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TMI Blog1989 (7) TMI 334X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... regard to places of suing, are also applicable to the suits referred to in the said Section 80. The question, in other words, is whether the said Section 80 is a complete, self-contained, exhaustive Code in regard to the place of suing respecting suits constituting a special law for such suits excluding, by necessary implication, the operation of provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The Full Bench, resolving the earlier conflicts of Judicial opinion in the High Court on the points has held Section 80 as containing within it a self-contained scheme for suits envisaged by it and that Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts, Act 1882 stand excluded from operation. The Full Bench, however, has left open the question whether Section 80 also over-rides clause 12 of the letters patent. 2. In the original proceedings from which C.A. 224 of 1988 arises, appellant instituted Money Suit No. 35 of 1978 against the Respondent in the Court of the 6th Sub-Judge at Alipore, Distt.--24 Parganas, West Bengal, seeking recovery of ₹ 13,200 respectin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase may be, or against the Railway Administration on whose Railway the loss, injury, destruction or deterioration occurred. The new Section 80 substituted in 1961 by the amending Act provides: 80. Suits for Compensation: A suit for compensation for loss of the life of, or personal injury to, a passenger or for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods may be instituted. (a) if the passenger was, or the animals or goods were, booked from one station to another on the railway of the same railway administration against that railways administration; (b) if the passenger was, or the animals or goods were, booked through over the railway of two or more railway administration against the railway administration from which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or to which the animals or goods were delivered for carriage, as the case may be, or against the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies, or the loss, injury, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred; and, in either case the suit may be instituted in a Court having jurisdiction over the place at which the passenger obtained his pass or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uch suits may be instituted . Referring generally to the scope of the changes brought about by the 1961 amendment to Chapter VII of the Railways Act, 1890, this Court, in Union of India v. The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate, Poona, AIR 1976 SC 879 observed: The history and the object with which the radical provisions of the new Act were introduced bear testimony to change of the nature of the liability of the railway administration. We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that under the new Act the liability of the Railway has been increased so as to take upon itself the responsibility of a common carrier. The new comprehensiveness of the scheme of the amendments was one of the circumstances that commended itself to the High Court to persuade it to hold that the new Section 80 in Chapter VII, constituted a complete and self-contained special law as to the place of suing respecting suits envisaged by that Section derogating from the generality of the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the provisions touching the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Courts and that with the enactment of the new Section 80 there was an implied r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ompensation may be instituted was itself introductive of a new law implying a negative. When the same subject of territorial jurisdiction has been dealt with in the subsequent legislation (i.e., Section 80 of the Railways Act) the prior laws (Section 20 of the Code and Section 13 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act) on the same subject were not intended to subsist. In other words, Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act by requiring something special to be done repealed by necessary implication the former general statute relating to territorial jurisdiction of Courts in so far as the suits for compensation against the Railways were concerned. Any other construction, according to the High Court, would lead to anomalies and render Section 80 a surplusage. High Court said: If it was to be held that clause (c) of Section 20 of the Code still applied to suits for compensation against the Railways, then the cause of action for the purpose of jurisdiction of Courts would arise not only at the three places mentioned in Section 80 of the Act but at several other places. In other words, the provisions of Section 80 of the Act relating to places where the suits for compensatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ghosh is that the construction placed by the High Court ignores the crucial aspect that while the old Section 80 did not render the destination railway as such, liable to be sued if loss was not proved to have occurred there, the new Section, however, renders the destination Railway also liable even though no loss occurred there. The provision in the new Section 80 enabling the suit to be instituted at the place of the destination Railway, where no part of the cause of action might otherwise be shown to have arisen, was, it is urged, a mere consequential provision--to give effect to the substantive provision, that the destination Railway was also liable. Dr. Ghosh emphasised the expression may be instituted in Section 80 to reinforce his contention that Section 80 did really expand the rights of and not seek to restrict therein suitors. Learned counsel also emphasised that section 80 did not contain any words expressly excluding clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as suits contemplated by Section 80 were concerned. The new Section 80, it is contended, did not intend to impair the choice of the forum afforded by Section 20 of the Code of Civil ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ws including Letters Patent: The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, including in particular the Letters Patent of the High Court. to contend that the construction opted for by the High Court would run in the teeth of this express provision. 10. Lastly, learned counsel invited our attention to the following passage in Crawford on Statutory construction: All laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing cases on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the Legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter,unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable. Bowen v. Lease, 5 Will 225. It is a rule, says Sedwick that a general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one, unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. And, as we have already suggested, it is essential that the new statute cover the entire subject matter of the old; otherwise there is no indication. of the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the old law. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... able to a question trader Art. 254(2) where the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate that the legislature which is presumed to know the existing state of the law did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions. Courts, in applying this doctrine, are supposed merely to give effect to the legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the two enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two provisions may by itself, and without more, lead to an inference of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to the same matter. In such a case the actual detailed comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary. It is a matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneously. Section 80 is a special provi-sion. It deals with certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their particular subject-matters. The High Court has come to the conclusion that new Section 80 made a conscious departure on the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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