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TMI Blog1962 (2) TMI 77X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the Parliamentary as well as State Legislative Assembly Electoral Roll. On the 20th August, 1952, he was, taken into custody by the police from the restaurant which he used to run at Bhopal and was told that he had been arrested under an order from the then Bhopal Government under section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Central) Act. He was then removed by train the very next day and left at the Pakistan border and was asked to go to Pakistan despite his protests. Thereafter, his elder brother, lqbal Ahmad moved the Court of the Judical Commissioner, Bhopal, under Art.226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus. In February, 1953, the learned Judicial Commissioner pronounced his judgment in the said writ petition. He found in favour of the petitioner that he was born in India and was a citizen of India. Even on the question of migration, the Judicial Commissioner made a finding in his favour. He, however, observed that the petitioner was in Pakistan in May and June, 1952, and be came to the conclusion that since he had contravened the provisions of section 3 of the Influx from Pakistan (Central) Act, he was liable to be removed physically from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n appropriate authority in that behalf and the result of the enquiry intimated to this Court as early as possible. On receipt of the result of the enquiry by this Court, the petition will be listed for final hearing. Meanwhile., stay of deportation of the petitioner was continued. In accordance with this interlocutory judgment, an enquiry was held under s.9(2) after serving a notice about the said enquiry on the petitioner On Saptember 11, 1961, the Central Government recorded its conclusion that the petitioner had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan after January 26, 1950; and before July 29, 1953. This conclusion was reached substantially by the application of the impugned R. No. 3. After the enquiry had thus terminated and its result communicated to this Court, the petitioner applied for permission to take additional grounds and amongst the grounds which he thus wanted to raise. are the, two questions which we have already indicated. That. in brief, is the background of facts in Petition No. 101 of 1959. Syed Abrarul Hassan, the petitioner in petition No. 136 of 1959, claims to be a citizen of India and was a resident of Bhopal. In 1951, his family received t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. Then he tried to obtain the assistance of Indian High Commission for returning to India but failed and so he applied for and obtained a Pakistani passport on December 14, 1957. According to him, he obtained his passport with a view to return to India. On returning to India with this passport, the petitioner made several representations to the Indian authorities for his recognition as a citizen of India and even tried to obtain registration as such. His efforts in that direction, however, failed and so he stood the risk of being deported from India. That is how the petitioner filed the present petition on February 20, 1961. By his petition, he claimed a direction against the respondents the Union of India and the State of Maharashtra restraining them from taking any steps to deport him from India. While admitting the petition, this, Court passed an order stating that it would be open to the petitioner to move the Government tinder section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act or the Government to act suo motu in that behalf. After the petition was thus admitted, the respondents entered appearance and opposed grant of stay on the ground that the petitioner had ceased to be a citizen of I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ses where citizenship of a foreign State had been acquired by an Indian citizen prior to the commencement of the Constitution. Article 10 guarantees the continuance of the rights of citizenship and provides that every person who is or s deemed to be a citizen of India under any of the foregoing provisions of Part II shall continue to be such citizen; but this guarantee is subject to the important condition that it would be governed by the provisions of any law that may be made by Parliament. The Proviso introduced by Art. 10, therefore, makes it clear that any law made by Parliament may affect the continuance of the rights of citizenship subject to its terms. That takes us to Art. 11 which empowers the Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by law. It provides that nothing in the foregoing provisions of Part II shall derogate from the power of Parliament to make any provision with respect to the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship. It would thus be noticed that while making provisions for recognising the right of citizenship in the individuals as indicated by the respective articles, and while guaranteeing the continuanc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anuary, 1950 and the commencement of this Act voluntarily acquired, the citizenship of another country, shall, upon such acquisition or, as the case may be, such commencement, cease to be a citizen of India : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a citizen of India who, during any war in which India may be engaged, voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another country, until the Central Government otherwise directs. (2) If any question arises as to whether, when or how any person has acquired the citizenship of another country, it shall be determined by such authority, in such manner and-having regard to such rules of evidence as may be prescribed in this behalf. There is no ambiguity about the effect of this section. It is clear that the voluntary acquisition by an Indian citizen of the citizenship of another country terminates his citizenship of India, provided the said voluntary acquisition has taken place between the 26th January, 1950 and the commencement of the Act, or takes place thereafter. It would thus be seen that whereas Art. 9 of the Constitution dealt with the acquisition of citizenship of a foreign State which had taken place prior to t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... les subject to which the enquiry should be held have also to be prescribed in that behalf. The result of this sub-section is that rules are to