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TMI Blog1987 (5) TMI 370X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the petitioners in all these cases have also raised several contentions other than the main one referred to above. The result is that, if we decide the above principal issue in favor of the petitioners, all the writ petitions can stand allowed but a decision by us against the petitioners on the main issue will necessitate the hearing of each one of petitioners on merits in regard to the other contentions that have been raised therein. With these preliminary observations, we proceed to deal with the contentions urged before us on the above issue first. 2. It is a well-known fact that, commencing from 1959, huge tracts of land in and around the city of Delhi have been acquired by the Government under the Act for facilitating the planned development of Delhi . We are concerned here with two notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, one on 5.11.1980 and the other on 25.11.1980. Under the former, the Government notified its intention to acquire the entire land comprised in the villages of Tughlakabad, Tigri, Deoli, Khanpur, Said-ul-Ajaib, Neb Sarai, Hauz Khas and Khirki. By the latter was notified the intention to acquire the entire lands situated in the revenue estates of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tions under Section 6. And, no notification under Section 4 prior to 29.1.1967, however old, became infructuous merely because considerable time had elapsed after its issue, so long as the declaration under Section 6 was made by 28.1.1969. 4. One more relevant aspect of the 1967 amendment may be touched upon here as some point was sought to be made of it. Prior to the above amendment, the position was that, where a notification under Section 4 was made in respect of certain lands, the declaration under Section 6 had also to be made in respect of all such lands together if it was desired to acquire all of them. It was not permissible for the Government to issue declaration under Section 6 piecemeal from time-to-time in respect of some of the lands covered by Section 4 notification. It was so held by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593. The 1967 amendment altered this position. It amended Section 6(1) to provide that different declarations under Section 6 may be made from time-to-time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1). 5. As we have mentioned earlier, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g an Explanation in the following terms: Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1)- (a) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) but before the commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of the three years from the dale of the publication of the notification; or (b) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: xxx xxx xxx Explanation 1 : In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, Sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Similar provisions were introduced, in respect of the making of awards, by inserting Section 11A and in respect of the period for which interest was payable by Government by inserting Section 23(1A) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he proviso read with the explanation. We cannot just stop at the proviso and say that, since the three years period had expired by 1983, no declaration under Section 6 subsequently is permissible. 8. To understand the scope of the new proviso and Explanation, it is necessary to envisage the various situations that could have existed. We may first start only with the proviso leaving the Explanation out of account. The object of the proviso was to curtail, w.e.f. 24.9.1984, the interval between Sections 4 and 6, to one year from three years. It could have simply read w.e.f. 24.9.1984 thus: Provided that no declaration under Section 6 shall be made beyond the expiry of a period of one year from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Such a provision would have led to doubts and difficulties as to whether the new provisions would apply only in respect of notifications issued after 24.9.1984 or whether it would apply even in respect of Section 4 notifications prior to the date. In the latter event, notifications under Section 4 published before 25.9.1983 would become ineffective and Section 6 declarations in respect of notifications un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... amendment Act so as to make it meaningful and purposeful. 10. Now we turn to the explanation. This provides for an extension of the period of one year or three years by excluding the period covered by stay orders. If the proviso had stood as indicated above and the explanation had been added, that would perhaps have had the effect of extending the period of limitation only in cases of notifications issued after 24.9.1984 and those issued before that date but in respect of which the period of three years had not expired by 24.9.1984. Where the notification had been issued prior to 25.9.1981, it could perhaps have been said that, as the period of three years had expired by the time the proviso came into effect on 24.9.1984 and there was nothing in the proviso or explanation to suggest that any retrospective operation was intended, the explanation would not help the Government to issue a declaration after three years. 