. No. 2435 of 1997 has been filed on February 12, 1997, challenging the assessment order as per annexures 1 and 1-A to the said writ petition. 6.. The main prayers of the petitioner are: (i) For issue of direction to the Sales Tax Officer to reconsider form D application as per S.R.O. No. 790/90; (ii) To quash all orders of assessment and to direct fresh assessment; and (iii) For compliance with both the aforesaid directions to fix time-limit. 7.. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Industrial P ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich is to do justice between the parties. The substantive prayer is to interpret the notification under section 7 and to direct issuance of notification under section 6 and quash the assessments as per annexures 1 and 1A or in the alternative if it is found that, there is no notification under section 6, a positive direction be given to the State to issue notification under section 6 to cover the classes of goods manufactured, inter alia, by new large scale industries on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, so that they may be exempted from payment and quash the assessment of sales tax. Reference has been made to (1990) 1 SCC 176 (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd.) where the contention of the revenue that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be pressed into service to command the State Government to issue a statutory notification was negatived and the court held that the petitioner would certainly be entitled to claim exemption in terms of the assurance of the State. 12.. It is highlighted that if a State has a policy and has not pleaded that it has gone back upon it at the insistence of a High Power Committee it is not a matter of equity. The State has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ieu of deferment as a pioneer industry in terms of clause 7.1.6. of the I.P.R. 17.. It is placed on record that clause 7.1.5. and clause 7.1.6. of I.P.R. deal with deferment/exemption of tax on finished products of the types of units mentioned therein. The petitioner s unit comes within clause 7.1.6. The petitioner had understood such provisions of the I.P.R. and made application before the Director of Industries for such exemption in lieu of deferment. The Director of Industries had issued the eligibility certificate. The petitioner had also availed of the tax exemption in respect of raw materials and machinery by using form 1-D and had submitted form D before the S.T.O. for exemption of tax in respect of its unit in lieu of deferment. All these were done by the dealer without any demur. In this view of the matter the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the contention that there was a promise for tax exemption in respect of the finished goods. 18.. The notifications of the Finance Department as per S.R.O. No. 790 of 1990 made under section 7 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act provide for exemption of tax in lieu of deferment. The schedule provides for the period of exemption in l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which of the dealers can be said to have effected sale at the first point and liable to be taxed has to be determined. Liability to pay tax can never be wiped away. 23.. Having heard the lengthy submission made by Mr. Mohanty for the petitioner Larsen Toubro Ltd., Mr. A.K. Ray for Kehar Agencies and Mr. Lal for the sales tax authorities, we find that the only question to be adjudicated is as to whether by extending the principles of promissory estoppel the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of exemption consistent with the I.P.R. There is already a notification under section 7. Within the scope of the said notification if the petitioner is entitled to any benefit on fulfilment of certain criteria, he can certainly ask for the same. But the prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the State Government to issue a notification extending the facilities as envisaged under section 6 of the Act appears to be quite confusing and untenable. We find the notification under section 7 to be consistent with the I.P.R. The petitioner cannot enlarge the scope of promise as to its liking. The promise has to be understood in the proper perspective. The court cannot ask the promis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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