be framed prescribing the authority by which the said questions should be tried, the manner in which they should be tried and the rules of evidence subject to which they should be tried. Section 18 (1) provides that the said power to make rules may be exercised to carry out the purposes of the Act, and sub-section (2) provides that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the rules may provide for the topics covered by cls. (a) to (k) of the said sub-section. Section 18(3) authorises the Central Government to provide that a breach of any rule shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees and s, 18(4) requires that all the rules made under the said section shall, as soon as may be after they are made, be laid for not less than 14 days before both Houses of Parliament and shall be subject to such modifications as Parliament may make during the session in which they are so laid. This rule is intended to enable the Parliament to exercise control over the rules made by the Central Gover ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that country. The question which arises for decision is whether this rule is constitutionally valid and if it is, whether s. 9(2) under which the power to hold the enquiry subject to the relevant rules, has been delegated to the Central Government is itself constitutionally valid. We will first deal with the challenge to the validity of r. 3. The principal ground on which the validity of r. 3 is challenged is that whereas s. 9(2) authorises the Central Government to prescribe rules of evidence subject to which the relevant enquiry should be held, what the Central Government has purported to do in framing-rule 3 is to prescribe a rule of substantive law. The argument is that when s. 9(2) refers to rules of evidence, it refers obviously to rules of evidence, properly so-called and since the impugned rule is in substance, not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law, it is outside the purview of the delegated authority conferred by s. 9(2) and as such, is invalid. It is true that s. 18 (1) confers on the Central Government power to make rules to carry out the purposes of the said Act, but this general power to make rules will not taken within its scope the power to make ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dence in a judicial enquiry that the rules of evidence refer to certain presumptions either rebuttable or irrebuttable. The term presumption in its largest and most comprehensive signification, may be defined to bean inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the truth or falsehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by a process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted. Thus, according to Best, when the rules of evidence provide for the raising of a rebuttable or irrebuttable presumption, they are merely attempting to assist the judicial mind in the matter of weighing the probative or persuasive force of certain facts proved in relation to other facts presumed or inferred. The whole scheme of the Evidence Act is thus intended to serve the objective of regulating the proof of facts by (1) The Principles of the Law of Evidence Twelfth Edition Pages 6. 23, 25 and 267. subjecting the production of evidence to the rules prescribed in that behalf. It is in the light of this function and objective of the Evidence Act that the argument of the petitioners has to be judged. It has been strenuously urged before us that when the impugned rule makes it obl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is said to be conclusively presumed, in the sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the second fact does not exist, the rule is really providing that, where the first fact is shown to exist, the second facts existence is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the proponent s case; and to provide this is to make a rule of substantive law, and not a rule apportioning the -burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the duty of coming forward with evidence(1) With respect,, it is doubtful whether it is correct to say that in drawing a conclusive presumption from one fact proved about the existence of another fact, the rule renders the second fact s existence wholly immaterial. What the rule provides is that the probative or persuasive value of the proved fact in relation to the fact not proved is so great that the fact not proved should always be taken to be proved once the other fact is proved. In any case, the opinion of Wigmore is in favour of the contentions raised by the petitioners. Phipson puts the proposition in somewhat guarded and qualified terms. In many cases (1) Wigmore on Evidence IX Edition P. 292. Para. 249 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s just indicated constitutes a branch of rule of evidence, according to Stephen. Dicey seems to take the view that even for purposes of domestic law, irrebuttable presumptions of law are rules of substance, and he adds that rebuttable presumptions of law must, for the, present purpose, be further sub-divided. First, there are those which only apply in certain contexts, such as the presumptions of advancement, satisfaction and ademption. It is submitted that these are so closely connected with the existence of substantive rights that they ought to be classified as rules of substance. Secondly, there are those which apply (though not always in precisely the same way) to all types of cases, such as the presumptions of legitimacy, marriage and death. It is uncertain whether such presumptions are rules of substance or rules of procedure. (1) According to Diciy, for the ,purposes of English domestic law, estoppel is generally treated as a rule of evidence. In dealing with this topic, Dicey has observed that : in order to determine whether presumptions are rules of substance or rules of procedure, it is necessary to distinguish between three kinds of presumptions . Then he refers ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tation, which assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some given inquiry. The exact scope and operation of these prima facie assumptions are to cast upon the party against whom they operate, the duty of going,forward, in argument or evidence, on the particular point to which they relate. They are thus closely related to the subject of judicial notice ; for they furnish the basis of many of those spontaneous recognitions of particular facts or conditions