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TMI Blog2015 (5) TMI 941X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ble to the appellant for preferring appeal to this Court is sixty+sixty days i.e. 120 days, subject to the condition that the appellant has shown sufficient cause for condonation up to sixty days beyond the prescribed period of sixty days and the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act have no application.The issue was thereafter considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board's case [2010 (4) TMI 1031 - SUPREME COURT]. Similar view was expressed by Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Delhi Development Authority vs M/s Durga Construction Company [2013 (11) TMI 1527 - DELHI HIGH COURT] decided on 7.11.2013. What can be summed up from the aforesaid authoritative enunciation of law on the issue by Hon'ble the Supreme Court and different High Courts is that where certain period has been specified in the special Act limiting powers of the Court to condone the delay, the same would amount express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act within the meaning of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. - Decided against the appellant. - CAPP No. 34 of 2014 (O&M) - - - Dated:- 4-5-2015 - Mr. Rajesh Bindal, J. Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Senio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r on finding that the writ petition was not maintainable, the present appeal was filed along with application for condonation of delay. Once the applicant-appellant was already before this Court within the period of limitation, may be by availing improper remedy, the bar as such contained in the provisions of the Act limiting period of condonation of delay will not apply. In such cases, this Court has ample inherent powers to condone the delay as there is nothing in the Act which bars the Court for exercising that power. He further submitted that when the appeal was filed, respondent no. 1 accepted notice in the appeal in Court which amounts to waiver of its right to raise the plea of limitation at a later stage. 4. In response to the contention raised by learned counsel for the applicant-appellant, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 submitted that the notice in the appeal was accepted in the Court as the counsel was appearing in other three connected appeals arising out of the same litigation. The counsel was not knowing that the appeal was delayed. After receipt of copy thereof, it was found that the appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation. Once the appeal was not m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... earlier on account of ill advise, a writ petition was filed, hence, taking support of Section 14 of the Limitation Act the delay is to be condoned, but such a plea is not available to the appellant as Section 14 of the Limitation Act has no application in appeals. 10. The interpretation of provisions in different statutes providing limited period for condonation of delay in availing the remedy was considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in number of cases. In Popular Construction Co.'s case (supra), the issue being considered was application of provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act with reference to the period provided in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which provide that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, it may entertain an application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. The relevant paras thereof are extracted below:- 1. The question which arises for determination in this case is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, are applicable to an application challenging ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y days in addition to the original period of sixty days (total 120 days) for filing an appeal as proviso to Section 10F does not permit such extension. Applying this principle enumerated hereinabove and the discussion, the maximum period available to the appellant for preferring the appeal was sixty + sixty days, i.e., 120 days up to March 24, 2007, subject to the condition that the appellant has shown sufficient cause for condonation up to sixty days beyond the prescribed period of sixty days. As noticed above, the initial period of 60 days in filing the appeal under Section 10F expired on January 23, 2007 and the extended period under the proviso to Section 10F expired on March 24, 2007. Hence, even if the contention of the appellant is accepted that he calculated initial period of filing the appeal as 90 days and the part of the period spent in the Delhi High Court is also considered to be the sufficient cause, it cannot be extended beyond 120 days, i.e., March 24, 2007. The present appeal having been filed on May 16, 2007, is barred by time. 12. Similar view was expressed by Madras High Court in Sivakumar Spinning Mills Private Limited, Andhra Pradesh High Court in Manohar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... allenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts (Section 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction. 27. It is thus evident that the Electricity Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which lays down that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application unless they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law. xx xx xx 31. In CCE and Customs v. Hongo India (P) Ltd. (2009) 5 SCC 791, a three-Judge Bench considered the scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and held that the High Court has no power to condone delay beyond the period specified in Section 35-H thereof. The argument that Section 5 of the Limitation A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court. (emphasis supplied) 32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 12 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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