11. But the Legislature did not stop with a simple proviso and explanation as indicated above. It has made the proviso very elaborate and made the explanation applicable to the computation of any of the periods referred to in the first proviso. Now, let us look ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he explanation should be taken into account in the cases of all notifications issued after 29.1.1967 whether or not the period otherwise limited under the proviso for a follow-up declaration under Section 6 in respect thereof had expired or not. We, therefore, reject the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners. 12. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the 1984 amendment has been worded in the above manner, not with a view to bring in all post-1967 notifications under its purview, but only because Parliament, in making the amendments, had to keep in view certain earlier amendments that had been made by certain State Legislatures. We see no force or relevance in this contention. It is true that there were several State Amendments enacting an exclusion clause between 1968 and 1972 on the same lines as the present explanation. The Karnataka Legislature by Act X of 1968 - passed in the wake of a State Amendment Act of 1967 - had introduced an explanation excluding periods during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under subs. (1) of Section 4 is held up on account of stay or injunction by order of a Court . The Mah ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hreshold from the date of the notification under Section 4 was crossed, the power to issue a notification under Section 6 would be exhausted vide Radhey Shyam v. State . Consequently, it is said, the land owners covered by the said notifications acquired a vested right that no declaration under Section 6 could be issued in respect of their lands on the expiry of the above period in 1983 and hence the explanation introduced in 1984 should not be so broadly interpreted as to take away that vested right. In support of this plea, Counsel referred to certain observations in Hossein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State Counsel contended, on the basis of the statements of objects and reasons and the Minister's speech in Parliament while introducing the 1984 Bill, that the object of the 1984 amendments was to confer a benefit on land owners by curtailing the time taken in finalising acquisition proceedings and in other ways. It was, therefore, a beneficial piece of legislation. Based on these steps, it was contended that the insertion of the proviso in 1967 and its substitution in 1984 were intended to be a remedial, beneficial and mandatory piece of welfare legislation and can admit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication . In our opinion, reading together the words used in the proviso and the explanation, the conclusion is inescapable that the exclusion envisaged in the explanation is available in respect of all notifications issued between 29.1.1967 and 24.9.1984. We have given elaborately our reasons for coming to this conclusion and, hence, we overrule this contention urged on behalf of the petitioners. 16. In regard to the third step in the argument the cases cited by Counsel do not hold them. The cardinal principle of these decisions is only that, in construing a statute, particularly an amending one, Courts should prefer that interpretation of it which would further the object and policy of the amendments and remove or mitigate what the Legislature presumably regarded as a mischief which ought to be remedied. If a statute is intended to confer benefit on any class of persons clearly a beneficial interpretation would subserve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ms possible and we see no justification for confining or restricting their scope in the manner suggested by Counsel for the petitioners. 17. Some argument was sought to be built on the language used in respect of certain other amendments introduced by the same Act of 1984. Attention was invited to the language of Section 30(2) of the said Act, which has been earlier referred to. Reference was made to the similarly worded explanation introduced in Section 11A. It was pointed out that a like Explanation occurs in Section 23(1A) of the Act which has to be read with Section 30(1) of the amending Act and it submitted that, if the respondents' contention here were to be adopted there also land owners will be deprived of interest on compensation amounts for substantial period of time. Such result, it is said, will work gross injustice and should be avoided. 18. We do not think much help can be derived from the provisions referred to in the present context. Sections 30(2) and (3) are transitional provisions, resulting from a situation created by the fact that an Amendment Bill of 1982 had to be withdrawn and a fresh Bill introduced in 1984. These transitional provisions have been ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e respondents rely on to bring the Section 6 declarations within the scope of the explanation. In Munni Lal v. Lt. Governor (CW 426 of 1981), wherein the validity of the notification dated 25.11.1980 was challenged by certain residents of village Satbari, the following interim order was passed in CM 668/81 on 18.3.1981: ....Case for 27.4.1981. In the meanwhile, respondents 1 and 2 are restrained from issuing any declarations under Section 6.... The above interim order was made absolute on 4.5.1981, when the writ petition was admitted: ....Stay order passed on 18.3.81 made absolute till further order with liberty to the appropriate authorities of the respondents to take action according to law if the existing conditions and requirements of the Master Pl?n and Zonal Plan, if any, are breached or violated by the petitioners. This writ petition was dismissed on 15.11.1983 (see 2nd (1985) 1 Delhi 469: (AIR 1984 NOC 230). In Laguna Farms (P) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor, (CW 1251/81) also, the petitioner challenged the validity of the Section 4 notification dated 25.11.80. The writ petition was admitted on 26.5.81 when an interim order in the following terms was also made in CM 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the respondents are misinterpreting the aforesaid stay order....and are saying that the aforesaid stay order is in respect of the entire village of Rithala and praying, therefore, that as the petitioners had prayed for stay only in respect of their lands, the Court should be pleased to clarify the order dated 23.4.1982 to the effect that the stay is only in respect of the petitioner's land, Khasra Nos. of which have been mentioned in the writ petition . The above position was contested by the Union of India which urged that the stay order had been granted qua notification under Section 4 and was not in respect of a particular land. After hearing both parties, the Court passed the following order on 24.2.1984: ...We do not understand what clarification is needed. The prayer in CM 1759/82 was in respect of the petitioners' land. It follows necessarily that the interim order we passed was in regard to the petitioners. No further order is, therefore, necessary. 22A. The petitioners also seek to derive support from an order passed by this Court on 7.8.1985 in CCP 153/85 in CW 861 of 1982 (Manakvala v. Chaudhary). That contempt petition was moved because the responde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ejudice, of any person not a party to the said proceedings. Counsel for respondent submits, however, that this rule is not of universal application. He submits that this would depend upon the nature of the proceedings and the terms of the stay order. He cites certain decisions in this context. In Sitaram v. Chunilalsa, AIR 1944 Nag 155 it was held, in the context of Section 15, Limitation Act, that where the order staying the execution of the decree is not restricted as against a particular judgment-debtor or in respect of money recoverable under the decree, the stay is in respect of the whole decree and it prevents the decree-holder from executing the decree against other judgment-debtors also and from recovering possession of the property. It is not necessary that the order should be a valid one or that it should be proper. Hulas Singh v. Dutta Ram an interpretation of Section 6, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act (25 of 1934) and Section 15, Limitation Act. An application had been made by the mortgagors before the Collector on 6.6.1936 under Section 6 of the Act, 25 of 1934. This was forwarded under the Act to the Special Judge who dismissed it on 10.8.1937. The mortgagee filed a sui ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... complete or absolute stay of execution and not a partial stay, i.e., a stay which makes the decree altogether inexecutable. Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that in cases of partial stay, the benefit under Section 15(1) can be had only where an execution application is directed against the same judgment-debtor or the same property, as against whom an execution was previously stayed. Stay of any process of execution is therefore stay of execution within the meaning of the section. Where an injunction or order has prevented the decree-holder from executing the decree, then irrespective of the particular stage of execution, or the particular judgment-debtor against whom execution was stayed, the effect of such injunction or order is to prolong the life of the decree itself by the period during which the injunction or order remained in force. The majority view to the contrary taken by some of the High Courts overlooks the well settled principle that when the law prescribes more than one modes of execution, it is for the decree-holder to choose which of them he will pursue. On the strength of these decisions, Counsel for the respondents contends that the language of the expl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... c., particularly after the amendment of 1967, the purpose of acquisition demands that at least substantial blocks of land should be dealt with together at least up to the stage of the declaration under Section 6. To give an example, if a large extent of land is to be acquired for the excavation of a canal, the scheme itself cannot be put into operations unless the whole land can be eventually made available. If even one of the land owners anywhere along the line applies to Court and gets a stay of the operation of the notification under Section 4, in practical terms, the whole scheme of acquisition will fall through. It is of no consolation to say that there was no stay regarding other lands covered by the scheme. To compel, the Government to proceed against the other lands (by refusing the benefit of the explanation in such a case on the ground that there is no stay order in respect thereof) would only result in waste of public expenditure and energy. If, ultimately, the single owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the Section 4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the Government will have to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... effect of an injunction passed by the Court against one of the parties thereto who has to act in the same capacity not only in the acquisition of the plot of land the owner of which has obtained a stay order but in all proceedings consequent on or in pursuance of same notification that is challenged in that petition. 