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TMI Blog2012 (7) TMI 986X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the award within the period of limitation, i.e. 90 days, on 01.07.2011. However, these objections were returned by the registry under defect. The objection petition was re-filed thereafter only on 21.09.2011, resulting in 72 days delay in re-filing. 3. The appellant, consequently, moved the aforesaid application to seek condonation of delay in re-filing the petition, i.e. I.A. No.16371/2011. The ground taken in the said application to explain the delay was that the objection petition was collected from the registry under defect by the junior counsel of the appellants counsel, as the clerk of the appellants counsel was on leave during the relevant period. The objection petition was mistakenly tagged with other files and, therefore, remained untraceable till 18.09.2011. Ultimately, the office of the appellants counsel started reconstructing the record for fresh filing. On 19.09.2011, the counsel for the appellant while searching for some other files, suddenly found the objection petition. Thereafter, the same was re-filed. It was averred that the delay in re- filing the objection petition was not deliberate or intentional, and had occurred due to bona fide reasons, as aforesai ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... view taken by the learned Single Judge, who has held that the application to seek condonation of delay in re-filing the objection petition was casual in nature and did not disclose specific details. The said application did not meet the stringent norms which apply while dealing with an application to seek condonation of delay in re-filing an objection petition under Section 34 of the Act, in view of the statutory scheme provided for under the Act. 8. The Division Bench in Shree Ram Construction Co. (supra) (which, we may note has been upheld by the Supreme Court with the dismissal of the SLPs) in para 29 and 41 observed as follows: 29. Reliance on the decision in Improvement Trust, Ludhiana -vs- Ujagar Singh, (2010) 6 SCC 786 to the effect that justice can be done only when the matter is fought on merits and in accordance with law rather than to dispose it off on such technicalities and that too at the threshold is of no avail in the backdrop of the A C Act which decidedly and calculatedly shuts off curial discretion after the expiry of thirty days beyond three months having elapsed from the date on which a copy of the Award had been received by the appealing party. In the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... shown for condoning the delay. The conduct of the party must pass the rigorous test of diligence, else the purpose of prescribing a definite and unelastic period of limitation is rendered futile. The reason attributed by the Appellant for the delay is the ill health of the Senior Standing Counsel. However, as has been pithily pointed out, the Vakalatnama contains the signatures of Ms Sonia Mathur, Standing Counsel for the Department; in fact, it does not bear the signature of Late Shri R.D.Jolly. Because of the explanation given in the course of hearing, we shall ignore the factum of the Vakalatnama also bearing the signature of another Standing Counsel, namely, Ms Prem Lata Bansal. We have called for the records of OMP No.291/2008 and we find that the Objections have not been signed by Late Shri R.D.Jolly but by Ms Sonia Mathur on 9.8.2007, on which date the supporting Affidavit has also been sworn by the Director of Income Tax. In these circumstances, the illness of Late R.D.Jolly is obviously a smokescreen. No other explanation has been tendered for the delay. The avowed purpose of the A C Act is to expedite the conclusion of arbitral proceedings. It is with this end in view tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re-filing, and the Court would conduct a deeper scrutiny in the matter. The leniency shown and the liberal approach adopted, otherwise, by the Courts in matter of condonation of delay in other cases would, in such cases, not be adopted, as the adoption of such an approach by the Court would defeat the statutory scheme contained in the Act which prescribes an outer limit of time within which the objections could be preferred. It cannot be that what a petitioner is not entitled to do in the first instance, i.e. to file objection to an award beyond the period of three months thirty days under any circumstance, he can be permitted to do merely because he may have filed the objections initially within the period of three months, or within a period of three months plus thirty days, and where the re-filing takes place much after the expiry of the period of three months thirty days and, that too, without any real justifiable cause or reason. 11. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Single Judge has applied his mind to the facts of this case on the basis of the correct legal proposition laid down by the Division Bench in Shree Ram Construction Co. (supra). The learn ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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