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TMI Blog1953 (5) TMI 20X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Uttar Pradesh, and the contempt proceedings were started against them, because of certain resolutions passed by the Committee on 20th April, 1949, copies of which were forwarded to the District Magistrate and other officers by a covering letter signed by appellant No.1 as President of the Bar Association. To appreciate the contentions that have been raised in this appeal, it would be necessary to state a few relevant facts. The resolutions which form the basis of the contempt proceedings relate to the conduct of two judicial officers, both of whom functioned At Muzafarnagarn at the relevant time. One of them named Kanhaya Lal Mehra was a Judicial Magistrate while the other named Lalta Prasad was a Revenue Officer. It is said that the first appellant as President of the Bar Association received numerous complaints regarding the way in which these officers disposed of cases in their courts and behaved towards the lawyers and the litigant public. The Executive Committee of the Association took the matter in hand and, after satisfying themselves that the complaints were legitimate and well-founded, they held a meeting on 20th April, 1949, in which the following resolutions were pass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he might find it convenient to fix an early date to meet the deputation of 5 members as indicated in the third resolution. The Divisional Commissioner, by his letter dated 27th April, 1949, addressed to appellant No. 1, acknowledged receipt of the copy of the resolutions and requested the addressee to supply specific details of cases tried by these officers in support of the allegations contained in the resolution. Without waiting for this information, however, the Commissioner on the day following wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary of the U.P. Government suggesting that the matter should be brought to the notice of the High Court inasmuch as instances were not rare where influential members of the Bar got resolutions like these passed by their associations with a view to put extra-judicial pressure upon the judicial officers so ,as to make them amenable to their wishes which often were questionable. On 10th May, 1949, a deputation of 5 members waited upon the District Magistrate and discussed with the latter the entire situation. The Magistrate also told the deputation that the details of complaints as required by the Commissioner should be furnished at an early date. These det ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y scandalising the court . The learned judges observed on authority of the pronouncement of Lord Russell in Reg. v. Gray(1), that this class of contempt is subject to one important qualification. The judges and courts are alike open to criticism and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no court could treat that as contempt of court. In the opinion of the learned judges, the complaint lodged by the appellants exceeded the bounds of fair and legitimate criticism and in this respect the members of the Bar Association could not claim any higher privilege than ordinary citizens. No distinction, the High Court held, could also be made by reason of the fact that the charges against the judicial officers in the present case were embodied in a representation made to authorities who were the official superiors of the officers concerned and under whose administrative control the latter acted. The learned Attorney-General who appeared in sup. port of the appeal, characterised this way of approach of the High Court as entirely wrong. His contention is that any act or publication which is calculated to lower the au ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rdwick(1). This scandalising might manifest itself in various ways but, in substance, it is an attack on individual judges or the court as a whole with or without reference to particular cases, casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character or ability of the judges. Such conduct, is punished as contempt for this reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the courts which are of prime importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties. There are decisions of English courts from early times where the courts assumed jurisdiction in taking committal proceedings against persons who were guilty of publishing any scandalous matter in respect of the court itself. In the year 1899, Lord Morris in delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee in MacLeod v. St. Aubin(2) observed that committals for contempt by scandalising the court itself have become obsolete in this country. Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them. His Lordship said further: The power summarily to commit for contempt is considered necessary for the prop ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... It seems, therefore, that there are two primary con- siderations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by scandalising the court itself. In the first place, the rejection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in (1) 70 1, A. 216. respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created. The path of criticism , said Lord Atkin(1), is a public way. The wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain, from imputing motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempt to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. In the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law (2). It is in the light of these principles that we will proceed to examine the facts of the present case. It cannot be disputed that in regard to matters of contempt, the members of a Bar Association do not occupy any privileged or higher position than ordinary citizens. The form in which the disparaging statement is made is also not material, but one very important thing has to be noticed in the case before us, viz., that even assuming that the statement was derogatory to the dignity of the judicial officers, very little publicity was given to this statement, and in fact, the appellants made their best endeavours to keep the thing out of the knowledge of the public. The representation was made to 4 specified persons who were the official superiors of the officers concerned; and it has been found as a fact by the High Court that the appellan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ate who is the administrative head of these officers. As regards the first part of the resolution, the allegations are made in general terms that' these officers do not state facts correctly when they pass orders and that they are discourteous to the litigant public. These do not by any moans amount to scandalizing the court. Such complaints are frequently heard in respect of many subordinate courts and if the appellants had a genuine grievance, it cannot be said that, in ventilating their grievances they exceeded the limits affair criticism. The only portion of the resolution to which 'prima facie objection can be taken is that which describes these officers as thoroughly incompetent in law and whose judicial work does not inspire confidence. Those remarks are certainly of a sweeping nature and can scarcely be justified. Assuming, however, that this portion of the resolution is defamatory, the question arises whether it can be held to amount to contempt of court. To answer this question, we have to see whether it is in any way calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice in these courts, or, in other words, whether such statement is likely to give rise to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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