9911796707
TMI Blog2014 (1) TMI 6X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... estion of law for considration that "Whether Sec.5 and Sec.29(2) of the Limitation Act would apply to appeal under Sec. 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944" and notices were issued to the respondent to address on the legal question which emerges for consideration. Ordinarily, after the order of admission there was no occasion for the registry to list the matter but as there is stay application filed along with appeals, the matter came up before us at orders stage. At this stage, counsel for respondent Mr. Sarvesh Jain pointed out that substantial question which has been framed by this Court for consideration has already been answered by the Apex Court much before filing of instant appeal and relied upon the judgment in Singh Enterprises Vs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ning delay only upto 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days period" Further in Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise Vs. Hongo India (P) Ltd. reported in 2009 (236) E.L.T. 417 (S.C.) it was observed which reads ad infra- 18. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter VIA of the Act which provides appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though the Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uage used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government, the legislature has provided ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dismisssed the appeal on the substantial question which has been framed by us reported in 2011 (24) STR 651. After judgment was brought to our notice, we referred the judgment of Apex Court in our earlier order dt.6.11.2013 and afforded opportunity to the counsel for appellant to address as to how substantial question which was framed by this Court vide order dt.10.4.2013 still requires consideration. Counsel for appellant has tried his level best to convince this Court that all these judgments are distinguishable on its own facts, however, on specific question put to him as to whether he was aware of these judgments referred to in our order dt.6.11.2013, he submits that he was completely unaware of and tendered apology that because of ig ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
