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TMI Blog2007 (8) TMI 21X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 4-B of the Act. Accordingly, the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad (in short the 'Tribunal') was set aside. 3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: Appellant (hereinafter referred to as the 'assessee') filed an application for grant of recognition certificate under Section 4-B of the Act in respect of notified goods mentioned in Annexure-III of the Notification No.7551 dated 31st December, 1976. By order dated 22.12.1987 the Assessing Authority granted recognition certificate in regard to Automobile Safety Toughened Glass whereby the assessee was authorized to purchase raw materials and packing materials at the concessional rate of tax. Being aggrieved by the denial of total exemption of sales tax on the purchase of raw materials and packing materials, an appeal under Section 9 of the Act was filed which was allowed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) by order dated 11.1.1989. Consequentially, the recognition certificate was directed to be amended to the effect that the assessee would be entitled to purchase raw materials and packing materials without payment of any sales tax on such purchases. This order was confirmed in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mented or cut glass bangles were specifically excluded. 10. In view of Clause 2(b) of the said Notification no tax shall be payable in respect of sale to or as the case may be purchase by a dealer holding a recognition certificate under Sub-section (2) of Section 4-B of the Act of any raw materials accessories and component parts required for use in manufacture by him of the notified goods mentioned in column 2 of Annexure I or of any goods required for use in the packing of such notified goods manufactured by him. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that para 17 of the judgment in Atul glass's case (supra) has no relevance. In that case the effect of a special entry and item was under consideration. Therefore, this Court had held that the special must include the general. Such is not the position here. What was required to be considered was the effect of the expression in all forms . 12. Learned counsel for the revenue on the other hand submitted that in Atul Glass's case (supra) this Court observed that for determining as to whether a new commodity is substantially different from the original has to be found out by analyzing as to how the prod ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. 17. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. [( See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Ana. (AIR 1998 SC 74)]. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. [ (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr . (JT 1998 (2) SC 253)]. It is contrary t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. An intention to produce an unreasonable result , said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available . Where to apply words literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result we must do some violence to the words and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. ( Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also observed: this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges . 22. It is then true that, when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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