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TMI Blog2000 (2) TMI 833X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by this Court's order dated 22-6-1999) are stated by the petitioners to have been admilled into the partnership along with the petitioners on 1-1-1981 under a registered partnership deed and that the partnership itself was dissolved on 25-2-1981. The petitioners have also urged tliat as per the deed of dissolution all the assets and liabilities of the., said firm were taken over by the newly introduced partners J. Durga Prasad and M. Sambasivaram, and that from the said date of dissolution the petitioners ceased to have any interest in the assets or liabilities of the firm. The petitioners also pleaded that Durga Prasad and Sambasivaram had reestablished the business in the name and style of M/s. Coastal Plastics, Kakinada, and also undertook to discharge all the liabilities mentioned in the balance sheet attached to the dissolution added, within one year including the loans due to the respondent-Corporation and the State Bank of India. It is also pleaded that the factum of dissolution and taking over of the assets and liabilities by Durga Prasad and Sambasivaram was intimated to the respondent-Corporation and that from then onwards the Corporation was dealing with the said ind ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her partners of the said dissolved firm M/s. Vikram Industries, Kakinada and requested that further action against them be dropped. Reasons for the said proposal were also set out in the letter. (E) To the above offer of the petitioners the Corporation responded by reiterating that the unit is in arrears specified in its letter dated 5-10-1988 towards principal, interest and other expenses. The Corporation also denied that its claim is barred by time and asserted that it is within the period of limitation. In conclusion the Corporation called upon the petitioners to clear the dues immediately and on failure to pay atleast a substantial part of the dues at once, proceedings under the Act for recovery of the dues were threatened. 5. The question of the validity of Section 52-A of the Act, urged in the writ petition was not pressed at the hearing of the writ petition in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Grandhi Kamaraj and others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 (2) ALD 1193, upholding the vires of the provision. 6. The only question that survives and has been urged at the hearing of this writ petition is that the demand by the Corporation of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter cannot constitute as an acknowledgment of the debt, in terms thereof. 12. Sri Y.N. Lohita learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Corporation contended alternatively that the petitioner's letter dated 18-10-1988 constitutes an agreement in terms of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. 13. Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (for short 'the Contract Act') is in the following terms: Section 25. Agreement without consideration void, unless it is in writing and registered, or is a promise to compensate for something done, or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law :--An agreement made without consideration is void, unless- 1. ..... 2. ..... 3. It is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorised in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the credit or might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits. In any of these cases such an agreement is a contract. 14. This Court in Lalam Sambayya v. Pattan Shemsher Khan, 1963 (1) ALT 501, has considered the provisions of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act in relatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es that the offer has been accepted nor could it be said that the advocate who was representing the respondent in the suit was an agent of the respondent and was competent to accept the offer on his behalf. On a consideration of these facts, I am not inclined to agree with the lower Court that the statement made by the petitioner came within the purview of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. 16. In view of the decision above with which I am in respectful agreement, in view of the clear provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act as well as on first principles this Court is of the considered view that the letter of the petitioners 1 and 3 dated 18-10-1988 does not and cannot in law constitute acknowledgment of a debt within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. 17. Does the letter dated 18-10-1988 constitute an agreement in terms of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act is the next question; in the view of this Court it does not. The petitioner recorded a clear demurrer in Paras 1 to 8 of the letter dated 18-10-1988 with regard to their liability to pay in the circumstances recorded therein, and categorically stated in Para 9 thereof that he claim of the Corporation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s not commend itself to this Court. True it is that a question of limitation is normally a mixed question of law and fact. However, all the relevant facts are already pleaded in the case and the specific plea of the petitioners contained in iheir letter dated 18-10-1988 and in this writ petition, the respondent-Corporation has categorically denied such contention and set out the relevant facts which are necessary to adjudicate and to pronounce on this aspect of the matter. The Corporation has contented itself with pleading that the petitioners' letter dated 18-10-1988 constitutes an acknowledgment of the debt. Orally, it was alternatively contended, that the letter dated 18-10-1988 constitutes an agreement within the meaning of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. This Court has considered both these contentions on the basis of the established facts as available on record. The respondent had ample opportunity to plead all the relevant facts in support of their contentions in view of the specific plea taken by the petitioners in the writ petition. No other factor has been pleaded, canvassed to rebut the contention of the petitioners in this regard. 20. In these circumstances th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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