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TMI Blog2007 (4) TMI 676X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hin the scope of section 2-A, the individual workman concerned may, within six months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later, apply, in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute and the Labour Court shall dispose of such application in the same manner as a dispute referred under sub-section (1)." Taking advantage of the new provision, on 4.10.1988, the appellant made an application to the Labour Court, Hubli (KID No.1055/88 subsequently transferred and renumbered as KID No. 497/1995 on the file of the Labour Court, Bijapur) seeking a declaration that his termination from service on 1.3.1980 was null and void and a direction for reinstatement with full back- wages, continuity of service and other consequential reliefs. The appellant contended that his termination amounted to illegal retrenchment, as the respondent failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 25- F of ID Act even though he had worked continuously for more than 240 days in a year. 4. The respondent ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a co-operative society. He therefore set aside the award of the Labour Court, reserving liberty to the appellant to work out his remedy in accordance with law. The said order of the learned Single Judge was challenged by the appellant in a writ appeal. A Division Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated 15.6.2005, dismissed the writ appeal, holding that an employee of a co-operative society having a claim against the employer has to raise a dispute under Section 70 of the KCS Act. The Division Bench purported to follow the decision of the Full Bench in Karnataka Sugar Workers Federation. The said decision of the Division Bench is challenged in this appeal by special leave. 8. The Appellant contends that amended Section 70 of the KCS Act took away the jurisdiction of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals functioning under the ID Act, only when the amendments to the said section as per Act 2 of 2000 came into effect on 20.6.2000, and it did not nullify an award made by the Labour Court prior to that date, that is on 15.10.1996. It was also contended that the respondent not having raised any objection about want of jurisdiction before the Labour Court, could not subsequently ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... result of the default of the principal debtor whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; (c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of a President, Vice-President, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer or Member of Committee of the society. (3) x x x (omitted as not relevant). Section 70 was amended by Karnataka Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 19 of 1976). The Amendment Act received the assent of the Governor on 7.3.1976. It was brought into effect from 20.1.1976. The Amendment Act added the following as clauses (d) and (e) in sub-section (2) of section 70 : (d) any dispute between a co-operative society and its employees or past employees or heirs or legal representatives of a deceased employee, including a dispute regarding the terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a co-operative society; (e) a claim by a co-operative society for any deficiency caused in the assets of the co-operative society by a member, past member, deceased member or deceased officer, past agent or deceased agent or by any servant, past servant or deceased servant or by its committee, past or present whether such loss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 'workmen' as defined in the ID Act. Clause (1) of Article 254 provides that if any provision of a law made by a State Legislature is repugnant to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the existing law shall prevail, and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. Clause (2) of Article 254, however, provides that where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, contains any provision repugnant to an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State. The question of repugnancy can arise only with reference to a legislation made by Parliament falling under the Concurrent List or an existing law with reference to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. If a law made by the State Legislature covered by an Entry in the State List incidentally touches any of the entries in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a co-operative society, was deemed to be a dispute touching the constitution, management, or business of a co-operative society which had to be referred to the Registrar for adjudication. But prior to 20.6.2000, there was no express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal. As a result, if an employee of a Co-operative Society answered the definition of 'workman' and the dispute between the co- operative society and its employee fell within the definition of an 'industrial dispute', then the employee had the choice of two alternative forums either to raise a dispute before the Registrar under Section 70 of the KCS Act or seek a reference to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1)(c) of the ID Act (or approach the Labour Court by an application under Section 10(4A) of ID Act). 13. In Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, A.P. (AIR 1970 SC 245), this Court considered Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, which dealt with disputes which could be referred to the Registrar. The said secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o-operative society answered the definition of an 'industry' and the dispute was an 'industrial dispute'. But when sub-section (1) of section 70 of KCS Act was further amended by Act 2 of 2000 by specifically excluding the jurisdiction of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals with the simultaneous addition of the words "notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947" in clause (d) of Section 70(2) of KCS Act, the said Amendment Act (Act 2 of 2000) was reserved for the assent of the President and received such assent on 18.3.2000. The amended provisions were given effect from 20.6.2000. Therefore, only with effect from 20.6.2000, the jurisdiction of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals were excluded in regard to disputes between a co-operative Society and its employees (or past employees) relating to terms of employment, service conditions or disciplinary action. It follows therefore that in the year 1996, the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to make an award in regard to such a dispute. The High Court could not have interfered with it on the ground that Section 70 of the KCS Act was a bar to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ard to references under Section 10 of the ID Act stood excluded. The High Court held so in view of clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 70 which provided that any dispute between a co-operative society and its employees (past or present) in regard to terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action will be deemed to be a dispute to be decided by the Registrar under sub-section (1) of Section 70, overlooking the fact that Amendment Act 19 of 1976 by which clause (d) was inserted in Section 70(2), had not received the assent of the President and therefore the jurisdiction of the Registrar under Section 70(1) of the KCS Act as expanded by section 70(2)(d), could not prevail over the provisions of the ID Act. If the amendment to section 70(2) by Act 19 of 1976 should be read or construed as having the effect of enabling section 70(1) of KCS Act to prevail over the provisions of ID Act, then the said amendment Act (Act 19 of 1976) would have required the assent of the President under Article 254(2). But there was no such assent. 