30. Secondly, the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are obtained are also very different from the old pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope and effect. Section 4 notifications are challenged in writ petitions and it is now settled law that in this type of proceedings, the principle of locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition on general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter parties simplicity : it is a public interest litigation which be nothing personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than not, grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact this group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same contentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e acquisition of any land in the locality. Where such an objection is put forward by an interested person or some other writ petitioner on general grounds, any stay order passed on such objection cannot be limited in operation to the owner of, or person interested in, any particular land only. It will affect the interests of all persons in all the lands proposed to be acquired. 33. The terms of some of the stay orders, set out earlier are also couched in wide language. One of them stays the issue of any declaration under Section 6. Another stays all proceedings pursuant to the notification. Another restrains the respondents from taking further proceedings in consequences of the notification. Though, in a sense, it may be correct to say that this order was passed at the request of a petitioner and should, despite the general wording, be confined to him and his land we should not read the order literally but assess its practical effect. Suppose, despite this order, the Government had proceeded with inquiries under Section 5A in respect of another's lands, it would have taken him just a few hours to file another writ petition and obtain a similar stay. The interpretation sugges ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... assuming that the respondents could claim the benefit of the explanation or of the general principle that no Court order should be allowed to prejudice the rights of a party, the respondents cannot take advantage of the mere fact that a stay order had been passed in some cases; they should be able to go further and say that, as a result of the stay order, it had become impossible for them to issue a declaration under Section 6. That cannot be said unless the respondents had tried every remedy in their power to have the stay order modified, clarified or vacated. It was always open to them to have applied to the Court that granted the stay (and some of the stay orders specifically permitted them to apply for variation) pointing out that the stay this, they took no steps to proceed further in respect of lands not covered by stay orders. order (according to them) was impeding them from issuing a Section 6 declaration in respect of other lands that, in view of the statutory period of limitation prescribed therefore, the stay order should be modified or clarified to make possible such action on their behalf in respect of the lands of others. 36. The decisions of the Supreme Court in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fact that this Court in some cases referred to earlier) gave them liberty to seek a variation of the orders, if so advised. (c) When some of the petitioners moved the Court for clarification that the stay order was of restricted scope, the respondents contested the position and their stand was rejected (in CM 315/84). Despite this, they took no steps to proceed further in respect of lands not covered by stay orders. (d) When the petitioners moved for contempt against the respondents for issuing a declaration under Section 6 in respect of some lands in CW 816/82, this Court pointed out that declaration under Section 6 technically be not right qua petitioners . This also explained the scope of the order and still the respondents remained indifferent regarding further proceedings. 38. In our opinion, these arguments do not help the petitioners. The explanation does not postulate any such requirement as we have already indicated while considering the decision of the Supreme Court in the Assam Jute Supply case . The explanation only directs the exclusion of a certain period in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a declaration. That is the period during which any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... liable to be quashed. We are of opinion that it will not be convenient or possible for the Full Bench to consider and pronounce the numerous contentions that may be raised in each one of the 73 petitions now. We have no option but to direct that all these writ petitions be listed before the Division Bench for hearing on the other contentions. We express no opinion on the other contentions which the petitioners will be at liberty to urge before the Bench hearing the matters finally to the extent they have been raised or are permitted to be raised. 41. We may also, at this stage, touch upon an aspect adverted to in the course of the arguments before us. It is argued that, if in truth, the respondents really believed and believe that the stay in one case operates as a stay of the whole notification, they could not have issued Section 6 declaration in respect of the petitioners' lands even in May-June, 1985 as they have done because some stay order or other in respect of the notifications under Section 4 dated 5.11.1980 and 25.11.1980 continues to be in force even till today. We do not know whether this is factually so, though it seems that some stay orders may perhaps be in fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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