TMI Blog2015 (5) TMI 941X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n 10F of the Act, he submitted that it provides a period of 60 days for filing appeal and further period of 60 days for which the delay could be condoned. In support of his plea, reliance was placed upon judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of India vs Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470, judgment of this Court in Pawan Goel vs KMG Milk Food Limited and others (2008) 142 Comp Cas 441 (P&H), judgment of Madras High Court in Sivakumar Spinning Mills Private Limited represented by its Managing Director vs Shanmughavelayutham and others 2009 (6) CTC 847, judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Manohar Lal Sharma vs Union of India and another (2009) 152 Comp Cas 412 (AP), judgment of Bombay High Court in Smt. Hetal Alpesh Muchhala vs Adityesh Educational Institute and others (2009) 152 Comp Cas 75 (Bom) and judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others (2010) 5 SCC 23. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no doubt, impugned order was passed by the Board on 5.3.2014 and the appeal has been filed in this Court on 24.9.2014. However, application seeking condonati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... decision or order of the Company Law Board (made before the commencement of the Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002) may file an appeal to the High Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Company Law Board to him on any question of law arising out of such order: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days." 8. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that 60 days period has been provided for filing an appeal to this Court against an order passed by the Board from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Board on any question of law arising therefrom. Proviso to Section 10-F of the Act provides that on a sufficient cause shown, the appeal can be permitted to be filed within 60 days thereafter. Meaning thereby the power to condone delay in filing the appeal has been limited to a maximum period of 60 days in the section itself. 9. In the present case, admittedly the copy of the impugned order dated 5.3.2014 was received by the appellant fro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result." 11. While considering the aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Popular Construction Co.'s case (supra) and subsequent judgment in Gopal Sardar vs Karuna Sardar (2004) 4 SCC 252, this Court in Pawan Goel's case (supra), opined that the maximum period available to the appellant for preferring appeal to this Court is sixty+sixty days i.e. 120 days, subject to the condition that the appellant has shown sufficient cause for condonation up to sixty days beyond the prescribed period of sixty days and the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act have no application. The relevant para thereof is extracted below:- "30. From the dictum of the aforesaid judgments, it is abundantly clear that where particular statute does not apply to Section 5 of the Limitation Act expressly or even impliedly in a special or local law itself, it shall be presumed that the exclusion is express. Section 29(2) of the Act not only excludes the application of Section 5 of the Limit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ient cause is shown. Hon'ble the Supreme Court opined that any appeal filed beyond 120 days would be barred by limitation. The relevant paras thereof are extracted below:- "25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression `within a further period of not exceeding 60 days' in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Trib ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ment has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act. * * * 32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35- B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory." 14. Similar view was expressed by Division Bench of Delhi High Court in FAO (OS) No.485-86 of 2011- Delhi Development Authority vs M/s Durga Construction Company, decided on 7.11.2013. 15. What can be summed up from the aforesaid authoritative enunciation of law on the issue by Hon'ble the Supreme Court and different High Courts is that where certain period has been specified in the special Act limiting powers of the Court to condone the delay, the same would amount express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act within the meaning of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. The issue was considered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court with reference to the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 where period of three months has been provided for filing application with further period of thirt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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