which make up that doctrine . (1) According to the same author, legal presumptions of the rebuttable kind are definitions of the quantity of evidence or the state of facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case ; in other words, of the circumstances under which the burden of proof lies on the opposite party. Thus, the rule of rebuttable presumption adds statutory force to the natural and inherent probative value of fact A in relation to the proof of the existence of fact B and in adding this statutory value to the probative force of fact A, the rule, it is conceded, makes a provision within the scope and function of the law of evidence. If that is so how does it make a difference in principle if the rule adds concl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tee provided by the 5th Amendment. In rejecting the plea urged by the State that the rule was a rule of substantive law, Mr. Justice Sutherland observed that a rebuttable presumption clearly is a rule of evidence which has the effect of shifting the burden of proof and in support of this conclusion, he referred to the earlier decisions of the Court. The Learned Judge then added that it is hard to see how a statutory rebuttable presumption is turned from a rule of evidence into a rule of substantive law as the result of a later statute making it conclusive. In both cases it is a substitute for proof, in the one open to challenge and disproof and in the other conclusive. We ought to add that the learned Judge made it clear that whether the presumption be treated as a rule of evidence or of substantive law, it constitutes an attempt, by legislative fiat, to enact into existence a fact which here does not, and cannot be made to, exist in actuality, and the result is the same, unless we are ready to over-rule the Schlesinger Case, as we are not; for that case dealt with a conclusive presumption and the Court held it invalid without regard to the question of its technical character ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at the application of the rule may in some hypothetical cases conceivably lead to hardship and injustice, is not relevant or material in dealing with the constitutional validity of the rule. In deciding the question as to whether a rule about irrebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence or not, it seems to us that the proper approach to adopt would -be to consider whether fact A from the proof of which a presumption is required to be drawn about the existence of fact B, is inherently relevant in the matter of proving fact B and has inherently any probative or persuasive value in that behalf or not. If fact A is inherently relevant in proving the existence of fact B and to any rational mind it would bear a, probative or persuasive value in the matter of proving the existence of fact B, then a rule prescribing either a rebuttable presumption or an irrebuttable presumption in that behalf would be a rule of evidence. On the other hand, if fact A is inherently not relevant in proving the existence of fact B or has no probative value in that behalf and yet a rule is made prescribing of a rebuttable or an irrebuttable presumption in that connection that rule would be a rule of substa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... D Arbel: (2) Upon the general and abstract question observes Thompson J., in delivering the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, whether the passport per se, was legal and competent evidence of the fact of citizenship, we are of the opinion that it was not. It would, however, be seen on looking at the whole of the judgment that the learned Judge, made it perfectly clear during the course of the latter portion of his judgment that on that issue, the court was divided in opinion, and the point was of course undecided. So, the general observation made in the earlier part of the judgment is really of no saistance in the matter. That case shows that the plaintiff had produced a passport granted by the Secretary of States of the United States, in order to show that he was the citizen of the State of Maryland. The defendant, on the other band, offered in evidence the record of the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana which contained proceedings in a suit which had (1) P. Weis on Nationality and Statelessness in International Law P. 225-226 (2) (1835) 9 Law. Ed., 692. been originally instituted against the plaintiff to the effec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... title to the property, be presumed to have occurred in order of seniority, and accordingly the younger shall be deemed to have survived the elder. It was held that the two relevant statutory provisions both of English and German Law were rules of substantive law., In fact, the relevant English section occurred in the Law of Property Act and its ,setting and context import that it was a rule of substantive law. So was the rule contained in Article 20 of the Civil Code of Germany treated as a rule of substantive law. The main reason given in support of the conclusion that the two rules were rules of substantive law appears to be that each one directed a certain presumption to be made in all cases affecting the title to property. It would be noticed that the scope, purport and effect of the two rules is substantially different from the scope, purport and effect of the rule with which we are concerned. In the rules with which the court was concerned in re-Cohn, there is no question about the probative value of one fact being judged or appreciated under statutory rule in regard to the proof of the existence of another fact. Like the rule that ignorance of law is no excuse, the rules w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t his status was untrue. In such a case, if the impugned rule prescribes that the obtaining of a passport from the Pakistan Government by an Indian national, (which normally would be the result of the prescribed application voluntarily made by him) conclusively proves the voluntary acquisition of Pakistani citizenship, it would be difficult to hold that the rule is not a rule of evidence. In our opinion, it would be pedantic and wholly unrealistic to contend that the rule in question does not purport to assess the probative value of fact A in the matter of proving fact B but imports considerations which are relevant to substantive law. