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TMI Blog1974 (12) TMI 69X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... subjective satisfaction ,,as regards the necessity for detention of the petitioner and that incident was in the following terms : On the night of 25/26-6-73 at about 00.1 hrs. you along with your associates being armed with lethal. weapons including fire Arms raided the house of Ananta Keyal of Naitala under Diamond Harbour P.S. and looted away cash, ornaments etc. At the time of operation you fixed from your fire arms indiscriminately disregarding human lives and their safety. As a result, the house owner Ananta Kayal and his close door neighbour Ajit Kayal sustained grievous gun shot injuries on their persons, Subsequently both of them ,expired in Diamond Harbour Hospital. You also brutally assulated some of the inmates of the house of occurrence. Your action created such panic in the locality and the local people felt a sense of insecurity. Thus you acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The petitioner made a representation against the order of detention on 29th January, 1974 but it was considered and rejected by the State Government on 31st January, 1974. The State Government thereafter submitted the case of the petitioner to the Advisory Boar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ere is, therefore, no hard and fast rule that merely because there is a time lag of about six months between the offending acts and the date of the order of detention, the causal link must be taken to be broken and the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived at by the District Magistrate must be regarded as sham or unreal. Whether the acts of the detenu forming the basis for arriving at a subjective satisfaction are too remote in point of time to induce any reasonable person to reach such subjective satisfaction must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The test of proximity is no* a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. It is a subsidiary test evolved by the court for the purpose of determining the main question whether the past activities of the detenu is such tat from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu and its utility, therefore, lies only in so far as it subserves that purpose and it cannot be allowed to dominate or drown it. The prejudicial act of the detenu may in a given case of such a character as to suggest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er on. 3rd January, 1974. That means that the criminal case must have been dropped and the petitioner must have been discharged sometime between 3rd January, 1974 and 18th January, 1974, the latter being the date when he was once again arrested pursuant to the order of detention. It is, therefore, not possible to say that the District Magistrate could not have arrived at a subjective satisfaction or) the basis of theincident set out in the grounds of detention, or that the subjective satisfaction reached by him was sham or unreal. Mr. Mukhoty on behalf of the petitioner then urged that even if the incident set out in the grounds of detention were true, it merely affected maintenance of law and order and did not have any impact on public order and hence there was no nexus between the act alleged against the petitioner and the subjective, satisfaction reached by the District Magistrate. Now, there can be no doubt that the acts of the detenu on which a subjective satisfaction is claimed to have been reached by the detaining authority must have relevance to the formation of such subjective satisfaction. If the acts of the detenu relied. on by the detaining authority are irrelevant, no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the Act upon the society. . . . The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed? If we ask this question in relation to the facts of the present cases, it is obvious that the act alleged against the petitioner was calculated to disturb the current of life of the community in the village. It was a serious act of dacoity which was alleged against the petitioner and it was perpetrated at dead of night and the petitioner and his associates who participated were armed with lethal weapons including guns and they used these lethal weapons recklessly and indiscriminately in utter disregard of human life and actually caused grievous injuries to at least two persons and beat up several others. This act of dacoity created a panic in the locality and seriously disturbed the even tempo of life of the community in the village. There was clearly disturbance of public order and the act alle ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order of detention was made by the District Magistrate an 29th December, 1973, he did not report the fact of the making of the order of detention to the State Government until 2nd January, 1974 and there was thus a delay of about five days which constituted a violation of the statutory requirement of section 3, subsection (3 ) that the fact of the making of the order of detention must be reported forthwith to the State Government. This contention raises the question as to what is the true meaning and connotation of the word forthwith as used in section 3 sub-section (3). The, question is fortunately not res integra. It is concluded by a decision of this Court in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay.(1) The statutory provision which came up for consideration in that case was section 3, sub-section (3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 which contained an identical provision as section 3. subsection (3) of the present Act and the question which arose was as to whether Commissioner who made the order of detention on 13th January, 1956 could be said to have reported that fact forthwith to the State Government under section 3, sub-section (3) whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 74. This explanation given by the District Magistrate it, in our opinion, sufficient to show that he sent the report to the State Government with all reasonable despatch and there was no avoidable delay on his part. Whilst taking this view on facts, we do not wish to underscore the need for strict compliance with this requirement of section 3, sub-section (3). It is a very important requirement intended to secure that the State Government shall have sufficient time for consideration before it decides-and this decision has to be made within twelve days of the making of the order of detention-whether or not to approve the order of detention and the Court would, therefore, insist on strict compliance with it and not condone avoidable delay, even if it be trivial But in the present case the facts stated by the District Magistrate in his affidavit show that be acted with prompt despatch and was not guilty of any avoidable delay. The District Magistrate must, therefore, be held to have sent the report forthwith as required by section 3, subsection (3). These were the only contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner in support of the petition and since there is no substance in them ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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