17. As the Division Bench had relied on two decisions of this Court in R.C. Tiwari (supra) and Sagarmal (supra), it is necessary to refer t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ral Act - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (except Chapters V-A, V-B and V-C relating to lay off and retrenchment, special provisions relating to lay off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishments and unfair labour practices), did not apply to any industry to which the said M.P. Industrial Relations Act applied. ID Act did not apply in the State of Madhya Pradesh for adjudication of disputes between the employer and employees, not because of any bar in the MP Co-operative Societies Act, but because of the State having made a law relating to industrial disputes, namely the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 which had received the assent of the President. The M.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, vide section 55, specifically provided that where a dispute including a dispute relating to terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action by a Society arises between a Society and its employees, the Registrar or any officer appointed by him shall decide the dispute and his decision shall be binding on the Society and its employees; and Section 93 of the M.P. Co- operative Societies Act provided that nothing contained in the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dustrial Relations Act, 1960, but chose the remedy of a reference under Section 10 of the ID Act, which was inapplicable in the State of Madhya Pradesh. This Court reiterated that as the only question before the High Court was the competence of a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and not the availability of the remedy under the Madhya Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 or the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960, the view taken by the High Court that the reference under Section 10 of the ID Act was incompetent, and the award made therein a nullity, did not suffer from any infirmity. In short, Section 10 of the ID Act was held inapplicable not because the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 prevailed over the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but because in Madhya Pradesh, the provisions of the ID Act, 1947 (except certain specified provisions relating to lay off etc.) did not apply in view of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960. Therefore, the decision in Sagarmal was also of no assistance. Therefore the decision in Veerashiva Co-operative Bank was erroneous. 20. The Full Bench ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder section 70 of the KCS Act with effect from 20.6.2000. 23. We therefore hold that the award of the Labour Court was not without jurisdiction. We, however, make it clear that this decision shall not be applied to re-open matters decided relying on Veerashiva Co-operative Bank and Karnataka Sugar Workers Federation, which have attained finality. Re : Question (ii) 24. As we have held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction, the next question that arises for consideration is the validity of the award. As noticed above, according to the appellant, the termination was with effect from 1.3.1980. The Labour Court found that the termination was in fact from 19.2.1978. The employee made an application under section 10(4A) of the I.D. Act on 4.10.1988. But for the insertion of sub-section (4A) in section 10 of the ID Act on 7.4.1988, the appellant's challenge would not have been entertained at all as the claim had become stale on account of the same not being agitated for more than 10 years. The Labour Court, however, proceeded on the assumption that any claim application filed within six months from the date when sub-section (4A) was introduced, is to be considered as in time, irr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ears under the new Limitation Act, 1963 which come into force on 1.1.1964. The Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to all suits filed after 1.1.1964, though the cause of action might have accrued before that date. But if cause action had accrued on 1.1.1962, and therefore, the right to file a suit came to an end on 1.1.1963 under the old Act, a suit cannot obviously filed on 1.4.1964, on the ground that the suit is within time as per the new law of limitation. In other words, any law relating to limitation, though will apply to cause of actions accruing earlier, will apply only if the cause of action was 'live' as on the date when the new Act came into force and not to claims which were 'dead' or unenforceable when the new law came into force. This general Rule is however subject to any express statutory provisions to the contrary. 27. This Court while dealing with Section 10(1)(c) and (d) of the ID Act, has repeatedly held that though the Act does not provide a period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10(1)(c) or (d), if on account of delay, a dispute has become stale or ceases to exist, the reference should be rejected. It has also held that lapse of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e, such a transitional provision is made to ensure that persons who are given a special right, do not lose it for want of adequate time to enforce it, though they have a cause of action or right as on the date when the new remedy or relief comes into effect. 29. Section 10(4A) does not therefore revive non-existing or stale or dead claims but only ensures that claims which were live, by applying the six month rule in Section 10(4A) as on the date when the Section came into effect, have a minimum of six months time to approach the Labour Court. That is ensured by adding the words "or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, which is later" to the words "within six months from, the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination." In other words all those who were communicated orders of termination during a period of six months prior to 7-4-1988 were deemed to have been communicated such orders of termination as on 7-4-1988 for the purpose of seeking remedy. Therefore, the words "within six months from the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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