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the impugned rule of evidence and falls within the scope prescribed by s. 9 (2). The challenge to its validity on the ground that it is rule of substantive law must, therefore fail. But quite apart from this thoretical or juris-prudential aspect of the matter, there is another independent consideration which supports the same conclusion. The question raised before us is one of construing the words rules of evidence used in s. 9 (2) of the Act, and in construing the said words, it would obviously be necessary ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... R. 18, S. would be idle to contend that the impugned rule is a part of the substantive law merely because it prescribes a conclusive presumption. If that be the true position, we do not think we would be justified in contruing the words rules of evidence to adopt the academic or pedantic approach suggested by the petitioners. The expression rules of evidence would certainly include a rule as to conclusive presumption like the one with which we are concerned in the present petitions. Therefore, on this construction of s. 9(2), the impugned rule must be he-Id to be intra vires. The question about the validity of this rule has been considered by some of the High Courts in India. The Andhra Pradesh (1) and Allahabad High Courts (2) have held that the rule is invalid, whereas the Bombay,the Rajasthan (4) and the Madras High Courts have held that the rule is valid. The next point to consider is about the validity of s. 9(2) itself. It is argued that this rule is ultra vires because it affects the status of citizenship conferred on the petitioners and recognised by the relevant Articles Of the Constitution, and it is urged that by depriving the petitioners of the status of cit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... han by naturalisation or registration and so it has provided for the third category of acquisition of foreign, citizenship under the la-at clause otherwise voluntarily acquires so that rule-making had to be confined primarily to this last category of acquisition of foreign citizenship. The basic principle on which the Act proceeds and which has been recognised by Art.9 of the Constitution itself is that no Indian citizen can claim a dual or plural citizenship. The acquisition of foreign citizenship can be made by naturalisation or registration and as soon as it is so made, the prior Indian citizenship is terminated. It is in the light of these principles which are writ large on the provisions of the Act that the rule making power had to make rules about the class of cases falling under the last category of acquisition of foreign citizenship, and the rules show how the task has been attempted. We have already referred to r. I to 3. Rules 4 and 5 which deal with cases other then those where passport has been obtained by an Indian citizen, prescribe the relevant factors which have to be considered in each case before deciding whether foreign citizenship has been acquired by an India ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o the Indian authorities asking them to recognize him as a citizen of Indian and/or to register him as such and/or to permit him to stay premanently in India. But ultimately the Indian authorities refused to recognise him as a citizen of India and/or to permit him to stay permanently in India. Faced now with the risk of being deported from India the petitioner has approached this Court for an order directing the respondents, the Union of India and the state of Maharashtra to refrain from taking any steps to deport or remove him from India and to recognise him as a citizen of India by birth under Art. 5(1)(a) of the Constitution., When admitting his writ petition after the preliminary hearing this Court made an order stating that it would be open to the petitioner to move the Government under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act or the Government suo motu to take action under it. Thereafter both the respondents have entered appearance and oppose the petition for stay on the ground that the petitioner has ceased to be a citizen of India. The Government of India then took action under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act and has determined that the petitioner has voluntarily acquired the cit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion must accordingly fail. It has been urged before us however that this determination of the Government has no legal force inasmuch as it was made on the basis of Rule 3 of Sch. III of the Citizenship Rules, which Rule itself is invalid. The principal question canvassed before us is as regerds the validity of this rule-. The main attack against the rule is that while s. 9(2) empowers the Government to prescribe rules of evidence, Rule 3 is not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law and is therefore beyond the limits of the powers which were delegated to the rulemaking authority by the legislature. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that a distinction must be drawn between a rule of evidence, properly so called and a rule which though called a rule of evidence lays down ai rule of substantive law ; and that if that distinction is borne in mind it becomes clear that r.3 is not a rule of evidence. The other argument is that when any fact is stated by a rule to be conclusive proof of another fact, the rule is in effect laying down that the happening of the first fact will be equivalent in law to the happening of the other fact and so a party interested to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xample : An action of battery upon a plea of not guilty, the defendant offers evidence to prove that the plaintiff used insulting words to the defendent before the attack, and this is rejected; here the ruling is in truth that insults constitute no excuse or no ground for, mitigation of damages, a rule of substantive law; or perhaps, that such a defence is. not available upon a plea ,traversing the, battery a rule Of pleading. It is certainly not a ruling upon a question of evidence ; it is a ruling that the proposition desired to be prove(] is either not tenable by, the substantive law, or riot issuable, by the law of pleading. This reasoning is obviously at the basis of Wigmore s view in s. 2492, Vol. IX of the Same treatise that rules laying down conclusive presumptions are really rules substantive law. In strictness says he, there cannot be such a thing as a conclusive presumption. Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed in the sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the second fact does not exist., the rule is really providing that, where the first fact is shown to exist, the second facts existence ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er seven is incapable of committing a felony, or that all men know the law (i.e., that ignorance of the law is no excuse for crime). He then gives several instances of matters which are conclusive presumptions or amount to conclusive evidence. either by statute or common law. But unlike Wigmore and Holdsworth, he does not say that all rules of conclusive presumptions are rules of substantive. The matter has been critically considered again by Sir James Stephen in his Digest of the Law of evidence. After stating first (p.xiii) that all law may be divided into substantive law, by which rights, duties and liabilities are defined, and the law of procedure, by which the substantive law is applied to particular cases. Stephen says that the law of evidence is that part of the law of procedure, which, with a view to ascertain individual rights and liaiblities in particular cases, decides : (1) what facts may and what may not be proved in such cases; (ii) what sort of evidence must be given of a fact which may be proved and (iii) by whom and in what manner the evidence must be produced by which any fact is to be proved. Speaking of presumptions, he says at p.xvii: Again, I have dealt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dence. For, a rule of evidence, can be concerned only with the manner and extent of presentation of facts, for the purpose of persuading the mind of the Judge or jury or other Tribunal of the existence or nonexistence of facts on which substantive rights or liabilities, civil or criminal arise. It has nothing to do with giving an answer to the question :-What is the right or a liability which arises on the happening of a fact ? If a rule, purporting to be a rule of evidence does in effect give such an answer, it has gone beyond the scope of the law of evidence and has trenched on the domain of substantive law. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that even though a rule laying down that one fact will be conclusive proof of another might be said to be a rule of substantive law if the former fact was wholly irrelevant in persuading a rational human mind about the existence of the other, the position is different when the former fact is relevant in the sense of having some persuasive value on the mind according to ordinary process of reasoning. All that happens, it is urged, when such a relevant fact is laid down by a rule to be conclusive proof of the fact to be pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... antive right results in affecting that right and ceases to be a rule of proof It was also said that estoppel, which is really a rule of conclusive presumption, has invariably been treated as a branch of the law of evidence. Suppose this is so. Does that prove that all rules of conclusive presumption are rules of evidence ? We have already said that some may be. Estoppels may belong to that class. There is said to be an estoppel where a party is not allowed to say that a certain statement of fact is untrue., whether in reality it is true or not : Halsbury s Laws of England, 3rd Edition Vol. XV, p. 168. It therefore is concerned with a statement of fact ; it is not directed to affect any particular right though no doubt ultimately all estoppels do affect some rights as all rules of evidence do. In so far as estoppels, whether treated as rules of conclusive presumption or not, are not intended to affect substantive rights, they axe rules of evidence. Therefore it seems to us that the contention that estoppel is a rule of evidence does not establish that all rules of conclusive presumption are rules of evidence. Let us come now to the impugned rule. It lays down that the fact that a c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ship of another country results in the extinction of his right as an Indian citizen. The rule therefore directly affects a subtantive right and, in the context of s. 9, mast be taken to have been intended to do so. Such a rule cannot obviously be a rule of evidence; it is clearly a rule of substantive law. Under the law as laid down in the impugned rule the fact of obtaining a foreign passport will have this result, even though it may very well be that though he has voluntarily acquired such a passport he has not thereby, or for that purpose acquired the citizenship of another country. This may happen for instance, when a person who is a citizen of India by reason of descent, but is at the same time a citizen of another country, says, France by birth, obtains a passport from the French authorities. Again, each country is of course free to make its own laws.. Suppose a foreign country makes a law under which it can issue a passport to one who is not its national. If an Indian takes such a passport, he does not under the law of that country become its national but under the rule now being considered, he is to be taken as a foreign national. The obtaining of such a passport in eith ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R. [1957] Andh. 1047.) and the Allahabad High Court in Sharafat Ali Khan v. State of U.P.(A.I.R. [1960] All. 637.) held the Rule to be void. For the reasons mentioned earlier we are of opinion that the view taken by the Andhra High Court and the Allahabad High Court is correct. The necessary consequence of our conclusion that r.3, Sch. III of the Citizenship Rules is void is that the determination of the Central Government that the petitioner has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan after the 26th January, 1950 and before the 14th December, 1957, has no legal validity. Two other contentions have now to be noticed. First, it is said that s.9 itself offends the Constitution as it takes away rights of citizenship. It is sufficient to dispose of this point to say that, if citizenship is a fundamental right, as to which doubts may legitimately be entertained, Art. 11 authorises Parliament to make any provision with regard to acquisition and termination of citizenship. Section 9 is thus cleary within this Article. It was next said that s.9(2) gives unguided power to the Government and is therefore bad as it really amounts to an abdication of Par ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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