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TMI Blog1994 (2) TMI 2X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o him accompanied by a "Statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of articles of charges" framed against him. The articles of charges are the following: "Article-1 The said Shri Upendra Singh while posted as Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, B. S. D. (North) Range, Bombay, during the financial year 1986-87, got a survey under section 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, conducted in the cases of Raghuvanshi group of builders on January 9, 1987. During the course of this survey incriminating documents and a confessional statement of the assessees showing unaccounted receipts of Rs. 1.56 crores and admitted unaccounted incomes of Rs. 46.60 lakhs earned by four firms of this group, viz., Messrs. Raghuvanshi Builders, Messrs. Raghuvanshi Developers, Messrs. Raghuvanshi Associates and Messrs. Raghani Builders, were obtained : (a) The said Shri Upendra Singh initiated proceedings under section 144A in the case of Messrs. Raghuvanshi Builders, Messrs. Raghuvanshi Developers and Messrs. Raghuvanshi Associates in an illegal and improper manner. (b) During the aforementioned proceedings under section 144A, the said Shri Upendra Singh neither examin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her consideration of interim relief. Order Dasti." Against the said interim order, the Union of India approached this court by way of Civil Appeal No. 4316 of 1991. The appeal was allowed by this court by its order dated September 10, 1992, and the Tribunal was directed to "deal with the matter in the light of the observations made by this court in Union of India v. A. N. Saxena [1992] 3 SCC 124". It was further directed that "in the meanwhile the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent on the basis of the memorandum dated February 7, 1991, would continue". It is necessary to notice the observations in the said judgment. The Bench first dealt with the submission that no disciplinary proceedings can be taken against an officer in respect of his judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It rejected the contention following the decision of this court in Union of India v. A. N. Saxena [1992] 3 SCC 124. While rejecting the said contention the Bench drew particular attention to the following observations in A. N. Saxena's case [1992] 3 SCC 124, 127 : "In the first place, we cannot but confess our astonishment at the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. In a case like ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uced at the inquiry. In short, the Tribunal undertook the inquiry which ought to be held by the disciplinary authority (or the inquiry officer appointed by him) and found that the charges are not true. It may be recalled that the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the principles, norms and the constraints which apply to the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal. If the original application of the respondent were to be filed in the High Court it would have been termed, properly speaking, as a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition is issued only when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. It is true that a High Court acting under article 226 is not bound by the technical rules applying to the issuance of prerogative writs like certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the United Kingdom, yet the basic principles and norms applying to the said writs must be kept in view, as observed by this court in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440. It was observed by Mukherjea J., speaking for the Constitution Bench (at page 443): "The language used in articles ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... thority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to the court or the Tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority, as the case may be. The function of the court/Tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath and Sons [1992] Supp 2 SCC 312. The Bench comprising M. N. Venkatachaliah J. (as he then was), and A. M. Ahmadi J., affirmed the principle thus (at page 317) : "Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after accordi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ut the evidence and material in support of the said charges. It is alleged that the conduct of the respondent 'shows an intention to confer undue and improper benefits on these assessees. He has thus displayed lack of integrity, lack of devotion to duty and conduct unbecoming of a Government servant...." The Tribunal observed in the first instance that in the articles. of charges, there is no reference to culpability of the respondent and that it is found only in the statement of imputations. This is not correct. The charges which we have set out hereinabove clearly allege the illegal and improper conduct on the part of the respondent. It was also alleged that he improperly and illegally acquiesced in the offer of the assessee to disclose a much smaller amount and that he failed to direct the Assessing Officer to bring to tax the full amount of the undisclosed income, which was admitted by the assessee during the survey. As a matter of fact, it was alleged, he issued a direction, contrary to law, to the Assessing Officer to complete the assessment of the concerns under section 143(1). Secondly, the Tribunal examined the truth of the charges with reference to the material and orde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which no doubt has been dismissed but that the Department is filing an application before the High Court under section 256(2). We do not know whether the said observations/findings of the Tribunal will ultimately be upheld or not. They are not yet final. In the circumstances, we are inclined to agree with learned counsel for the Revenue that the order of the Tribunal is clearly in excess of its jurisdiction. Sri R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent, referred us to certain material which according to him establishes the innocence and good faith of the respondent. We do not propose to refer to the said material or to comment upon it since any such comment is bound to prejudice the case of the parties before the disciplinary authority, which should now proceed expeditiously according to law. We must mention that Sri R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent, did not dispute the proposition that a disciplinary inquiry can be held even with respect to judicial/quasi-judicial orders passed by an officer. His main contention was that the charges are not sustainable, which contention, as we have indicated above, cannot be countenanced at this stage of the proceedings. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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